

JPRS-WER-86-004

14 January 1986

West Europe Report

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

14 January 1986

WEST EUROPE REPORT

CONTENTS

POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

- Egon Bahr Analyzes SPD Relationship With GDR's SED
(Egon Bahr; VORWAERTS, 28 Sep 85) 1

FINLAND

- Book Reviews 'Lines' of Presidents
(Matti Haikio; UUSI SUOMI, 4 Nov 85) 5
- Koivisto, Other 1988 Presidential Contenders Profiled
(Martti Haikio; UUSI SUOMI, 2 Nov 85) 8
- Finns View U.S. Least, USSR Most Active in Peace Search
(Helsinki Domestic Service, 14 Dec 85) 12
- Swedes Briefed on Koivisto Period, Freedom of Speech
(Kyosti Karnoven; HELSINGIN SANOMAT, 25 Nov 85) 13
- Politicians Received Purchase Price Discounts
(Jouko Heikura; HELSINGIN SANOMAT, 19 Nov 85) 16
- Vayrynen Anticipated Fall of SDP Government
(HELSINGIN SANOMAT, 25 Nov 85) 19

FRANCE

- Marchais Discusses Anticipated PCF Election Plans
(L'HUMANITE, 18 Nov 85) 22
- Demographic Institute Responds to Dufoix Immigration Remarks
(LE FIGARO-MAGAZINE, 9 Nov 85) 24
- Dumont Comments 24
- Two Weeks of Exchanges 31

Foreign Situations Viewed	34
Raspail Commentary	39
Further Demographic Institute Remarks, by Henri Amouroux	40
Griotteray Comments	43
Commentary by Pierre Chaunu	45
Marchais, PCF, Soviet Ties Examined Through Fabien Book (Serge Maury; L'EVENEMENT DU JEUDI, 12-18 Sep 85)	48
GREECE	
Political Moves by Former Minister Arsenis Reported (I VRADYNI, 2 Nov 85; ETHNOS, 5 Nov 85)	62
Possible Kyrkos-Arsenis Alliance	62
Arsenis Details Economic Program	63
Goals of Former Minister Arsenis Seen Unclear (Pandelis Kapsis; TA NEA, 10 Nov 85)	65
Sartzetakis' Difficulties: 'Style,' Not 'Substance' (M. Dimitriou; TO VIMA, 10 Nov 85)	67
ND's Mitsotakis Seen Increasingly 'Anti-Karamanlis' (ENA, 14 Nov 85)	70
Briefs	
Ambassador Andropov's Absence Puzzling	72
ITALY	
PCI Plenum Debates Congress Theses Amendments (Antonio Caprarica, et al.; L'UNITA, 9 Dec 85)	73
PORTUGAL	
Pintasilgo Comments on Presidential Candidacy (Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo Interview; EL PAIS, 25 Nov 85)	82
Salgado Zenha on Presidential Candidacy (Francisco Salgado Zenha Interview; DIARIO DE NOTICIAS, 2 Dec 85)	84
Distinct Tendencies Seen Within Left (Jose Miguel Judice; SEMANARIO, 1 Nov 85)	88
Poll on Popular Concerns: Employment Desired (SEMANARIO, 1 Nov 85)	91
SPAIN	
Poll Reflects Stability on Major Issues, Personalities (ACTUALIDAD ECONOMICA, 7 Oct 85)	96

Poll Indicates PSOE Unlikely To Achieve Absolute Majority (TIEMPO, 14 Oct 85)	109
--	-----

SWEDEN

SIFO Poll Views Liberals' Gain, Comparisons (SVENSKA DAGBLADET, 3 Nov 85)	113
Poll Results, by Willy Silberstein	113
Editorial Comment	117
Polling Techniques Examined, Hans Zetterberg Interview	119
Paper Perceives USSR 'Superpower Arrogance' Toward Sweden (Editorial; SVENSKA DAGBLADET, 14 Dec 85)	124

TURKEY

Talks With U.S. on New Bases Accord Postponed (CUMHURIYET, 27 Nov 85)	126
Denktas Scores Planned Talks on EEC-Cyprus Customs Union (CUMHURIYET, 27 Nov 85)	128

MILITARY

GREECE

'Real' Purpose of U.S., Turkish Aegean Violations (Stratos Kalogeropoulos; ETHNOS TIS KYRIAKIS, 27 Oct 85)	129
PASOK's 'Magic Formula' for Maintaining U.S. Bases (ENA, 7 Nov 85)	132
Briefs	
French Missile Purchase Meetings	134

ITALY

Defense Chief of Staff on Reorganization of Armed Forces (INTERARMA NEWS, 10 Jul 85)	135
General Bartolucci's Address	135
Military Observer Comments	140

NETHERLANDS

Need for Increase in Conventional Arms Questioned (G. van Benthem van den Bergh; NRC HANDELSBLAD, 9 Nov 85)	148
--	-----

ECONOMIC

DENMARK

Government Proposes Adjustments To Decrease Deficit (BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 5, 6 Dec 85)	151
Schluter Defends Government Intervention, by Helle Ravn Larsen	151
Economists Criticize Income Policy, by Hugo Garden	152

ENERGY

GREECE

Plans Reportedly Drawn for Nuclear Power Plants (Andonis Zisimatos; MESIMVRINI, 4 Nov 85)	155
--	-----

POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

EGON BAHR ANALYZES SPD RELATIONSHIP WITH GDR'S SED

Bonn VORWAERTS in German 28 Sep 85 p 3

[Analysis by Egon Bahr: "Chances For A New Phase In German-German Relations. Taking Advantage Of The Opportunities"]

[Text] The first exchange of views between Willy Brandt and Erich Honecker has resulted in the two men finding a platform that, regardless of the burdens of the past, is geared completely toward moving ahead with future cooperation. The resulting possibilities are of interest for the relationship between the two German nations and on a broader scale.

It became clear during the exchange that formalization of relations between the SPD and SED is out of the question. The SPD has no need to a decision on the present situation. Of course, this does not impede exploratory contacts that have already been established.

The basic conceptual differences between the two parties have not changed. Neither side has held back its views. This also applies to our assessment of the forced merging of SPD and KPD, which will be 40 years ago this spring; there is nothing to be corrected. But the ideological differences must not obstruct the possible avenues for increasing cooperation on a German level as well as an international level if ensuring peace is involved.

In this area, the visit produced two discernible results that may have significant effects in the future.

First, Erich Honecker has adopted as his own the thoughts concerning common security via a security partnership. The similarity and, in part, identity of his ideas with those of Willy Brandt were astonishing. The reality of the matter is that we either live together or perish together. Nobody can get around this elementary fact, even if it is disputed verbally.

The SPD has campaigned for the concept of the security partnership. Just because the idea should receive support in the East is no reason for us to run away from it. A "community of responsibility" is a nice phrase for it. It would be an empty phrase if not followed up by practical action.

The second import result concerns the practical relationship between the two nations. In this regard, Willy Brandt has formulated an open-ended

phase of mutual activity to be embarked upon after the essentials of living side-by-side have been defined by means of the basic treaty.

More important than the fruitless argument over nation and unity (as it is, nothing more can be achieved with respect to convictions and differences in views than has already been established in the preamble of the basic treaty) is how far the common interest of the two states in security extends. There is no room for naivety here: The two alliance systems do exist. They will be around for a long time. Both nations are bound to them. No one can nor wants to break away. But there is a chance for Germans--a chance to develop joint initiatives which each side will discuss in his respective alliance in order to gain the indispensable participation of his friends in the common interest of European stability.

We should be glad--after all we are all neighbors--that there is no German-German dispute to put an additional strain on East-West relations. It would be a blessing if the joint efforts of the two nations not only improved East-West relations but made peace in Europe more secure as well.

Whoever fails to avail himself of the opportunities here assumes a serious responsibility. Who knows how long these opportunities will last? The favorable situation can also change. If this happened, lamenting over lost chances could be a bitter truth. This does not suit the Union parties. But the earlier policies that led to the basic treaty did not suit them either. The basic treaty could not be reached today. The current Federal Government profits from what the Union parties were fighting at that time. This could be repeated in the area of security.

Where security is concerned, parties can only fill in the gaps left by governments. This holds true for a zone free of chemical weapons. The Federal Government simply will not escape a decision of having to respond to the governments in East Berlin and Prague have given Bonn the alternative of accepting or rejecting the model worked out by a work group made up of the SPF parliamentary party and the SED.

In this case, it is a question of a negotiations proposal, not a signature. The Federal Government would be well advised to take advantage of the progress made at the work level. The Government is at liberty to improve upon this and would then stand to be congratulated. But the responsibility no longer lies with the parties. It lies where it belongs in the relationship between the two governments: with the governments themselves.

The governments cannot escape this responsibility, not even the Federal Government. If it refuses to accept it, a Federal Government led by the SPF would clearly use the model to its advantage.

Thus, the Federal Government should not overlook the fact that the idea of a zone free of chemical weapons is also finding increasing support in the West. This was demonstrated this past week-end in Brussels by all Social Democrat and Socialist parties of the Scandilux group: Norwegians

and Danes, Dutch, Luxembourgers and the two Belgian parties. They welcome the initiative for a zone free of chemical weapons even if they have no such weapons on their soil, because the removal of these weapons from Central Europe would also mean increased security for their countries. The last word has not been spoken on this matter.

The talks regarding a corridor free of nuclear weapons, as proposed by the Palme Commission, will begin at the same work level in November. Nothing can be said with regard to the prospects for success because the topic is far more difficult and complex. This area is also one in which the governments have so far left a gap. There are still no negotiations at any level regarding strategic nuclear weapons, although these represent the most immediate danger--and not just for Central Europe--in the event of a conflict. No amount of grumbling by the representatives of the Union parties will stop us from carrying out our responsibility of trying to do what we hold for proper and necessary.

Willy Brandt's visit has also revealed that there is a far-reaching consensus between the Federal Government and the Opposition with regard to all current problems and negotiations between the two nations.

Cultural agreements, environmental agreements, expanded youth exchange, more visits--these and more constitute a common matter of concern. The competition to see who achieves the most in this area will do nothing but benefit people. It is equally important that the coalition and opposition work toward the same end.

The Federal Government has reason to be indebted to Willy Brandt. The fact that his interpretative depictions of the humanitarian improvements, offered during the press conference following the talks, were printed in their entirety in the GDR newspapers is an additional confirmation. The Federal Government will certainly use this to its advantage. It must take measures to ensure that Erich Honecker's anticipated visit to the FRG is hampered this time not by Mr. Dregger, but by others.

Our understanding that the People's Chamber does not have the same powers as the lower house of the FRG Parliament is not new, but it has not prevented the delegation from the lower house from recognizing the delegation from the People's Chamber in the framework of the Interparliamentary Union nor from meeting in the People's Chamber.

Also, I cannot discern any differences in quality between the Supreme Soviet, the (Sejm) and the People's Chamber as far as the elections are concerned that produced these and other parliaments, with which the lower house has no problems. It is one of the last relics from the Hallstein era, which has meanwhile become ridiculous, to pose the question of the legitimization of the second man in the GDR while seeing no problems with the top man.

These comical scuffles of the Union parties as to whether there is not at least one niche in which the 1950s can be recreated will only damage the

Union, and perhaps the Federal Government, if Honecker's visit should fall through because of them.

On another level, the Federal Government must be careful. By considering participation in SDI, the Government could easily fall into a situation similar to the one that developed after missiles began to be stationed. At that time, it created the policy of loss limitation. That cannot be accomplished with money this time.

Owing to the basic treaty, owing to the expansion options introduced by Helmut Schmidt at Lake (Werbelin), and owing to the policy of continuity that the Federal Government has pursued, relations between the two German nations have remained undamaged by the deteriorations in the East-West situation. The fact that also the GDR was able and wanted to participate should not be overlooked. In this respect, all those involved have reason to be satisfied.

A new phase may be on the horizon, either less than before, further than before or more than before. The opportunities that Willy Brandt has made evident mean only one thing for us: more than before. It is up to the Federal Government to see that the opposite does not come true.

12399/9190
CSO: 3620/55

POLITICAL

FINLAND

BOOK REVIEWS 'LINES' OF PRESIDENTS

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 4 Nov 85 p 15

[Review by Matti Haikio of book "Suomen presidentit valtiollisina johtajina K.J. Stahlbergista Mauno Koivistoon" [Finland's Presidents as Political Leaders from K.J. Stahlberg to Mauno Koivisto] by Jaakko Nousiainen; Werner Soderstrom, Inc., 304 pages]

[Text] This study by Professor Jaakko Nousiainen, author of our country's basic political-science textbook "Suomen poliittinen järjestelmä" [Finland's Political System], will disappoint those who are looking for a fresh or even an analytical interpretation of Mauno Koivisto's presidency. Nousiainen's appraisal is summed up in the statement:

"After the expansionary era of Kekkonen, the presidency has been retreating to the early positions of Paasikivi, but hardly much further back."

Nousiainen seeks a solution to the Koivisto enigma by asserting that the 1982 election represented a general period of transition for the West in which the old authoritarian structures gave way to a new style of participatory culture. This created expectations for a popular-leader president.

"In place of a distant authority, people are looking for a popular leader with an intimate awareness of social issues, and in place of a respected, external power figure, they seek a warm human being who is thought to have methods of procedure, interpretations of reality, and world views close to theirs."

Nousiainen claims, however, that the "full-scale exploitation of the suggested civic relationship to develop personal and charismatic control was alien to Koivisto's personality."

Koivisto has, accordingly, returned to the "traditional and constitutional exercise of power."

Kekkonen's "Enormous Power Potential"

Nousiainen's work is a depiction--one which gets its start from political-science theories--of Finland's presidents and prime ministers as persons who actually wield power, modify the Finnish constitution, and fulfill leadership standards.

Kekkonen's extraordinary use of power is emphasized in a historical perspective, and Nousiainen, a notoriously cautious man, is compelled to resort to qualifying statements such as "during the culmination period [there was] an enormous power potential which opened the door to dictates and familiarity with which influenced other functionaries."

Nousiainen nicely describes Kekkonen's personal network--untransferable to his successor--of contacts and power arrangements. Serving as a good example is the fate of the 1969 election law when Kekkonen went over the head of the prime minister, Koivisto, and took personal responsibility for burial of the project.

Before Kekkonen, presidential power formed a very fixed framework.

Nousiainen sees Paasikivi mostly as a clever political tactician who could get his wishes fulfilled even under difficult conditions. Ryti, on the other hand, was by force of circumstance the founder of foreign-policy leadership in the modern sense.

Relander Had "Concept Lines"

In Kallio's unfinished presidential term Nousiainen has found "scarcely a single instance in which the president took significant initiatives, forcefully saw his wishes carried out, or purposefully disentangled the internal conflicts of the government front."

On the other hand, Svinhufvud was an overseer who enjoyed broad support and who was above everyday politics. The culmination period of Svinhufvud's power actually occurred at the end of Relander's presidential term when "on his own authority and as the popular leader which the situation demanded, he took the reins into his own hands."

According to Nousiainen, Relander's "busy" presidency was the activity of an arbitrator and compromiser more than an actual leader. Striking is the perception that in the field of foreign policy Relander "had concept lines...but they did not acquire the concrete and stable form of a program of foreign-policy action for the government."

Nousiainen deals most thoroughly with Kekkonen and with K.J. Stahlberg, creator of the presidency. The latter was a man "who knew what he wanted," and he did not want to use all the presidential prerogatives of power. Stahlberg stressed a strong Parliament, but the "result was continuous changeability of leadership, balanced government policy, uncertainty, and a power struggle."

Prime Minister

The account of the development of the posts of president and prime minister turns out to be the most interesting of many topics. After all, formally and according to the Finnish constitution, the prime minister has no more than the role of technical chairman. On the other hand, strong prime ministers from Svinhufvud to Paasikivi and from Kekkonen to Sorsa are known who have sought solutions to political problems with the approval--or at least without the hindrance--of a president who remained in the background.

Nousiainen also thoroughly describes the circumstances in which the government form was born and the monarchist roots of the semipresidential system which was introduced into Finland. Although Nousiainen strives to make his presentation vivid and in places succeeds, a lot could have been done to improve the readability of the work. There are generally only two paragraphs per page, and there are not many subheads. There are no pictures or list of sources, though there are references to sources used and an index of persons.

As a political-science survey, Nousiainen's work supplements the juridical picture of Finnish presidents by Antero Jyranki and the more incident-centered portrait by historians, most recently Sakari Virkkunen. Nousiainen does not offer a strong personal interpretation but is content to explain that of others. The book will undoubtedly be used by our country's political-science students and enthusiasts for many editions to come.

12327

CSO: 3617/33

POLITICAL

FINLAND

KOIVISTO, OTHER 1988 PRESIDENTIAL CONTENDERS PROFILED

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 2 Nov 85 p 18

[Article by Martti Haikio: "Mauno Koivisto and His Challengers"]

[Text] In what sort of setting will Finland's 1988 presidential election take place? What are the different parties doing, and what kind of men are expected to challenge Mauno Koivisto?

Dr Martti Haikio, a special editor for UUSI SUOMI, discusses these questions in his article. The text is an excerpt from Haikio's soon-to-be-published book "Puolueeton Suomi puolueellisessa maailmassa" [Neutral Finland in an Unneutral World].

The political parties' influence on foreign policy is at its greatest when the president of the republic is being chosen. The nomination of candidates has practically been the exclusive right of parties during the entire period of independence. The great majority of elector candidates are persons who have participated in municipal and parliamentary elections on the parties' lists. Just as in other elections, managing and financing the presidential election campaigns are the responsibility of political parties.

Becoming the presidential candidate of a major party is the biggest obstacle in a politician's path to the presidency. The nomination of party candidates has been crucially significant, particularly in elections of recent decades. Once he becomes a candidate, the person in question can conduct a more or less independent campaign for election. In the presidential election campaigns of both Matti Virkkunen and Mauno Koivisto, there were a great many features independent of their own parties.

1982 Election Was Exception

In normal circumstances, no Finnish party comes close to having a simple majority. Even the two largest parties together do not command more than 50 percent support. The backing of three major parties is ordinarily needed to achieve a simple majority. In this regard, the election of Mauno Koivisto in 1982 formed an exception: in addition to his own Social Democratic electoral alliance, only the SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] was needed to assure a majority

and an election victory on the first ballot. But this election took place in exceptional circumstances: what it boiled down to, after all, was the premature interruption of a longtime president's term of office due to illness.

The 1988 election will be different in several respects from the last presidential election. No longer will the battle be fought for Kekkonen's successor, nor will the Kekkonen legacy be discussed. No longer will power politics be dominated by the network of personal relationships fostered and maintained by Kekkonen. The biggest difference is that the main issue in the coming election will no longer be Kekkonen but Koivisto. People will ask whether Koivisto has been a successful president, whether he wants to pursue a second term of office, whether he has managed to preserve his personal popularity to such a degree that it enables him to bypass party advantages, whether he has a realistic chance to obtain the support of at least three major parties, and who his rival candidates will be.

An incumbent president does not generally like an election campaign. Its early beginning can strip him of the prestige and homefield advantage offered by the presidency, which is, of course, the most important trump card in the election itself.

Then again, from the challengers' point of view, a long election campaign is the only way to gather enough strength and credibility to topple an incumbent president.

Nowhere has Koivisto announced whether he could imagine a second term as president. It is useless to expect him to declare his eagerness for such until enough support emerges to conduct a successful campaign. It would be a major sensation if he did not announce his candidacy and if the Social Democratic Party did not back him from the outset. If Koivisto himself refused to continue, the party's candidate would most obviously be Kalevi Sorsa.

Koivisto and Karjalainen

It is likely that the SKDL will support Koivisto this time, too. It could have as a nominal candidate--the way it did last time--former SKDL chairman Kalevi Kivisto, who was appointed district governor by Koivisto.

The communists' choice could be rendered more difficult, however, by the desire of the so-called minority to support an individual which it finds more unmistakably pro-Soviet than Koivisto. The only suitable candidate may be Dr Ahti Karjalainen, who sought to be the Center Party's presidential candidate in the last election with the explicit help of his connections to the Soviet Union.

If Karjalainen was the minority's candidate, it would cause a crosscurrent in both the SKDL and the Center Party, but the transfer of votes would scarcely be noticeable.

Vayrynen Looks to Future

The Center Party has a very difficult choice before it with regard to nominating a candidate. It is quite unlikely that Johannes Virolainen, who has crushed the party leadership with his personality, or some other elder statesman of the Kekkonen era would be chosen as the party's candidate.

The real struggle in selecting a candidate may take place between Koivisto and Chairman Paavo Vayrynen.

The party and especially its chairman, Paavo Vayrynen, can assume that Vayrynen's candidacy in the 1988 election would lay a foundation for subsequent elections and would increase Vayrynen's credibility as a politician of presidential timber. On the other hand, Koivisto's support at this stage could assure the party a seat in the government for a long time to come.

The Conservative Party has three basic alternatives. It can go into the election with its own candidate, as happened last time, it can back a common nonsocialist candidate, or it can come out in favor of Koivisto's reelection.

Supporting Koivisto is hardly thinkable, because the Conservative Party's hopes of entering the government by backing an incumbent president have been thoroughly crushed. In addition, Koivisto's willingness and ability to influence the formation of governments in Finland can be somewhat limited.

Specifically in this regard, Koivisto's notion of bolstering Parliament's capacity to function--or reducing the power of the presidency--has come up on several occasions.

Taxell on the Rise

Swedish People's Party candidate Jan-Magnus Jansson sought the burdensome role of common candidate for the nonsocialist parties in the last election. Besides Jansson, the Swedish People's Party cannot offer a candidate of its own with longtime experience. Christoffer Taxell's continuation as minister increases his chances of overtaking former chairman Par Stenback and becoming the party's candidate but hardly a force for unifying the nonsocialist parties at the presidential level.

The Finnish Rural Party backed Koivisto in the last election, as did the Constitutional Right Party, but both parties were virtually insignificant in the election itself.

Conservative Party Has Several Alternatives

The Conservative Party's most natural choice for its candidate would be Harri Holkeri, who did quite well in the last election, party chairman Ilkka Suominen, parliamentary speaker Erkki Pystynen, or Helsinki mayor Raimo Ilaskivi. The party has also traditionally taken a look at broadly nonsocialist and sufficiently dynamic individuals who are close to the party. Such a person could be National Bank president Jaakko Lassila, for example, or Attorney General Kai Korte. Since a broad nonsocialist front will hardly develop behind the Center Party, it is very likely that the Conservative Party will come up with its own candidate.

Leadership in Foreign Policy

But does anyone have a chance of defeating Koivisto? That depends first on Koivisto's statecraft and secondly on the alternative offered to it. Leadership

in foreign policy will clearly be one issue in the next presidential election. Under Koivisto, the office of president has lost its credibility as a center of leadership in foreign policy. To be sure, this is not necessarily disastrous for Koivisto or for Finland. There are examples of Finnish presidents who did an excellent job--as father of the country--of uniting the people, even though they did not direct foreign or domestic policy at all.

Red Ocher Tradition

A second, perhaps more significant topic of the presidential election may be connected with the policy followed for forming governments. The popular front or red ocher [read: pro-Soviet] model followed with minor exceptions in Finland since the end of the 1930s ceased--in terms of both its support and its political meaning--to respond to Finnish society's range of viewpoints and demands for reform as early as the start of the 1970s. With respect to the policy followed for forming governments, the Koivisto presidency has been increasingly synonymous with retrospection, imprisonment in the past, and burial of future opportunities under the long-established policy of handing out jobs to members of the Center and Social Democratic parties.

If, in the next election, a rival of Koivisto can give Finns the feeling of vigorous leadership in foreign policy and get them to look toward the future and if he can demonstrate dynamic and innovative alternatives for domestic policy, he will have a good, even an excellent chance to be elected. Mauno Koivisto has honorably managed the smooth and sensitive transition from the Kekkonen era to the present day. But he has been unable to provide Finland and the Finns with a vision of the future and with hope for an even better Finland.

12327

CS0: 3617/33

POLITICAL

FINLAND

FINNS VIEW U.S. LEAST, USSR MOST ACTIVE IN PEACE SEARCH

LD161616 Helsinki Domestic Service in Finnish 1030 GMT 14 Dec 85

[Text] According to the latest opinion poll, Finns believe that the United States is the state posing the greatest threat to world peace. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, is seen as the state that most actively promotes world peace. This is clear from an opinion poll published today by ETELAE-SUOMEN SANOMAT.

Those interviewed, who supported the left, saw the Soviet Union as a stabilizing factor for world peace.

According to the Center Party and Coalition Party supporters, the Soviet Union and the United States are equally active in their actions for peace.

As far as culture is concerned, France came first, and, in the view of Finns, the United States was viewed as the poorest country in those terms. Sweden was seen as the most democratic of the six countries included in the poll. Some 500 Finns responded to the opinion poll conducted by the Market Data Center Ltd. in October-November.

/9365

CSO: 3617/50

POLITICAL

FINLAND

SWEDES BRIEFED ON KOIVISTO PERIOD, FREEDOM OF SPEECH

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 25 Nov 85 p 9

[Article by Kyosti Karnoven: "Great Discussion About Climate of Opinion"]

[Text] Expectation is in the air at the Hanasaari cultural center on a Wednesday morning. A significant group of Finnish opinion makers have gathered to instruct Swedish opinion makers about the Finnish climate of opinion.

Whom do we see at the site? At least Ralf Friberg, Stig Hasto, Bo Stenstrom, Klaus Tornudd, Kari Nars, Matti Klinge and Johannes Salminen. A discussion about the first half of the Koivisto era can begin, bara pa Svenska (only in Swedish).

Well, Osmo Apunen is present. But where are Max Jacobson, and Jan-Magnus Jansson? The relief is great when at least Jansson appears for the afternoon.

The topic chosen for the afternoon is Finnish free om of speech. And whom do we see now as panel discussants? Per-Erik Lonnfors, Christoffer Taxell, Carl-Gustaf Lilius, Henrik Gronqvist and Leif Salmen. However, present on the site are at least Sakari Kiuru and Jouko Tyyri. But where are the women panelists and the large masses of the Finnish Finns as discussants.

Lilius Gets Nervous

The sculptor Lilius becomes nervous in the afternoon over the choice of panelists. He asks whether only men are able to discuss freedom of speech. He also sees a difference in whether one speaks of freedom of speech in Finnish or in Swedish -- his writings offered to the Finnish language papers had not been published. According to Lilius, dicussion about Finland in Swedish is more lively than in Finnish.

The discussion about the Koivisto period is started by Apunen, followed by Professor Toijala.

Apunen does not believe that we can speak of a Koivisto era. According to him it is too optimistic to say that we are yet half way through the Koivisto era; according to such a count Kekkonen's half-way mark would have been in 1959.

Mining counselor Hasto, considers Koivisto's most "speculative" act thus far to have been his acceding to be chosen for the presidency. He would also rather speak of Koivisto's period of activity rather than his era. He considers the Finnish political-commercial situation to be the result of the work of his predecessors.

Hasto had to answer the question why industry backed Ahti Karjalainen for the presidency in 1981. Hasto's standard reply is that no names had been mentioned in taking the stand and that the counselors had emphasized only continuity and the significance of trade politics as well as loyalty to party ties.

Manager Nars amused the seminar participants by telling a joke about what Koivisto had said in Uppsala.

Professor Klinge estimated that from the point of view of a historian the Finns have had it too good since they no longer have any external enemies and the economy grinds out high percentages.

Doctor Salminen sees the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line as having crystallized to where self-interests have become paramount. For this he uses as an example Matti Pulkkinen's new book, which hardly pats Finland on the back for its share in aiding developing countries. He has also noted that in Leningrad the toilets don't work any better than the ideology.

No Help From the Little Blue Book

Chief Editor Stenstrom, the conductor of the famous "lemming interview" accuses the press of "gyppo-journalism." According to him the Koivisto era is now undergoing a pause between the prologue and the first act, to which one cannot find counsel even from Kekkonen's "little blue" or Tamminiemi book.

The greetings of the foreign ministry are conveyed to the Swedes by the Assistant Secretary of State, Tornudd, who warns against comparing Koivisto's three years to Kekkonen's 25. We have not had nighttime frosts, note crises nor the need for notable acts.

Tornudd rejects, without question, the contention that Finland is leaning toward the West in going for full membership in EFTA, for membership in ESA and becoming a participant in EUREKA. These enterprises just happen to be timely at the same time. Joining the European council, however, does not fit into the same time period.

According to Tornudd refugee politics involve more than just receiving refugees and besides, Finland doesn't really have the opportunity to receive refugees. First we had to take care of the resettling of the Karelians and also the emigration wave to Sweden caused problems... He promises, however, that the annual quota could even rise from the agreed-upon 100 refugees.

At the beginning of the afternoon the Chairman of the Public Word Council, Gronqvist, compares the legislation on the freedom of press between Finland and Sweden.

On his own behalf editor Salmen labels the morning discussion as typical of the Finnish level. He charges that the parties in power have intentionally left the new communication media at the mercy of market forces and economic interests.

Who Won the Civil War

The writer Tyyri argues that the world's best behaved opposition is to be found in Finland and that the true winner of the Civil War was the peasant.

The Chief Director of the State Radio, Kiuru, will not say directly whether the government has political purposes in delaying the decision to raise the Radio's appropriation. He does, however, support Salmen, who sees a clear connection between the delay and the dissatisfaction of top politicians with the State Radio.

Attorney General Taxell reasons that the new communication media will hardly add to the freedom of speech, but that their prohibition would restrict it. He considers decisionmakers and journalists to be the same kind of surface skimmers.

During the final phase the Swedish guests also woke up. One of them asked who was really behind the mysterious pseudonym "Yuriy Komissarov." After a long period of dribbling Lilius is persuaded to say that he is the ministerial Counselor Yuriy Deryabin of the Soviet Union's foreign ministry.

The clock has already passed the 16th hour. It is time to leave for cocktails at the Swedish embassy. Even the Swedish guest who had slept the whole day in the back row wakes up.

The Finnish climate of opinion today is a fascinating subject. Would the Swedes have something to learn from it?

12989/12951
CSO: 3617/34

POLITICAL

FINLAND

POLITICIANS RECEIVED PURCHASE PRICE DISCOUNTS

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 19 Nov 85 p 12

[Article by Jouko Heikura: "Title Puts You Behind a Wheel of a Discount Car"]

[Text] The Scan-Auto company sells Saabs at a "considerable discount" to highly paid individuals who have socially significant positions. Scan-Auto has noticed that a minister sitting at the wheel of a Saab is the best advertisement for the trademark.

Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa and the Finance Minister Ahti Pekkala, who have bought discount cars that had been used as demonstrators, have thus become mannequins for the Saab company.

Ahti Pekkala, who is noted for his exceptional memory for figures, does not remember how much the discount was on the Saab he registered in March 1985. Prime Minister Sorsa announced through the mouth of his political secretary that he had no need to comment on the matter at all.

Manager Hugo Ahlberg admits that Scan-Auto gives the decisionmakers a discount on the cars precisely because of their social standing. "We consider it important that the governmental decisionmakers present an example and drive a domestic car," says Ahlberg.

The Saabs of Sorsa and Pekkala had been registered by the company for about four months for demonstration use before the ministers purchased them.

Many Desire But Few Receive

Scan-Auto sells about 25,000 cars altogether annually of which nearly 500 are demonstration models used for less than 6 months and thus registered under the firm's own name.

The new model, little used and advantageously sold demonstration cars are in demand and not nearly everyone who wants one can purchase one. The discounts of the demonstration cars vary according to the buyer and the model of the car; to ordinary citizens they are sold at about 10 percent discount compared to the original price.

"I myself would rather buy a car that has been used as a demonstrator rather than a completely unused one" says Ahlberg. "One can get a demonstration car for considerably less than a new one. And although many have driven it, it has been cared for like a flower."

The demonstration cars have been driven during their 4 to 6 months use period "only a few thousand kilometers" according to manager Ahlberg. All possible "new car problems" have been noticed in the little used demonstration car and fixed; also the stiffness caused by newness has disappeared.

Ahlberg admits that Scan-Auto has contacted many decisionmakers and offered them cars at a discount for advertising and marketing purposes. "Discounts are a natural part of the automobile business" Ahlberg instructs us. He admits that each customer has his own value -- and the discount varies accordingly. "If a minister drives a Saab it is good advertising for the trademark."

Half the Government Drives a Saab

Of the 17 ministers in the government, altogether 9 prefer the domestic Saabs in civilian use as well. It is not known whether Saab has favored other ministers, in addition to Sorsa and Pekkala, because the auto registration center of the transportation ministry does not give information on the former registrants of the ministers' cars.

The name file of the auto registration center turned secret during the investigation; only the previous registrants of Sorsa's and Pekkala's Saabs had been revealed as Scan-Auto, when it was discovered that the card file was "for own use only." The auto registration center's card file would also reveal the previous registrants of the other ministers' Saabs. And pre-registration by Scan-Auto would tell of considerable discounts.

Cars bought new are always registered directly in the name of the purchaser.

Pekkala's Sedan and Sorsa's Multi Coupe

According to information from the auto registration center Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa registered a 5-door Saab Multi Coupe 900 GLS in his name on 9 September, 1982. Scan-Auto had registered the name Saab for its use on 12 May, 1982. The car's price then would have been 85.000 markkas new. Minister Ahti Pekkala registered a 4-door Saab Sedan 900 in his name on 8 March, 1985. Scan-Auto had registered the car for its use a good 4 months earlier on 25 October, 1984. The car would then have cost 104.800 markkas new.

Pekkala's previous car was also a Saab.

Minister Pekkala confirms annoyed that yes he has acquired for himself a "Saappi-car" but wonders whether it could be a very important question from the viewpoint of state finances. "Nowadays, it's difficult to get by without a car," says Pekkala.

According to Pekkala the discount Saab had been driven before the deal "perhaps over 10,000 kilometers."

"Do you think Scan-Auto intended to influence your activities by offering you a car at a considerable discount, minister Pekkala?"

"I don't believe they had any intention of influencing me. And they did not offer it; a deal always starts from the fact, that the buyer asks around and reaches the conclusion that the time has come to change cars."

"Do you believe, that the discount was given to you because of your position?"

"I don't believe that. One argues over the price and the deal is made. I believe everyone gets this kind of discount from them," Pekkala surmises, but does not reveal the amount of the discount.

The cabinet ministers now have their use, along with chauffeurs, 16 cars, 10 of which are Saabs, 3 Volvos, 2 Chryslers and 1 Mercedes-Benz. The acquisition prices of the cars do not vary a lot, because the state can buy all its cars tax-free.

This year the state has about 50 million markkas for buying cars. According to the guidelines prepared by the state finance ministry for the purchase of automobiles intended for state use the recommendations for 5-person cars include Ladas, Talbotts and Saabs. For the representatives' cars Volvos and Saabs are recommended. The state purchase directions are usually adhered to scrupulously.

At present, of the cars owned by the state, 1545 are Ladas, 1312 are Saabs and 302 are Volvos.

Even a Functionary Received a Discount Car

In addition to the ministers at least one functionary has been sold a discount Saab. The technical office chief of the Interior Ministry's police department, Jorma Nykanen, had been able to buy 5-door Saab 900 Turbo Multi Coupe, that had been in demonstration use, from Scan-Auto in June of 1980. The price of a new Turbo then would have been 112,000 markkas.

The police department's technical office, which Nykanen leads, answers, among other things for the automotive needs of the police. Chief Nykanen does not tell how much he paid for the car. Neither is Nykanen sure whether Scan-Auto offered the Saab to him, or whether he inquired about it himself.

Nykanen is of the opinion, that the discount he received could not have in any way influenced the fact that nearly all Finnish police drive Saabs with blue lights flashing on their roofs.

12989/12951
CSO: 3617/34

POLITICAL

FINLAND

VAYRYNEN ANTICIPATED FALL OF SDP GOVERNMENT

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 25 Nov 85 p 7

[Article: "Vayrynen Suspected the Dissolution of the Government"]

[Text] The leadership of the Center Party suspected a few weeks ago that the Social Democrats were attempting to wreck governmental cooperation efforts, trying to dissolve the government. So explained the Center Party chairman, Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen at the meeting of political commentators on Monday concerning the rumours about the threat of government break-up and the forthcoming elections for dissolution, that the representatives of the Center Party had spread so assiduously recently.

Vayrynen based his evaluation of the governmental crisis on the fact that the state's constitutional amendment--change in the way the president is elected--and the law about municipal pension payments did not advance in the parliament in the fashion proposed by the government.

"The chairman of the Finnish Social Democratic Party (SDP) spoke of the constitutional amendment as if there were no government program at all," said Vayrynen.

Now the suspicions about the demise of the government have already been dispelled according to Vayrynen, since the constitutional amendment seems to be making headway in a satisfactory manner and "at least the assistant chairman of the SDP, Matti Ahde, has announced that the constitutional amendment will be implemented according to the agreement."

The Situation Has Clarified

The situation has clarified and the belief that governmental cooperation will continue until the normal parliamentary elections has strengthened, says Vayrynen.

Vayrynen did not want to explain just on what the rumours disseminated lately by the Center Party were based, that the dissolution of the government would also be followed by premature parliamentary elections, or that the President would dissolve the Parliament in the middle of the election period.

The power to dissolve the Parliament is one of the stronger ones that the President has and it was believed that Mauno Koivisto, who has been emphasizing the power of the Parliament, would not resort to it as a first measure. The normal parliamentary elections will be held in a little more than a year, in March, 1987.

Leaders and functionaries of the Center Party have hinted at the possibility of governmental crisis often enough that also the Center Party was suspected of trying to break up the government. Vayrynen denied such conjectures by assuring that "We have always had the strong wish: Present government until the elections."

A couple of weeks ago in his All Saints' Day speech Vayrynen threatened that the Center Party would be forced to "throw a monkey wrench" in the way of governmental cooperation, unless the SDP would get its ranks in order.

On Monday Vayrynen said that "at the time of the speech I held it possible that the government situation would lead to a crisis."

The leader of the Center Party says that he believes now that the trust in governmental cooperation has grown we would also get through the winter's income decision. From the SDP's fateful question about the rules of the game for the labor market, the government could extricate itself with the help of director Matti Pekkanen; Pekkanen will either bring about a negotiated settlement between the organizations or bring his own rule proposal to the government. The Center Party is, according to Vayrynen, ready to approve Pekkanen's contribution. The party trusts that Pekkanen will produce a sufficiently impartial and implementable proposal.

The Interest Legislation Does Not Threaten Government

During the Monday meeting Vayrynen sharply accused the Social Democrats of breaking last summer's capital city agreement, but that conflict over the interest legislation does not now seem to be threatening governmental stability. Center Party's ministerial group has seen that the matter cannot be made into a governmental issue.

According to Vayrynen the governmental parties broke the agreement, because it said nothing of the requirement of the day care and health center enterprises in the capital area to pay interest on the state aid received. The government, however, decided to propose by vote that any aid, subsequently received, would be subject to a 7 percent interest.

Vayrynen remarked that no other municipalities charge interest on such special aid packages. In regard to the capital city there is no question of any supplementary funding system for which interest would be charged.

In the capital city decision or the budget proposal of the government there is no concept of supplementary funding, but the Social Democrats have used that term since the summer.

Vayrynen said that the Center Party will oppose the collection of interest also in the parliament. What the Center Party will do if it ends up in the minority during the parliamentary voting has not been decided.

In government, according to Vayrynen, the Center Party would have been ready for a 3 percent interest charge, if Vantaa's carrying capacity classification would have been simultaneously raised. But the government parties did not agree to such a deal.

State Radio Appropriation to be Raised

At the meeting of the political commentators Vayrynen presented his viewpoint that the appropriation for the State Radio should be raised sufficiently so that the production of domestic programs would be assured.

"In relating to the State Radio all parties should be able to separate themselves from shortsighted tactics. The securing of the State Radio's position is an important national question," Vayrynen said.

This message was intended for the Prime Minister, Kalevi Sorsa, who, a few weeks ago, stopped the raise on the appropriation.

12989/12951

CSO: 3617/34

POLITICAL

FRANCE

MARCHAIS DISCUSSES ANTICIPATED PCF ELECTION PLANS

PM261147 Paris L'HUMANITE in French 18 Nov 85 p 5

[Unattributed report: "Every Communist Vote Will Count"]

[Excerpts] [PCF Secretary General] Georges Marchais was the guest on the Radio-Luxembourg-LE MONDE "Grand Jury" program yesterday evening, and he started by answering a question suggesting that the PCF is playing into the Right's hands as the parliamentary elections approach. "Nobody can honestly think that the PCF is joining forces with the Right," he stressed, adding: "We are the Right's resolute adversaries."

The issue of this election, he pointed out, will be to "judge the policy pursued by the government, the National Assembly majority, and the President of the Republic."

With regard to the danger of the PCF's being pushed to the fringes in the framework of what one journalist called the Right-Left split, he replied: "People often say that the PCF regards the PS and the Right as the same thing: I challenge you to find a single document or a single party saying that." He explained that the communists want to defeat the Right and prevent its return to office. "But we do not want an alliance between the PS and the Right either."

In the next part of the program, Georges Marchais stressed the coherence of the 12-point proposals of which the PCF has just printed 8 million copies and which PCF members are going to make known as a priority. "Three essential ideas" are likely to lead people to vote communist "on the basis of their own experience." First, the need "to be well defended." And then the fact that the communists are alone in proposing a different policy, which would make it possible to revive the French economy to create jobs and have modern social protection.

Summing up his remarks, Georges Marchais said: "People vote communist to defend themselves, to support serious proposals, to prevent the Right from returning to power and entering into cooperation with the PS." It is for all these reasons that the only useful vote in 1986 with proportional representation is a communist vote. "I believe that the voter who supports all or part of our policy can be certain that his vote will count this time."

Georges Marchais was then questioned on the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting. With regard to relations between the PCF and the CPSU, he recalled that it had taken until 1980 for the CPSU to accept the notion of "differences of opinion." He stressed the "solidarity" which exists between the two parties, especially on the question of peace and disarmament, and recalled that there are differences of analysis and disagreements, like the one on democracy in building socialism--although, he noted, "progress has been made." He described Mikhail Gorbachev as a "very open man who, in my view, is well suited to the development requirements of contemporary Soviet society." I think, the PCF secretary general added, "that the changes which have come about in the USSR should enable that country to attain the ambitious objectives it has set itself for the future." Georges Marchais also stressed that Gorbachev is a man "who loves peace and practical results" on the disarmament question--a position which is, after all, "natural for a communist."

Finally, asked several questions about [PCF Central Committee member] Pierre Juquin, Georges Marchais said: "I do not believe that there is any Juquin affair." He expressed the view that his book was "way behind the progress made by the PCF" and regretted that it contained "obvious untruths." It was a "gift" to the PCF's enemies at a time when the party "is engaged in a difficult battle. I understand the discontent of some comrades," Georges Marchais added, and he concluded: The PCF is "strong enough to carry three dissenting comrades in the party leadership, including the Central Committee. They were elected by the congress...and they have been entrusted with tasks and responsibilities. I hope that they will work at them." There are no "sanctions," he said.

/8309

CSO: 3519/71

POLITICAL

FRANCE

DEMOGRAPHIC INSTITUTE RESPONDS TO DUFOIX IMMIGRATION REMARKS

Dumont Comments

Paris LE FIGARO-MAGAZINE in French 9 Nov 85 pp 109-112

[Text] This issue contains the following articles on the following subjects: Gerard-Francois Dumont refutes point by point the criticisms made by Minister Dufoix. "Two Weeks of Calumnies: What They Dared to Say and What We Said in Reply." "These Countries Have Already Become Aware of the Danger": the United States, by Veronique Grousset; Germany, by Marc Kunstle; Switzerland, by Gabriel Veraldi. "A Taboo Has Been Demolished," by Jean Raspail. "The Manufacturers of Amalgam," by Henri Amouroux, of the institute. "There Are Humane Solutions," by Alain Griotteray. "And If the Risks Were Even Greater," by Pierre Chaunu, of the Institute of Political Demography.

The truth is often disturbing. The publication of our inquiry into the immigration question has "scandalized" Georgina Dufoix [minister of social affairs] and "traumatized" the Socialist Government. We asked: "Will we still be French 30 years from now?" (see our issue published on 26 October). However, this study cannot be refuted, given the present fertility rate of French women (1.7 percent), compared to that of non-European women resident in France (4.69 percent). This also calls for a projection of the trend into the future and an evaluation of the consequent danger for our national identity if appropriate measures are not urgently taken to remedy this situation.

First of all, we wanted to alert public opinion to the problems arising from the demographic difference between the Third World and the West. (The thousands of letters received over the past 2 weeks prove that this initial objective has been attained.) These are problems which

threaten to face our civilization during the next century. Another purpose of our inquiry was to draw the attention of the government to the dangers which our ostrich-like policy in this area is creating for us.

In fact, we have begun a national debate. No doubt it is the most important for the future of our country. The government has attempted to transform this national debate into a squalid quarrel, not shrinking from using the most disgraceful procedures to discredit us, such as calumny. They have publicly denounced the 6 months' study carried out by Gerard-Francois Dumont. They have challenged the work of Alfred Sauvy, a world renowned demographer. They have raised the issues of apartheid, racism, and nazism. They have even gone so far as to make a comparison between our inquiry and the work of the sinister Doctor Mengele. And only 4 days after the publication of our inquiry Minister Dufoix published hastily-gathered statistics on the same subject.

Was all of that necessary to try to cover up the approval expressed by Prime Minister Fabius of the views expressed by Jacques Chirac on the subject during the televised debate of 27 October?

To govern is to choose, but it also involves foreseeing emerging problems. And as Alfred Sauvy has said so well, regarding demography and immigration, it is better "to look ahead than not to see at all." That was our only objective. In the following series of articles we reply to all of the attacks directed against us. The national debate is now open.

In her press conference statement of 30 October, extracts of which appear below, Minister Dufoix violently attacked our newspaper, which is accused in particular of "manipulation of the statistics." She also urged journalists not to pay any attention to the work of the Institute of Political Demography, whose president is Gerard-Francois Dumont. Here is his reply to her charges.

[Minister Dufoix] The preparation of correct forecasts implies care in the use of the basic facts and credibility in the use of assumptions.

[Dumont] The use of the word "forecasts" is nonsense. I made no forecasts in our inquiry but simply presented projections or, in other words, an outline of what could happen under certain assumptions.

It is a particularly gross error for a cabinet minister, who has a battalion of specialists available to her to compare a scientific presentation of projections to forecasts of the future such as those that fortune tellers like Madame Soleil might make.

The use by Minister Dufoix of the term "forecast" instead of "projection," which is always used for this kind of study, shows that the minister refuses to understand the scientific logic of the work I prepared, thereby implicitly recognizing its scientific value.

The basic facts are correct, contrary to the doubts expressed by Minister Dufoix. I will show this below.

The assumptions I have used are credible, and even too conservative if France follows inappropriate family and immigration policies.

[Minister Dufoix] The article does not make clear the statistical sources which were used to recount the situation in 1985.

[Dumont] I wish to confirm, as Jean Raspail writes in general terms below, that the population projections on which the inquiry was based used official figures from the census taken at the beginning of 1982 and not the census estimates of 1985. The 1985 estimates were used as a 30 year reference point for the projected situation in the year 2015.

[Minister Dufoix] The inquiry indicates that there are 51,400,000 French and 2,600,000 non-European foreigners. The census of 1982 contradicts these indications, showing that there were then 50,600,000 French and 3,700,000 foreigners, 1,950,000 of whom were non-European.

[Dumont] There is no contradiction between these figures, apart from the difference of 4 years between the beginning of 1982, when the census was taken, and the end of 1985, the date of the study.

The minister quite simply forgets that in 4 years the population can change.

[Minister Dufoix] From the beginning the presentation of the situation is erroneous, since the number of non-European foreigners mentioned in the article (or 2,600,000) is one-third higher than the reality (2,600,000, compared to 1,950,000).

[Dumont] Once again, Minister Dufoix confuses the situation at the beginning of 1982 with that at the end of 1985. In 4 years the figures changed, as explained above.

[Minister Dufoix] Regarding the young, non-European foreigners under 15 years of age, there is a difference between the data in the article and census data of nearly 40 percent.

[Dumont] Once again, Minister Dufoix is comparing the figures at the beginning of 1982 with those which I have calculated for the end of 1985. In 4 years, quite evidently, a lot of water has flowed under the bridges of the Seine.

[Minister Dufoix] The point of departure was clearly overstated, regarding the number of non-European foreigners.

[Dumont] The point of departure was not overstated because the projections were made on the basis of figures from the census of 1982. The data for 1985 was simply used for comparison with the projection for the year 2015.

[Minister Dufoix] It is totally out of the question that in 3 years the number of non-European foreigners could have increased more rapidly than in the course of the 2 previous intercensus periods, each of which covered 7 years.

[Dumont] From the beginning of 1982 to the end of 1985 is 4 years, not 3. The last census was held during the first quarter of 1982 and not at the end of the year.

The estimate of the number of non-European foreigners at 2.6 million in 1985 is, in reality, an underevaluation. Every Frenchman and every specialist knows in his heart that there are more than 2.6 million non-Europeans in France today.

In fact, the last census gave the figure of 1,950,000 non-European foreigners in France in March 1982.

Now, even in a developed country like France, the margin for under registration of persons included in the census is substantial.

This margin is estimated at between 600,000 and 1 million for the whole population, or the equivalent of the population of a city like Marseille.

The figure of 2.6 million at the end of 1985 results from the following adjustments to the figure of 1,950,000 at the beginning of 1982:

--300,000 births in 4 years, which for the non-Europeans is equivalent to an annual increase of about 33 percent;

--240,000 net immigrants in 4 years, particularly due to family reunification and requests for asylum;

--The mortality rate of non-European foreigners in France is low by reason of the youth of this population. Half of the non-European females were less than 20 years old, according to the census of 1982;

--Taking into account known under registration in the census of 1982, we made an adjustment of 5 percent. There is no doubt that this is less than the reality.

From this we obtained a reliable and very reasonable figure of 2,600,000 non-European foreigners as of the end of 1985.

That does not take into account the clandestine immigrants who cross our borders every day and who are therefore not included in the statistics, just as the black market economy does not appear in the statistics.

[Minister Dufoix] The supposed fertility indicator would change for each of the two groups involved [European and non-European].

[Dumont] I have never written that this indicator would change. I have set out various projections on the basis of various assumptions. To assist us in our consideration, Jean Raspail commented on one of the mathematical assumptions, which shows what could happen if France should adopt a Malthusian policy.

[Minister Dufoix] Using an assumption of 1.25 percent in 1992 corresponds to a real decline in the [European] birth rate. There is nothing on which to base this forecast.

[Dumont] If that were true, I would be happy to say so. However, that does not make such a decline totally impossible. The role of responsible political leaders is to consider the worst, for example in terms of defense, in order to take action to avoid the worst.

A decline in the fertility rate of French women from 1.7 to 1.25 children over a period of 7 years, or 0.45 percent, is quite foreseeable, unfortunately.

Perhaps this would already have occurred in the absence of reports and proposals for the life of the APRD, in particular with the assistance of Alfred Sauvy, Pierre Chaunu, and myself.

Those who consider this assumption dishonest remind me of those who, in 1974, stated that fertility in France was not going down or those who, at the same time, assured us that the decline in the marriage rate was a myth.

Let us recall that the fertility rate of German women declined by 0.75 children per woman in the 7 years between 1974 and 1981. Let us also recall that the fertility rate of Spanish women declined by 0.93 percent in the 7 years between 1976 and 1983.

It was to avoid such a decline that I proposed, at the end of the national conference of the APRD in Melun on 19 October, 25 concrete measures to be part of a family policy for the future.

[Minister Dufoix] The alleged continuation of foreign fertility does not take into account the lessons of the past.

[Dumont] Once again, this is not a supposition but is a projection based on a calculated assumption.

It is correct to note that there has been a decline in the fertility of Algerian and Tunisian women in France. However, this ignores four other elements:

--This slight decline does not change, as of now, the nature of the fertility pattern of non-European foreign women. Despite this slight decline, the fertility rate of these women remains three times as high as that of French women.

--We should not forget that, even if there is a slight decline, non-European women continue to arrive in France with the fertility pattern of their countries of origin, which is more than six children per woman.

--Minister Dufoix omits mentioning, as if by accident, a figure which contradicts her position: the fertility rate of the Moroccans in France has increased in the following way:

(a) In 1968: 3.32 children per woman;

(b) In 1975: 4.68 children per woman;

(c) In 1982: 5.32 children per woman.

--Finally, referring to the decline in the fertility rate of non-European women in France as something which inevitably will occur involves supposing that the problems of integration have been resolved, which is precisely one of the questions raised by our inquiry.

[Minister Dufoix] The fertility of foreign women therefore does not increase the average fertility in France by more than a small proportion.

[Dumont] That is correct. However, the non-European foreign population is young. Therefore, the number of foreign women of childbearing age who live in France is going to increase. This could increase the role of foreign women in overall fertility.

[Minister Dufoix] The net balance of 59,000 immigrants is considered higher than the figure calculated by the INSEE [National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies] over the 10 year period from 1975 to 1984, which reflects an actual average of 33,600.

[Dumont] Here Minister Dufoix should remember that the official statistical office has honorably corrected an error it made.

Since 1975, under the pretext that the borders were officially closed to immigrants, official statistics pretended that the net increase in immigration had been brought down to zero.

It is only retrospectively that these figures have been corrected, raising net immigration figures from zero to 40,000 between 1975 and 1982.

Despite my requests, France does not have available a statistical procedure for indicating net immigration between national censuses. Therefore, we were forced to estimate them. Minister Dufoix has presented official figures showing the net immigration figure at 37,000 in 1982, 16,200 in 1983, and 14,000 in 1984. This was to prove the effectiveness of the immigration control policy of the government. I believe I am right in asking myself whether, as was the case during the years 1975-1982, the official estimates quite simply reflect the government's version and not the reality.

The methods used to determine the three figures for 1982, 1983, and 1984, given above, have never been explained. That reminds us of the way in which statistics are developed in certain totalitarian countries.

Beyond this basic debate there is an unquestionable reality: with the differences of demographic pressure which exist around the Mediterranean, with the present geopolitical changes, where old Europe has not succeeded in finding a way of reducing poverty sufficiently in the Third World, the assumption of a net immigration figure of 59,000 is a low assumption.

[Minister Dufoix] The most recent data published by the National Office of Immigration (ONI) show that there have been changes, which cannot be compared with the preceding suppositions.

[Dumont] Again, this is an erroneous statement.

In effect, Minister Dufoix forgets to tell the French people that the National Office of Immigration does not cover the movement of Algerians or Africans.

The official report published by the INSEE shows that in 1982 there were more than 140,000 permanent, salaried foreigners and their families who had been brought to France by the ONI. Half of them, or more than 70,000 people, came from Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey.

[Minister Dufoix] This is a situation which reportedly has been stabilized.

[Dumont] The method used necessarily describes a situation today which is considered durable and will remain so. I say this for the reason that it will not remain stable.

The assumption of stability supposes that the people who live in this country will agree to live together, in the name of freedom, which is our basic heritage. This assumes a policy of providing ourselves with the means

of accelerating the integration of the foreigners who are to remain in France and who today are often left out of things.

Our inquiry was aimed only at making it possible for the citizens of a free country to think about the risks of unsuitable family and immigration policies.

Seeking to attack the information is an attack on democracy.

Minister Dufoix Applied a Measure Recommended by Gerard-Francois Dumont

The priority card for pregnant women is not issued until the fourth month of pregnancy and then only at the express request of the woman, thus excluding the first 18 weeks of pregnancy when the risks of spontaneous abortion are the greatest. Thus, for several years Gerard-Francois Dumont has urged, and particularly in his contacts with the office of Minister Dufoix, that these priority cards for pregnant women should be issued earlier in pregnancy.

In September 1985 Minister Dufoix finally adopted this measure on her own account and decided to issue pregnant women with a priority card on a systematic basis, at the same time as the maternity book.

Laurent Fabius Consulted Gerard-Francois Dumont

At the request of an important service in the office of the prime minister, in 1985 Gerard-Francois Dumont, in collaboration with Evelyne Sullerot, prepared a report for Prime Minister Fabius in which a revision of the Nationality Code was suggested.

Two Weeks of Exchanges

Paris LE FIGARO-MAGAZINE in French 9 Nov 85 p 113

[Text]

What They Dared to Say

What We Say in Reply

(1) On 26 October, in a communique Minister of Social Affairs Dufoix stated: LE FIGARO-MAGAZINE is adopting the Le Pen method, which consists of issuing lying statistics, the grossest possible, in order to attempt to establish the worst case theory and incite to racial hatred. The procedure is simple. They take false figures on the death rate and the fertility rate of French and of "non European" women and the number of additional immigrants granted entry

(1) "You cannot seriously say that knowing how to count incites to racial hatred!" That is what Pierre Chaunu wrote on 31 October. He is known, among other things, for his ability to count. "The assumptions presented by Gerard-Francois Dumont are plausible and reasonable. The assumption on the flow of immigrants used by Dumont seems too optimistic to me. That is why my projections would be even more dramatic than those of Dumont's." (Published in LE FIGARO-MAGAZINE of 31 October)

into France. This scenario, which recalls the maddest theories of nazism, must be torn down and attacked."

(2) Also on 26 October, on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the UNAF, Prime Minister Laurent Fabius issued "a very serious warning against those who, allegedly speaking in the name of French values, are today advocating the exclusion of foreigners, and are displaying egotism and advocating racism, and, finally, hatred."

(3) Monsignor Vilnet, president of the conference of Catholic bishops of France, also spoke on 26 October at Lourdes "of the unjustified fears," of "unacceptable attitudes of scorn" which prevent us from "building a common future for the immigrants and French citizens."

(4) On 28 October, in LE MATIN, Max Gallo asked himself: "Is this a mad vision? Is this an intentionally racist group or does it belong to the National Front? Is this the obsessive statement of a neo-nazi? Not at all, Louis Pauwels explains to us. No doubt, due to the importance and the circulation of the magazine which published it and the moment chosen, this is a document which will be remembered in the history of racism in postwar France. The figures, the tables, the rates of fertility or of mortality--interpreted as they should be, but that is not the essence of it--serve as a rational 'scientific' cover, leading to delirium, to anguish, to fear, to everything which feeds racism."

(2) Louis Pauwels had previously replied to Laurent Fabius in his editorial, quoting Claude Levi-Strauss: "It is in no sense wrong to value one way of life above all others. Certainly, this relative evaluation does not authorize anyone to oppress or destroy the values which one rejects. However, within such limits there is nothing revolting about it." (LE FIGARO-MAGAZINE, 26 October)

(3) A common future? Jean Raspail was thinking of Monsignor Vilnet when he wrote: "I think that Christian charity does not require us to begin by betraying our values at the risk of no longer having anything true or profound to offer." (LE FIGARO-MAGAZINE, 2 November)

(4) Such extravagance and such little control of himself is not even worth a suit for slander. Let us recall calmly the words of Louis Pauwels, "that we only had the explicit objective of making our cultured readers consider, on the basis of French realities, that the problem of the demographic differences between the developed but infertile West and the hungry and prolific Third World will be the essential human problem of the early part of the 21st century." (LE FIGARO-MAGAZINE, 2 November)

(5) In LE MONDE on 29 October Andre Fontaine explained that "Georgina Dufoix moved too quickly to denounce the 'Hitlerian' character, in her view, of this study."

(6) Philippe Seguin (RPR) [Rally of the French People] also commented on 29 October: "In the publication, LE FIGARO-MAGAZINE, I only do the crossword puzzles and I don't read the reports on immigration. And if I had to make the problems of immigration into my religion, I wouldn't do it in the press but rather out of my personal experience and examples from abroad."

(7) On France-Inter [radio station] on the morning of 30 October Jack Lang [minister of culture] said: "When I saw a newspaper, which has now become a propaganda tract, LE FIGARO-MAGAZINE, in the same issue of 26 October, tell us that, on the one hand, in 20 years France would no longer be France, which is completely grotesque and ridiculous, and carry an article on scholars in South Africa proving that apartheid does not exist, as they told us in the 1940's that the crematorium ovens did not exist--I find that scandalous."

(8) On 30 October in the National Assembly Laurent Fabius mentioned the headline of our study: "Under this provocative headline, a newspaper with a large circulation did not hesitate a few days ago to incite us to exclude foreigners. To all of these false accountants who manipulate immigration figures I say that they are going against the interests of our country, because the immigrants have produced and are producing an

(5) Thank you, Andre Fontaine. He was the first to underline the excesses in the words of Minister Dufoix.

(6) What immigration reports is Philippe Seguin talking about? Apart from our study, there has been no other article published before the item written in haste by Georgina Dufoix on 30 October and which, in the same issue, G-F Dumont demolishes completely.

(7 and 8) On 2 November Louis Pauwels wrote in LE FIGARO-MAGAZINE: "It is only democratic for journalists to be opposed to a government, and we are not lacking in that respect, as we all know. But it is intolerable that people in government should try, in order to justify their views, to advocate that people pay no attention to a newspaper and to think that they have the right to take such unworthy and diffamatory action. In a free country we cannot tolerate that those in charge of the government should stoop to such terrorist actions. We cannot tolerate that people who are not capable, not only of resolving, but even of formulating a problem which silently absorbs our national conscience and, with it, the entire, traditionally Judaeo-Christian Western conscience, should be allowed to cast infamous discredit on writers, experts and journalists who raise the problem before public opinion."

important part of the wealth of France. To all of our compatriots who face difficulties or are concerned, I say that the connection too often made between unemployment and immigration is false and dangerous. And they should not believe those who invent scapegoats and simplistic solutions. I want France to remain a fraternal country. That is its honor. That is its wealth. That is its interest. That is its soul. France must refuse to adopt a policy of segregation."

Foreign Situations Viewed

Paris LE FIGARO-MAGAZINE in French 9 Nov 85 pp 114-115

[Text] "In the United States Raising the Problem Is Not a Sin," by Veronique Grousset.

Alamo Bay is a small port on the Gulf of Mexico. For a long time the Americans living there--poor and white, for the most part--have fished for shrimp. An economic crisis occurred. Then there was the latest wave of Asian immigration, and a conflict arose, filmed by Louis Malle, the French movie director.

In France some people thought they saw in that situation evidence that the French problem did not amount to much, compared to what was happening elsewhere.

In effect, this is so. Particularly if you compare the figures. However, it still remains to be seen whether what people are comparing in fact is in any way comparable.

First of all, the statistics: of all the nations in the world, America is a nation of immigrants. It is made up only of immigrants. It has been built up by successive and increasingly larger waves of immigrants.

500,000 Every Year

The first wave of immigrants, who arrived in America between 1815 and 1860, brought 2.5 million Irish and 1.5 million Germans to the country. The second wave arrived between 1860 and 1890, involving 10 million northern Europeans, essentially composed of British, Swedes, Dutch, and Norwegians. The last European wave of immigrants came from eastern and southern Europe between 1890 and 1914, bringing 16 million Sicilians, Bulgarians, Greeks, and Russian Jews.

Today American immigration is essentially Hispanic and Asian, and two-thirds of the immigrants of the entire world are finally settled in the U. S. A.

However, the fact remains that the situation in Alamo Bay is the exception which in no way confirms the rule.

Because despite the large number of its new immigrants—about 500,000 per year, not including clandestine immigration—America does not suffer from the same problems as France.

Quite simply, this is because the immigration programs in the two countries are not based on the same criteria. Not anyone at all can enter the United States. Those who enter are those who have the primary intention of integrating themselves into the life of the country and finding a new fatherland. In short, and without renouncing their countries of origin and their customs entirely, they wish to become Americans.

Furthermore, America has no religious problems. Whatever the number and diversity of the imported religious faiths, none shows any desire to grow and none threatens to become the faith of the masses—or of becoming a fanatical creed.

Finally, integration seems to be easier in the United States. No doubt, this is because the desire to succeed is stronger there. Because the ethnic or racial obstacles are the same: each new wave of immigrants has encountered them. Today less than one-third of the American people (about 27 percent) favors the policy of the open door to immigration. The immigrant is not necessarily welcome. However, more than two-thirds (67 percent) of those polled nonetheless believe that integration is possible. The immigrant is not underestimated.

And this is only proper. For the American immigrant stands out for his desire to be integrated into American society which has little in common with the feelings of his European counterparts. He is willing to work hard—12 to 15 hours a day, on the average, during the first 10 years he spends in America. He studies, he takes any kind of job, even when his professional qualifications might have made it possible for him to consider himself ready to handle other positions.

An Ongoing Debate

As a result, the average income of Asian families in the U. S. A. by 1980 had already exceeded the national average income (including whites), amounting to \$22,700 annually. Regarding blacks from the Caribbean, for a long time their average income has been 40 percent higher than that of American black families.

This is a phenomenon which clearly is the source of considerable jealousy. This is all the more so, since U. S. immigration is raising questions that

concern people as much as in Europe: worsening crime (Organized crime finds its recruits among the newly arrived. In times past it was the Irish. Today it is the Asians.), an economic crisis (In the U. S., as elsewhere, the struggle for jobs works to the detriment of the people who are least motivated. Often the American-born are less motivated than the immigrants.), and the cost to the nation (Certain communities such as the Hmong of Laos have not succeeded in integrating themselves and remain a burden on the taxpayers.).

However, the essential difference is that people talk about it.

In America there is an ongoing debate on immigration. The people are brought into the discussion. Their views are considered, and no one has the right to ignore them.

"Germany: Assistance for Returning to Their Countries (from 70,000 to 300,000 Francs) Has Persuaded Them to Leave," by Marc Kunstle

Neither is anything simple in Germany. At least for a long time they have moved ahead of France and, as in the case of the problems of the steel industry, in a better planned and more effective way. Here the demagogic laws passed by the German socialists under Willy Brandt created an unfortunate problem. Armed with official promises giving the Turks the same rights as Germans, particularly in terms of protection for their families, nearly 2 million "almancilar" (Germanicized people) as they are called East of the Rhine, arrived from Turkey in the course of a few years. Due to the economic recession and in view of the material and cultural deterioration of entire neighborhoods in the large German cities the German Parliament approved a law 3 years ago which was tempting enough to persuade 350,000 Turks to leave the Federal Republic of Germany. The German Ministry of Labor has also decided to repay in advance the retirement deductions paid during the entire time foreign workers were present in Germany. With everything added up, those who are prepared to leave who have worked 15 years or longer in Germany are offered between 77,500 and 310,000 francs! These statistics do not adequately explain the general outflow of foreigners from Germany. As a result of unemployment, their living conditions have become much more difficult and, above all, they have been faced with unyielding and discouraging checks by German officials.

These different circumstances have led to three consequences:

—In 1985 immigration fell to one-third of the level of the 1980's;

—Since 1982 net immigration into the Federal Republic of Germany has been negative: (net decline of 200,000 in 1984);

—Births of foreigners have decreased by half in 10 years. Moreover, the prospects of definitive integration into German society are particularly poor. In 1983 only 39,000 people acquired German citizenship, or less than 1 percent of the total number of foreigners.

These results have also made it possible for the federal government to make substantial savings. Although they were initially costly, the measures have saved the Federal Treasury more than the equivalent of 8 billion francs in terms of social security, unemployment insurance, and family allowances.

For all of that, in Germany as in the other countries of the European Community, the problem of the free circulation of persons living in the EEC has not been resolved. The agreements permitting such free movement, beginning on 1 December 1985, cover the Turks as well. To avoid returning to the previous situation, Bonn and Ankara are involved in major political and economic negotiations. The solution to the problem of immigration, at least for the Turkish community, which is the largest foreign group, followed by the Yugoslavs (600,000), involves significant trade advantages provided by Germany, an increase in its military assistance to Turkey, and the construction of major public works there (a bridge over the Bosphorus, the Istanbul subway, oil pipelines, and electricity generating plants). In fact, it is difficult to compare the immigration problems of France with those in Germany. To the problems of the different nationalities represented in France are added the specific problems of large communities, such as the North African group, which rejects any kind of integration other than economic.

"In Switzerland 'the Quiet Invasion' Is Not Acceptable," by Gabriel Veraldi

The immigration situation in Switzerland is particularly instructive. The immigrants as such do not present any problems, although 14.5 percent of the population is composed of foreigners--18 percent, including those living along the borders, seasonal residents, and refugees. That is because the errors made by France have not been repeated here. There is no disorderly immigration: a foreign worker receives authorization to come to a specific place to perform a definite function. Naturalization is a slow and very much controlled process. Above all, Switzerland has always prohibited the entry of any significant number of non-Europeans. There are also no ghettos, no foreign enclaves. If there were a single street where not only the police but the simplest citizen would not dare to go, the people themselves would reestablish order.

Berthier Perregaux, the director of immigration affairs in the Protestant Social Center, was only able to mention two problems to me: the children forget the language and culture of their countries of origin. They readapt themselves poorly if they return to their countries. In short, their assimilation in Switzerland is almost too perfect. It is just the opposite of what happens in France. This is because the responsible officials have taken sensible action in time. It should be said that the people, who are really "sovereign" in Switzerland, know how to control their leaders in case of need through the use of their "popular initiatives." Therefore, the question of immigration has not been publicly raised since 1980, until recently.

However, it has just arisen again, and brutally, in another form. In the Geneva elections of 13 October "Vigilance," a group opposed to an excessive

number of foreigners, has suddenly become the largest party in the Canton of Geneva, having the same strength as the liberals. The same change, at the expense of the parties of the Left and Center, took place in the Canton of Vaud on 27 October.

It is the people who reacted against "the quiet invasion," which Zinoviev, the exiled dissident, considers "as destructive as a war." By the thousands, in effect, Tamils, Zairians, Turks, etc, have come to claim political asylum, taking advantage of a longstanding tradition and extremely generous laws. A confidential federal report concluded: "It is enough to say the magic words: 'I request political asylum,' in order to enjoy total financial support for a long time, without having to work personally." For example, in Basel 40 persons requested asylum in 1980 and 3,400 in 1985. In Geneva four in 1981 and 441 in 1985! In seeking the reasons for this sudden flood of those seeking asylum the police did not take long to discover that the traffic is organized by the intelligence services of Eastern Europe. The refugees are transported by the Soviet Aeroflot airline, the Rumanian Taroum airline, and the East German Interflug airline. A dispatching center at the Berlin-Schonfeld airport provides them with directions, addresses, and money.

Eric Bertinat, the young president of Vigilance, 29 years old and the third person elected out of 331 candidates in the elections of 13 October, said: "It seems that the operation has the objective of implanting destabilizing forces in the European countries which have no colonial past, such as Switzerland, Sweden, and Germany."

Edgar Fasel, personal adviser to the president of the Swiss Confederation and a philosopher of Swiss politics, considers that, "internally, it is a good lesson for the traditional parties, which have given in to the practice of doing nothing." He continued: "As to those who practice emotional blackmail and who insult the people, calling them racist and xenophobic, they are wasting the little credit which they still have."

In fact, the churches are discreetly taking their distance from the more extremist elements. Responsibility for immigration comes under the first Swiss woman to become a member of the Federal Council, the central government of the Swiss Confederation, Elisabeth Kopp, "minister" of justice and police. One of her close associates said: "She has taken the time to study the situation carefully." And the associate said, "Now she will act with humanity and firmness."

In effect you can be confident that Switzerland will act in its own national interests. Switzerland only fears that her example will not be followed by her neighbors.

Raspail Commentary

Paris LE FIGARO-MAGAZINE in French 9 Nov 85 p 116

[Text] So our figures were right. Clearly, we knew this ahead of time. Could anyone believe for a second that we had so little sense of honor as to fake and manipulate the facts on so serious a subject? The support which we have received from people whose reputations cannot be questioned have swept away all of the accusations which have been made against us, often in unacceptable terms. And even our detractors have calmed down, recognizing, like Georgina Dufoix, minister of social affairs, that they had let themselves make "excessive, spectacular statements." We will accept this type of excuse because we anticipate that, beyond political polemics, there is finally being sketched out, thanks to us and for the first time, real thinking on this great national debate.

False Appeals to Fear

Because if our statistics were correct, as a simple consequence our projections for the year 2015 are also correct. They exploded like a bomb in the face of an official disinformation campaign. However, in that case also, there have been many expressions of regret from those who insulted us. What only yesterday was a shameful business and a case of racist aggression (that is, making projections by nationality, distinguishing between Europeans and others, and even looking into the question of French citizenship) no longer is that. On the contrary everyone will prepare statistics from now on. They have promised it, they have sworn they will do it—even the state, which has announced that it will issue its statistics in the first few months of 1986. A ridiculous taboo has been disposed of. Many people are already thanking us. The others will do so later on, as you will see.

What we were particularly criticized for was the shock treatment used and these now well-known, 30 year projections. They spoke of our penchant for predicting catastrophes, of our fantasies, of our using excessive language, of our appeals to fear. I will ignore all of that. And this time it was to me personally that these elegant expressions were addressed, because I was the author of the commentaries. They spoke of my "imagination," as if, as a novelist, which is true, I had written a new novel, black and in anticipation of all of that.

I have to answer this, to end the matter.

I was investigated, quite stupidly. From the time that this study was decided on, I saw a considerable number of people, read everything written on the subject, built up an enormous file of press clippings, and traveled a great deal in France. Then I was initiated, by the best specialists available, into delving into the secrets of demography, which is fascinating. When the

figures prepared by Gerard-Francois Dumont were dropped into my office, I already knew a lot about them. So much so that I realized, with astonishment, that everything that I had learned, checked, heard, and saw was precisely packaged in the figures with no need to imagine anything or to let myself become involved in alleged fantasies. Our future in 2015 flowed from the brutally dry spring of statistics (once again, I repeat, if nothing happens to change them).

On the army and the national education system in 2015, on the consequences of the right to vote and automatic naturalization, on the de facto segregation which already exists in Marseille, Paris and in many cities and which I saw spreading in 2015 like a Lebanese type of leprosy, on the tragic imbalance of births in 30 years—everything that I had written, everything that I had described, came from simple reflection, in the sense that a mirror reflects an image. In the mirror our statistics quite naturally took shape. Hence the shock. Oh well, I assure you that, once you have the same statistics and with a minimum of intuition, any Frenchman would have done this, with the exception of certain, obstinate politicians. That falls outside their understanding, that's all.

I had only lent my pen to millions of French people who would suddenly discover in the mirror what all of us already felt, without even having the need for statistics. This is quite simply something felt in the heart.

Further Demographic Institute Remarks

Paris LE FIGARO-MAGAZINE in French 9 Nov 85 pp 116-117

[Commentary by Henri Amouroux]

[Text] Words are not innocent. This faction of the Left knows this perfectly well, this group which, in order to avoid seeing and studying these problems which could threaten our future, makes use of language which it considers will project the most revolting images in the people's imagination.

As a result, our study on immigration, concerning which it would have been possible, in the course of a serious debate, to discuss both the form and the substance, was made into an occasion for a festival of serious insults. It was the pretext for an attempt to create an amalgam, an amalgam being the specialty of totalitarian minds and regimes. It was as if they were thinking: "You annoy me with your arguments and your statistics, and the truth you are telling displeases me. Therefore, I will identify you with the devil, with absolute evil." In this sense the devil is Hitler and the absolute evil is nazism.

It was Minister Dufoix, the government spokesperson, who declared in a statement considered excessive even by her friends that our study was inspired by "the maddest theories of nazism." It was Max Gallo, the former government spokesman—but his previous function still sticks to him and to his pen—who

in a comment published in LE MATIN referred to "Doctor Mengele," to Hitler, who "needed Hindenburg and von Papen," to the exposition held at the Palais Berlitz during the nazi occupation, called "The Jew and France," and even to the delivery by the Vichy authorities of several tens of thousands of Jews condemned to perish in the concentration camps!

Hateful and Insane Language

Thus, merely raising the immigration problem, discussing it, and using the figures prepared by Gerard-Francois Dumont, president of the Association for Demographic Research and Information, was equivalent, in the eyes of Minister Dufoix and Max Gallo, to collusion with Hitler and to Doctor Mengele. When the convoys of Jews arrived in Auschwitz, Doctor Mengele selected the detainees whom he was to use for mad and criminal experiments. Our study was equated with these nazis who in November 1938 organized in Germany a night of terror called "crystal night," following the death in Paris of a counselor of the German Embassy, who was killed by a young man named Herschel Grynspan. In the course of this night 814 Jewish stores were destroyed, 191 synagogues were burned, and 36 Jews were killed.

The "logic" of Dufoix and Gallo led them to identify those who drew public attention to the dangers of uncontrolled immigration in France with the most devoted servants of a doctrine known to history, which was followed by a pitiful procession of the millions of people killed in the concentration camps.

That was hateful. And it was insane. It was all the more hateful and insane because the accusations came from the lips and the pens of men and of women who are seriously compromised by their associations with this other totalitarianism, which is just as cruel but has much greater longevity than nazism: communism.

Novelist or Prophet

Those who spoke and wrote about "Hitler and Mengele" carefully avoided discussing first of all the figures prepared by Gerard-Francois Dumont. They attacked Jean Raspail, the novelist. But why can't a novelist at times be a prophet? When H. G. Wells wrote "The War of the Worlds" in 1897; when George Orwell wrote "Animal Farm" and "1984" something like 40 years ago, which were visions of the totalitarian and bureaucratic world, he must have been attacked, I imagine, by critics who denounced him as foolishly as those who attacked Jean Raspail for his novel, "Camp des saints" [Camp of the Saints]. This Raspail novel is a work which perhaps the future will find mistaken, but which had the merit of raising, many years ago, a question which even the Left will find it difficult to avoid: that of the identity of France.

It was Jean Daniel who, clearly, does not approve of everything in our study but who wrote these words in LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: "Now, it is perfectly legitimate to ask ourselves about the implications of the flow of immigrants,

as well as about certain disequilibria in demographic trends. This is a matter which involves not only France, but Europe as well."

It is even a question which involves Africa.

Do we see in the case of these French mothers who cannot go to visit their children born of Algerian fathers more than an attempt by Algeria to maintain its national and religious identity?

And aren't the Israelis confronted with a problem of maintaining their own identity?

To Ruin Our Study

Whether or not one agrees with all of the words which we used, let us discuss our projections, which are of uncertain value, like all projections—as Louis Pauwels said at once. So be it. But on the substance of the question—and it is the substance of the question which counts—Laurent Fabius had a marvelous opportunity on 27 October to ruin our study, when he spoke to millions of French people on television.

He had known of this study for 48 hours. He knew of the statements by Minister Dufoix. He could have known of the editorial by Max Gallo. Now, not only did he avoid expressing an emotion which he was only to give vent to 3 days later in the National Assembly, in the course of a pitiful "session session for catching up on Assembly business," but he said he agreed "with only one or two exceptions" (we will never know what they were) with the views held by Jacques Chirac on the questions of insecurity and immigration.

Come on, the manufacturers of nonsense are fakes. They want to make us believe that history repeats itself.

Today, in 1985, the French people know very well that it is not 1938. The Germany of today is not under the nazis. Italy is not a fascist country. And Franco is dead.

France is not encircled by nations preaching immoral and contagious doctrines. If there is, in fact, a totalitarian threat, it is found in Eastern Europe. This involves the threat posed by Soviet Russia, which already holds many countries under the yoke of its ideas and of its prohibitions.

The manufacturers of nonsense are acting today, driven less by virtue than by political interest, which is much worse. They rattle the skeletons which they shook in the past when—with a hypocrisy of the pen which was added to the malice of insinuation—Francois Mitterrand, in "Le coup d'etat permanent" [The Permanent Coup d'Etat], already has compared General De Gaulle to Franco, Mussolini, and, finally, Hitler.

Griotteray Comments

Paris LE FIGARO-MAGAZINE in French 9 Nov 85 pp 116-119

[Text] Students of politics and of the future can return to their beloved studies. The terms of the political debate are decidedly unforeseeable. Everyone expected that the conflict would be centered in the economic field. Now what are the two politically decisive questions of these past 5 years? I would say the schools and immigration. The first question caused the explosion which ended on 24 June 1985 with 2 million French demonstrating in the streets. The second question has overturned electoral assumptions in a manner which can be considered permanent. The electoral "card" which well served Jean Marie Le Pen in the past is too clearly associated with immigration questions for the electoral score of the National Front to last very long, unless what brought the front into being does not disappear.

In this sense the debate begun by LE FIGARO-MAGAZINE will have served only as a catalyst. We can discuss the statistics and the interpretations to be made of them. The fact remains that there will be an "immigration question," just as there was a "social question" during the 19th century. And to answer this question it will not be possible to limit oneself to "letting things ride from time to time," in the words of Francois Mitterrand. The RPR [Rally of the French People] and the UDF [French Democratic Union], which so legitimately aspire to regain control of the government in 1986, will be judged in particular on the action that they will take in this area.

Contrary to what many people want to make us believe, these measures have been studied and discussed in various documents. It is a test of intention to state that the opposition has nothing to say on this subject. On the other hand, what is true is that more than one of the opposition representatives (We will mention no names.) would like to avoid talking about the subject and that others have ideas exactly contrary to those which their respective parties have adopted.

This last attitude is based on two evident reasons, but which are too rarely given proper emphasis: first, there is the desire to take care of one's image before the media, which is sympathetic "with the Left." In his own time Leon Blum spoke of the fear that "people will say you are a communist." There exists today a fear of "what will they say in LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR" (or in other, similar publications.). People will say to me: that is stupid. It's 5 years since the Left saw all of its hopes go up in smoke in less than a week. How could they still be courting the favor of those who have been a sounding board for the Left for so many years? In fact, it is stupid, but there it is. Just as the Marxist Christians will probably be the last to revere Marx, for a long time to come there will still be members of the RPR or of the UDF who will be haunted by the idea of displeasing the media of the Left. The second reason is that those who disagree with the views of their party on immigration questions are either not holding elective office or have been elected in areas where immigration is a marginal phenomenon and where, consequently, the

vote in favor of Le Pen itself is very small. Thus, there are positions being taken which are considered "courageous" but which are based on a little bit of cowardice, of compromises, and of taking the easy way out which somewhat diminish their heroic side.

However, we cannot fool around for long with the facts. At present the diagnosis has been made, and it has been presented publicly. Even if a real embargo is placed on the statistics the government has, which poses the whole problem of information in a democracy. Is it proper that so much money should be spent every day to improve our apparatus for collecting statistics and that the authorities can cover up reality by mutilated statistics, on incorrect or dissimilar bases, and oriented to serve their presuppositions? That is the first thing that the new governing majority will have to do: develop unquestionable facts and statistics. There are thousands of government employees who work for the INSEE [National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies] and in many other government offices, at the departmental or other levels, who collate all possible and imaginable data. If they can't do that, what good are they?

In fact, they can do this very well, provided they receive orders to do so from a determined government. Notwithstanding the lack of precise statistics, we know right now that the contribution of immigrant labor can be considered as largely surplus to our needs. We can take into account its actual cost, particularly in terms of social security allocations. Is it a scandal to say so? No. What is scandalous is the desire to make a whole people (our own) feel guilty about another people toward whom we have shown a generosity unknown elsewhere in the world. Thus, to know what will be done after the elections of March 1986, we will need to refer to a few documents and easily obtainable statements. We will also find them in the publications of the Perspectives and Realities Clubs and in those of Club 89, as well as in the RPR brochure entitled "Le Renouveau" [The Renewal] and in documents published by the UDF, whose substance will be found in the governmental platform now being negotiated between the RPR and the UDF.

Of course, we will find there the reaffirmation of a need for tighter control of our borders. In the first place that requires a strengthening of European cooperation (What's the use of closing our borders to Zairian immigrants if they can freely enter Belgium and come to France from there?). That involves a restrictive visa policy, particularly with the countries of the Maghreb. And too bad if that creates frictions with certain countries. To govern is to choose, as Pierre Mendes France used to say. In the domestic sphere there is a whole series of simple measures to undertake, which would aim at making immigration less attractive. Reference is often made to the case of family allowances which, by a singular, perverse effect, "encourage births in those non-European families which already have too many children, without having any significant impact on Frenchwomen. In fact, this is an example, but it is a whole system of social security which is involved, from which even clandestine immigrants benefit, and which must be restudied, chapter by chapter.

However, it is in the legal area that it will be necessary to act the most quickly and firmly. It will be necessary to be determined to "go all the way," so that the laws of the republic can once more be applied in certain areas which have become territories outside the law, where the police cannot enter. Much more than financial resources, it is political will which the police need to take action in this area. And it is this same political will which will make it possible to carry out identity checks. Is it so much to ask people to carry a small piece of paper with them, certifying their identity? If they have such an identity card, what are they afraid of? And if they don't have such an identity card, by what right are they immune from control? Regarding obtaining this national identity card, that be done under a specific procedure, aimed at returning to the ways of a chosen nationality and no longer obtained clandestinely.

What is extraordinary is that some people are afraid of the "cost" of such a policy. Apart from assistance to help immigrants return to their country--for which the necessary finance is rather easy to imagine--truth forces us to say that this policy will cost almost nothing and, due to the abuses which it will bring to an end, it will even make it possible to achieve some substantial budgetary savings.

Thus, there are pages and pages of measures which will have no other effect than to make sure that the clocks run on time. Many people will ask themselves whether that will be possible? Can we have confidence in the traditional parties? This is an area where we delayed a great deal and at times made the wrong decisions prior to 1981, it is true. This is another reason for thinking that we will do the job all the more quickly after March 1986.

Commentary by Pierre Chaunu

Paris LE FIGARO-MAGAZINE in French 9 Nov 85 p 119

[Text] The reaction of the government spokesperson regarding the study in LE FIGARO-MAGAZINE on immigration, using the calculations of Gerard-Francois Dumont, is revealing and absurd. It reveals a surprising degree of irresponsibility. Minister Dufoix (remember her handling of the "Greenpeace" affair and the AIDS question) spoke, snarled, threatened, and then apparently reflected--perhaps someone even reflected for her in her personal cabinet--on the imprudence shown in her first reactions.

The advisers who inspired the statements by Minister Dufoix have proved their total inability to anticipate changes. They only know the verse from Ecclesiastes: "What has been is what will be." Oh well, no. What will be is what they have been totally unable to imagine. Unless the wall of cowardly silence is broken, we will finally succeed in provoking this positive, retroactive step which Alfred Sauvy so well defined in his celebrated statement: "Predict in order not to see."

So let us look again at the challenged data in the assumptions regarding the future by Gerard-Francois Dumont. Is it necessary to recall them? These only involve a hypothetical future situation, which we will call an assumption. In a scientific study you calculate several projections, following several assumptions. Don't ask a news magazine to publish all of the assumptions calculated which call for space. A magazine like POPULATION would be honored to do this. LE FIGARO-MAGAZINE limited itself to the publication of a single, plausible assumption if bad luck ensured that France continued to be led for a long time by the "irresponsible leaders" of today.

The first challenge concerns the 2.6 million non-European foreigners. All of the experts know (see Jacques Dupaquier) how much the census of 1982 is open to challenge on this point. How can we take into account clandestine immigrants and people left out of the count? A number of converging indices show that Gerard-Francois Dumont's assumption is plausible and relatively low, with the end to immigration controls, our borders like a sieve, and police who are discouraged if not disarmed, and who wisely fold their arms. Is it necessary to add those automatically naturalized through the operation of legislation which goes back to the time when immigrants were Europeans of Jewish or Christian ancestry and sincerely wanted to integrate themselves into French society and for whom military service was a serious obligation, equally binding on all?

The second point is more serious. I have already mentioned it.* It involves the demographic differential. An immigrant population which is integrated into another society does not maintain for long a fertility rate radically higher than that of the society which accepts it. However, that is precisely where the shoe pinches.

The Marange Report

This immigrant population is not being integrated. It is meeting obstacles which are difficult to overcome. The Marange report underlined the failure of the children of immigrants to assimilate themselves into French society. This new phenomenon is only beginning to become apparent. When the volume of immigrants crosses a threshold already reached in southern France along the Mediterranean and in the large cities, a kind of de facto spatial segregation will occur which will have the effect of maintaining fertility differentials.

Therefore, there is nothing to prove that the Arabs of the Maghreb in our country will suddenly behave like Malthusians tomorrow, as the Italians did in France. With a different cause there will be a different effect. Until more detailed information is available, the assumption made by Gerard-Francois Dumont is therefore as valid, if not more so, than those made by the office of the government spokesperson.

* In LE FIGARO of 31 December 1980, p 2.

The essential problem remains: the fertility rate of Frenchwomen and the evaluation of the immigration flow from the South. The rate of 1.25 children per woman predicted in France in 1992 is, unfortunately, the level reached in 1985 by more than 100 million Europeans on our borders (in the Federal Republic of Germany, the northern part of Italy, Denmark, and Holland). That is the level which we will reach if the socialists continue in government. The fertility rate is already lower in the large German cities (Munich has a fertility rate of 0.75 children per woman.) and in most of the large Italian cities, thanks to abortion (about 1.0 abortions per woman). Germany had been stable for 10 years around the long time unthinkable level of 1.40 to 1.45 children per woman (I had predicted this in 1964.). In the past 2 years Germany has fallen below 1.25 children per woman.

Finally, here are irrefutable statistics which Minister Dufoix should know and which prove, unfortunately, how far Gerard-Francois Dumont has looked ahead toward the problems which lie in front of us. Unless there is a miracle, which we are trying to bring about. Between 1968 and 1972 Rennes and Niort had fertility levels of 2.4 and 2.71 children per woman. In 1984 they had dropped to 1.38 and 1.42, respectively. In 1984 Poitiers had a figure of 1.34; Limoges, 1.26; Limousin, 1.42; and Toulouse, 1.40. The Limousin and the Poitou-Charentes areas have almost no immigrants. They are the areas which have dropped the most. They didn't wait until 1992 to prove that, after all, Gerard-Francois Dumont is right. I wish that the Muslims in France could live, transmitting to their children their culture and their faith, in an atmosphere of order and harmony. That is why I raise my voice now to call for a major national policy of giving priority to life, which the present opposition should win with in the period after 16 March 1986. You won't be able to build a rampart against the wave of immigrants coming in from the South, simply to protect an old people's home. A third child in every home is the only way of maintaining a French France which will also have among its descendants people of Maghrebian ancestry, who will have agreed to share our destiny, respecting our customs and our traditions.

5170

CSO: 3519/40

POLITICAL

FRANCE

MARCHAIS, PCF, SOVIET TIES EXAMINED THROUGH FABIEN BOOK

Paris L'EVENEMENT DU JEUDI in French 12-18 Sep 85 pp 7-13

[Article by Serge Maury: "How Marchais Handled Marchais"]

[Text] That Gorbachev would receive Georges Marchais in Moscow was not a surprise. Why would the new Soviet leader refuse to see the leader of a communist party which is largely back in the socialist camp after a few years away from it? That the two men issued a joint communique whose contents were of interest to almost nobody is a fairly natural development. What was strange, on the other hand, is that this statement did not contain any attacks against the terrible French socialists who sold out to the big capitalists and the mercenaries of imperialism. The paradox is that today everything is going on as if it were the French communists who, in a sectarian or dogmatic way, are acting much like the Soviets. For their part the Soviets seem to want to improve their image. They have avoided displaying a dogmatic position, to some extent. For undoubtedly it is the Soviets who, in the joint communique, carefully avoided expressing the most primitive form of the anti-Socialist Party propaganda which is so dear to the PCF [French Communist Party].

How did this happen, when just 10 years ago the French communists seemed to wish to move away from Moscow, following the example of the Italian communists, in order to reestablish their democratic and liberal virginity, so to speak?

The enigmatic Jean Fabien (see "La guerre des camarades" [The War Between the Comrades], published by Editions Orban) provides an answer to this question. Who is Jean Fabien? We can state once again that behind this collective pen name are members of the apparatus of the French Communist

Party who worked for the adoption of Eurocommunism in the PCF. The present party line has cast them into the depths of despair.

An Unavoidable Deterioration

For our part, we don't intend to become involved in an internal party debate which does not concern us at all. Although the Stalinist communists look terrifying to us, the reformist communists often look to us either as utopians or as quite naive in their outlook. On the other hand, it is important for us to understand how the French Communist Party could take the sharp turn which led it to the brink of a break with Moscow, finally returning to an excessively pro-Soviet position. This is particularly important, as this change in the party line looks like a real kind of sabotage, a formidable kind of suicide. By refusing to adapt itself to modern realities, the communist party has condemned itself to an kind of deterioration which, over the long run, threatens to make it totally irrelevant.

We can take some pleasure from this, since the decline of the Communist Party plays into the hands of reformist and liberal forces. On the other hand, we might consider that an Italian kind of communism is a useful stimulus which could benefit the country because of the creative challenge which it could present. In any case we need to understand that this form of self-destruction was possible. We should understand how a small, anti-party group led by Leroy and Plissonier was able to paralyze Georges Marchais, cut off those advocating change, and gain effective control of the party apparatus.

Jean Fabien, who observed these changes from inside the party, answers these questions in a clear and precise way. That is why we exclusively publish here extensive extracts from the book published under his name. [Text of comments from L'EVENEMENT DU JEUDI and extracts from "La guerre des camarades" are identified]

The Communist Party: the Secret History of an Act of Sabotage

[L'EVENEMENT DU JEUDI] It was a large-scale Soviet intervention which led the French Communist Party, and more particularly Georges Marchais, to abandon its Eurocommunist inclinations and return to communist orthodoxy as defined by the Kremlin. That is what a group of communist leaders, writing under the pen name of Jean Fabien, declare in their new book which Les Editions Orban is publishing. This is a precise, fascinating book, which absolutely must be

read to understand one of the great turning points of the past few years. Everything begins in 1973, when the PCF was trying to free itself from Moscow control by moving closer to the Italian Communist Party.

["La guerre des camarades"] Within the party a gigantic battle was taking place between those called "opportunists" (but also "liquidators," "Eurocommunists," etc), led by Georges Marchais, and the "dogmatists" (also called "pro-Soviets," "fundamentalists," etc), led by Roland Leroy. This battle, with no holds barred, took place under the watchful eyes of the Soviets. They helped and advised the latter group, while arranging for the defeat of the former.

After having condemned the Soviet Union at the time of the military intervention in Czechoslovakia it was the "liquidators" or "opportunists," led by a Marchais who had "turned his Stalinist coat," who attached the PCF chariot to the Socialist Party, whose leader, Francois Mitterrand, was not in good odor in Moscow, to say the least. In Moscow they considered him more of an "Atlanticist" and more pro-American than the leaders of the French Right.

[L'EVENEMENT DU JEUDI] Beginning in September 1973, Roland Leroy took advantage of the coup d'etat led by Pinochet against President Salvador Allende in Chile to fire the first shots of the barrage.

["La guerre des camarades"] Roland Leroy immediately published in L'HUMANITE an article entitled "The Coup d'Etat in Chile and 'Le defi democratique,'" [This is a reference to "The Democratic Challenge," a book by Georges Marchais. Under the appearances of "defending" the concepts in the Marchais book, he undermined them by using a long-tested method which can be summarized in a few words: the bourgeoisie will never let us alone! Leroy wrote: "The coup d'etat and the reactionary and fascist terror in Chile demonstrate once again that imperialism, the big capitalists, and the reactionaries are ready to do anything to protect their privileges, to prevent the workers and all of the people from marching forward to democracy and socialism. They are ready for anything--even in France."

After the signature of the Common Program with the Socialist Party Roland Leroy decided to be the leader of an opposition group in the party. When the coup d'etat took place in Chile, he found suitable ground for his efforts.

He intensified his efforts, applying the famous precept of the revolutionary movement: move to the Left of a communist party which has gone too far to the Right. Leroy therefore based himself on the "spontaneous" fundamentalism of party members, on their credo: unfailing support for the Soviet Union and "innate" mistrust of the social democrats or Socialist Party, who are "worse than the Right."

Roland Leroy is too skilled a politician to apply these old fantasies literally. However, he made use of these "principles" to force a communist leadership engaged in a dangerous adventure to change direction.

It must be said that this man had so many scores to settle! "Swept off" the Central Committee of the party in 1954, to use his own term, he had just missed the supreme and prestigious position in the party leadership: that of secretary general. Waldeck-Rochet clearly considered that he had no choice. In no case, he said, should Roland Leroy become secretary general. Regarding Marchais, Waldeck-Rochet thought, I will have 10 years to train him. Unfortunately, illness was to cut short Waldeck's program.

Not that Leroy, a Norman, did not have the qualifications required to serve as secretary general. He was too well qualified! Leroy is so byzantine, so much at home in the labyrinth of government, its traps, and its terrible pleasures.

[L'EVENEMENT DU JEUDI] However, supported in particular by Kanapa, Marchais tried to speed up the process.

["La guerre des camarades"] Nonetheless, what was then attempted in the PCF was done in silence. Now, how could these changes be made in a party where at least two political lines were in conflict? The use of secrecy forced the two factions in the party to make use of the techniques of palace revolutions. This made any change or evolution in the struggle very difficult.

What was done by a majority of the secretariat of the PCF and the Political Bureau--by a few men, in other words--could be undone in the same way.

Thanks to the Pinochet Coup d'Etat, Roland Leroy Undertakes His Offensive

[L'EVENEMENT DU JEUDI] And, in effect, the guerrilla warfare carried on by Roland Leroy continued. For this reason he had articles published in L'HUMANITE criticizing LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR but which were really aimed at the modernist wing of the Communist Party. On several occasions the supporters of the Eurocommunist line had to water down their statements to avoid giving ammunition to the "dogmatists."

["La guerre des camarades"] For example, after having spent nearly a week in Czechoslovakia, Paul Laurent made a joke, stating that the Czechoslovak workers and their communist party had worked steadily "to eliminate the painful traces of 1968." The purpose of the maneuver was to avoid at all cost being bypassed on the Left by Leroy, who appeared in everyone's eyes as the official spokesman of the "pro-Soviet group" and the sectarian communist element.

[L'EVENEMENT DU JEUDI] Internal tension within the party was at its height when unexpected events made Georges Marchais believe that he was in a position to speed up the process he was engaged in.

["La guerre des camarades"] The death of President Pompidou in April 1974 spoiled the "Eurocommunist" plan. During his political life Secretary General Waldeck-Rochet, Marchais' predecessor, never ceased warning the other PCF leaders. He had advocated the drafting of a Common Program with the

socialists and permitted it to be completed. However, he repeated these warnings like an obsession. He said never, and underlined the never, should a first secretary of the Socialist Party be permitted to become the joint candidate of the Left in presidential elections! Because, he thought, on the basis of the enthusiasm produced by the Common Program, the socialist candidate would sweep the board.

Attentive, as always, to what he was advised to do, in 1974 George Marchais hastened to propose to Francois Mitterrand, who had become first secretary of the PS at the party congress in Epinay in 1971, that he be the candidate of the Left! "Georges" pressed the Central Committee to ratify the joint candidacy of Mitterrand. The latter began by resisting. He felt the situation was not ready for that. However, the leadership of the Communist Party immediately launched a broad campaign throughout the country to encourage people to speak up in favor of such action. The results were unexpected and quickly swept away any remaining resistance. In fact the PCF leadership opted for a joint candidacy for internal reasons in particular. They saw in this rapidly developing event an historic chance to establish a policy of union with the socialists which had met with too much opposition in the past. There had been opposition both within the party and abroad.

Marchais Forgets Waldeck's Recommendations

It was thought that taking part in an election based on the Common Program and which would therefore imply the participation of communist ministers in the government would have a double advantage. It would involve having millions of citizens accept the idea of the participation of communist ministers in government, even in case the Left was defeated. On the basis of a good electoral performance they tried hard to demonstrate the irreversible and necessary character of modernizing the PCF.

The results were unexpected for those within the PCF who advocated a turn toward democratic practices.

However, during these presidential elections, two events should be noted which had a major impact on the future: the revolution in Portugal and the "surprise" visit of the Soviet Ambassador in France to President Giscard during the period between the two rounds of the 1974 presidential election.

This thunderbolt was not a total surprise for the communist leadership. In the party they knew that the Soviets firmly advocated the status quo in Europe.

This balance in Europe, achieved with difficulty as a result of World War II, was convenient for the Soviets. Any change which would carry the risk of changing the borders is still perceived by them as a direct threat. This was the case with Hungary in 1956, with Czechoslovakia in 1968, and with Poland more recently. In 1974 candidate Mitterrand, even though he had little chance of winning in the second round, represented a threat of destabilization for

the Soviets. Since de Gaulle they had counted on contradictions and frictions between the French bourgeoisie and the Americans. The Russians were used to this bourgeoisie, maintaining cordial relations with many French right wing politicians and satisfactory state to state relations with France. When the anti-Soviet campaigns of the Right mobilized the communists in France, the Soviets were not particularly offended, knowing well that the same men who referred to the bolshevik threat were sending them soothing messages through many channels.

Their reasoning was simple: a man of the French Right, in his relationships with the Americans, did not have to prove his loyalty. On the other hand, a man of the Left might add something in decisive areas: relations with the U. S. A., involvement in NATO, firmness regarding the USSR.

Moscow Plays with Giscard to Sabotage Marchais

The Soviet ambassador, by paying a visit to Giscard between the two rounds of the 1974 presidential elections, went to designate him, in the eyes of the whole world, as the preferred candidate of the USSR and to give him a decoration for his services to international detente.

By acting in this way the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] designated the enemy to be destroyed to the "pro-Soviet element" in the PCF, confirming them in the views they held with certainty: Francois Mitterrand is worse than the Right!

Naturally, a communique was published by the Political Bureau of the PCF, stating that the visit by the Soviet ambassador to Giscard was untimely. it would have been instructive to see those in the Political Bureau who were very happy about the Soviet action sign the communique figuratively with both hands. They knew that in political life it is easier to do the wrong thing to repair damage already done.

In applying the indirect "signal" from the Soviets on how to vote, many communists--already!--were going to vote in the second round for the candidate of the bourgeoisie. As the difference between Giscard as the winner and Mitterrand as the loser was not even 300,000 votes, that led the "changed" leadership of the PCF in 1981 to think that the communist vote for Giscard in the second round could have swung the balance over to the "correct" side.

The time had not yet come to have a "fight." Among the "dogmatists" it was expected that the "revisionists" would be hoist with their own petard and would sweep the social democrats [the Socialist Party] off the board.

Then, after the presidential elections, large numbers of letters were received at the headquarters of the party containing membership applications. However, there it was: many of the applications were addressed to the "Common Program Party," when they were not addressed to the "Socialist Communist Party."

This regrettable confusion was blamed on the enthusiasm of men and women who had previously had little to do with politics. The youth of the letter writers was considered to have been largely responsible for it.

[L'EVENEMENT DU JEUDI] It was in this atmosphere that Henri Fizbin, the new leader of the PCF federation in the Paris area, took the initiative of inviting non-communists to a meeting of the local PCF committee.

["La guerre des camarades"] Towering with rage, the "pro-Soviet group" at the local level frothed at the mouth at this display of opportunism. On the other hand, the "pro-Soviet" leaders encouraged such initiatives. To destroy your adversary, you have to let him destroy himself.

The "heresy" reached its high point at the Central Committee meeting held on 10 and 11 June 1974. There it was stated that with the exception of the feudal elements of the financial and industrial world and of their political lackeys, everyone had his place in the union of the people of France! This unleashed an outcry within the party. Critics said, what? The gaullists, the bosses of small and medium-sized companies, those who had voted for the "center"--these people had a place in the union of the Left?

A large proportion of the Central Committee had become drunk with success.

[L'EVENEMENT DU JEUDI] The "renewers" believed that they had won the battle. The 21st party congress, they thought, would support the new line in a spectacular way. The "dogmatists" felt that they had lost. That is when Roland Leroy decided to strengthen his counteroffensive.

["La guerre des camarades"] He prepared his tactics in complete secrecy. First of all, he let the "opportunists" destroy themselves. He let them talk on as much as possible to obtain flammable material for a spectacular trial at the Communist Party level, which had 20 percent of the votes at the party congress. Secondly, he relied more than ever on the Soviets. Thirdly, he worked discreetly on members of the Political Bureau and the Central Committee "to turn them" to his way of thinking.

To accumulate flammable material, Leroy thought that it would be enough to let Georges Marchais talk. The latter believed more and more in his audiovisual skills. In effect, Marchais was beginning to perform marvelously well with the media. On television in mid June 1974 this skill served Leroy and the "dogmatists" in an unexpected way. Marchais said that, yes, the Communist Party was changing and would change even further. Yes, some members of the party were saying that certain principles were being abandoned. For communists who were used to dissimulate for long period of time ideas contrary to those expressed by the party leadership, this last statement by Marchais showed them that there were many party members who opposed the new line.

However, what created a scandal among the communists used to "fighting with the socialists," was the statement that the Socialist Party reportedly had

abandoned the principle of class collaboration. Wouldn't the PCF be the only party to oppose the bourgeoisie firmly? The outraged "dogmatists" demanded to know what difference would remain between the two parties.

The Stalinists Play the Policy of the Worst Outcome

The "dogmatists" would base themselves on this fear. It was the whole tradition of the party which was at risk, against the possibility of participation in government.

The Soviets, who were kept regularly informed of the development of this struggle within the French party, gave their "friends" an encouraging push.

Still in mid June 1974--on 19 June, more precisely--a major Soviet delegation arrived in France at the invitation of the PCF. It was led by Boris Ponomarev--called "Pono" for short--who at the time was an alternate member of the Political Bureau, a secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and the boss of the International Department. He was Moscow's eye on the world. To prevent the delegation from meeting Leroy, he was sent to Cuba for 2 weeks, from 10 to 23 June.

How Leroy Set His Delayed Action Bombs

However, Leroy arranged for a part of the Soviet delegation to visit his own area, Seine-Maritime. He was therefore brought up to date precisely and by his own "men" on the wishes of the CPSU and the view of the international situation which the Soviets held at this crucial moment for the future of the PCF. What Leroy learned on his return strengthened him in the conviction that a victory over the "liquidators" was possible. Ponomarev's "heavy hand" could be clearly seen when he explained that the events in Chile had been the first and a somewhat lengthy experiment with the peaceful development of the revolution. He meant: you see, my French comrades, how that ended!

In fact, Ponomarev repeated in France what he had just published in the June issue of PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM. Concerned about the consequences, in a period of preparation for an extraordinary congress of the party, the leadership of the PCF had decided not to publish Ponomarev's article in the French edition of the magazine. The Soviet delegation took advantage of its trip to Seine-Maritime to leave behind, for whatever use might be made of it, a translation of the text of the article for Leroy's "faithful friends."

From Cuba, naturally, Leroy took pleasure in reporting to the Political Bureau the questions asked by the Cuban comrades who sounded the same themes as the Soviets.

To Leroy and his supporters, there was nothing more to do than to wait attentively and to chose the best time to unleash their offensive.

At the end of September 1974 partial legislative elections took place in France, in the midst of preparations for the extraordinary congress of the PCF. Apart from one exceptional race in the Dordogne, these partial elections marked a decline in the vote of the Communist Party. The obsession of a major group in the party--not to lose ground to the Socialist Party--was transformed into a nightmare: it had happened! While a "great fear of well-intentioned" communists ran through the party, Leroy began a broad offensive, using all of the methods of conspiracy. In mid flight the extraordinary congress was turned away from its "renovating" course.

In the history of the PCF there has never been a draft resolution which was torn apart to such an extent. The final draft was aimed in exactly the opposite direction.

It was the brusque, backward step taken by Marchais which made it possible for the "dogmatists" to win. Warned by his extreme sensitivity to events, he estimated--and certainly overestimated--the dangers of a situation where all of the internal forces within the party and external forces (the Soviets) as well were in league against modernizing the PCF. He thought that the moment had not yet come to force his way through. One can only imagine how much Khrushchev's unfortunate experience weighed on the decision. After having carried his party through a courageous criticism of the activity of the PCSU during the Stalin period, Khrushchev was removed from power in 1964 by a party apparatus which had never accepted this formidable challenge. The Khrushchev experience marked Georges Marchais forever. At the 21st Congress Leroy roughly handled the party "fundamentalists."

How the Hard Line Communists Sabotaged the Marchais Congress

Leroy passed the draft resolution through the grinder and was cheered by a party apparatus--for the party apparatus was at the congress, for the most part--which was disturbed to see the party diluted in the union of the Left and likely to lose its identity.

Another event in November 1974 was the appointment of Leroy to the position of editor of L'HUMANITE. After the "coup" at the 21st Congress, everyone thought that the proximity of the two "comrades" would raise insoluble problems, as "Georges," despite everything, remained as party secretary general. A compromise was sought. Gaston Plissonier proposed to Leroy making him the editor of L'HUMANITE. Thus, there was neither victor nor vanquished. The diplomatic ability of "Gaston" made it possible for the two principal leaders of the PCF to accept the decision. For "Georges" "Gaston" had just approved the work Leroy had done to split the party; for Leroy he proved the importance of the central leadership of the PCF in changing a political line, slowing down or speeding up its application.

The "Renovators" Go All Out

Leroy, as editor of L'HUMANITE, never ceased demanding that the most obscure dancer at the Bolchoi Ballet and the humblest Soviet bureaucrat passing through Paris, should be warmly welcomed at the newspaper office.

[L'EVENEMENT DU JEUDI] However, the renovators did not admit defeat. Georges Marchais had not yet really changed course. As it was known that the Soviet Union was paying more and more attention to President Giscard d'Esting, the renovators took pleasure in attacking Giscard's foreign policy more and more sharply in an effort to bypass the Soviets to the Left. However, they showed prudence in doing so. When, in October 1974, Alexander Dubcek stated that a totalitarian system had again been established in his country, Georges Marchais was stung to anger. This Dubcek had just complicated his business once again. For he was preparing to take his revenge on Leroy!

["La guerre des camarades"] After having their fingers burned by the sharp reversal at the 21st congress the Eurocommunist leaders in the PCF prepared a full scale plan for battle. They set up a team to "present" advanced ideas, they chose the themes to raise in preparing for and even holding a party congress which they wanted to be "historic." This 23rd Congress was to confirm the autonomy and even the "independence" of the PCF with regard to the USSR. "Fabien" knew that if they did not achieve this goal, the party would be swept aside by French public opinion, which would seek refuge in the arms of the Socialist Party.

It was a matter of urgency for the Soviets to change tactics. That is what they did. They decided that the PCF was the weakest link in the "revisionist" coalition established by the Italian, Spanish, and French communist parties. The PCF was made even weaker because the CPSU set up a "fifth column" within the French party.

The Soviets reasoned this way. Their Stalinist advanced guard within the PCF had succeeded in hindering the "democratic" development of the French party, going so far as to reverse the course of the 21st Congress. However, the Soviets considered that they had to count on their own forces more and more. They only made use of those forces developing within the PCF as support elements, charged above all with collecting "information."

A Low-Ranking Member Denounces the Dictatorship of the Proletariat

[L'EVENEMENT DU JEUDI] Clashes between the CPSU and the leadership of the French Communist Party continued to increase in number. With each step taken by the "renovators" the Soviets issued a warning. For the moment, things went no further. Marchais then regained his confidence and thought he could take further action.

A minor, obscure, low-ranking party member was to propose, during the discussions at the 23rd Congress, an amendment which would have "earth

shaking" consequences. The member in question lived in the Department of Essonne. He prepared a text which was entitled, no less: "Concerning the Dictatorship of the Proletariat." The secretary of the Pablo Neruda cell in Epinay-sous-Senart quite simply proposed eliminating this concept. In his view--in fact for the party leadership which made use of this member--you could not advocate full democracy and administer it with a "good" dictatorship.

As if by accident, Marchais appeared on television on the same day. He was asked about the dictatorship of the proletariat. He supported the unknown party member. What Brezhnev had feared since 1968 had happened. The dictatorship of the proletariat had become outmoded. This was the beginning of a long series of messages called "televised decisions," that is, with members of the party and even of the party apparatus learning more and more frequently of changes in PCF positions on television. The "palace revolution" to bring the PCF up to date thus made use of tried and tested methods: secrets held by a few privileged members and the use of public forums, etc. However, in politics everything is valid if it pays off. Because the use of secret maneuvers made it possible for those who were politically defeated in the corridors to take their revenge. One day or another.

[L'EVENEMENT DU JEUDI] The 22nd Congress was a success for the "renovators." Furthermore, it was at this time that Roland Leroy broke three ribs following a fall in his apartment. From that moment on the Soviet counteroffensive began. The PCF leadership counterattacked by deciding to inform party members of the state of the dispute and the realities of the disagreement with the Soviet comrades.

["La guerre des camarades"] Departmental committees of the party, expanded to include the secretaries of party sections, were informed of the differences between the PCF and the CPSU. However, much to the surprise of the French Eurocommunist leaders, it was noted that very few party leaders had been much impressed by the decision of the Political Bureau to free party members of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Stalinist lobby within the PCF was operating at full speed. It made the decision of the Political Bureau inoperative. Thus, it showed the power which it still had.

[L'EVENEMENT DU JEUDI] On the Soviet side they made use of the Czechs, the East Germans, and then Suslov, the theoretician of the old guard. The participation of Juquin at a meeting in favor of the dissident Pliouchtch and the appearance of Kanapa on the program, "Dossiers de l'ecran" [Screen Files] on the occasion of the showing of the film "L'aveu" [The Confession] set off the powder keg.

["La guerre des camarades"] It was in mid February 1977 that everything came to a head. On a mid February afternoon, at 4:00 pm, an emissary from Moscow arrived at the Place du Colonel Fabien in Paris, the headquarters of the French Communist Party. He had a communication to present to the PCF leadership. A few days before the "Eurocommunist Summit" in Madrid, scheduled

for 2-3 March 1977, it was known that this communication from Moscow reportedly "cordial and frank," as described in diplomatic circles. Therefore, it was rude.

The Kremlin Uses the Threat of a Split

In effect the messenger began by indicating that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had kept itself informed of the preparations for the Madrid meeting. Then the special representative of the CPSU came to the essential point: the project for the preparation of a charter of Eurocommunism, marked more significantly by open criticism of the Soviet Union. All of this meant, in the eyes of the CPSU, an unacceptable division between the two parties! If that was the case, comrades, the Soviet messenger said, emphasizing his words, this would be a very serious matter. It would be a step toward a split.

The terrible and magic word had been spoken: a split! In national and international communist organizations there is perhaps no more effective a threat! The specter of a split haunts communist parties, as that of a schism haunts the Catholic Church.

After having made his impact, the messenger concluded in a heavy handed way by hoping that the French Communist Party would find a means of avoiding coming to such an extreme point. With all of the consequences which that implied! He was referring to all of the assistance provided to the PCF.

[L'EVENEMENT DU JEUDI] However, the Madrid meeting took place. The French and Italian communists, impressed by the Soviet threats, showed the greatest prudence. That was not enough. In March 1977, between the two rounds of the municipal elections, a letter from the Kremlin, couched in terms of unheard of violence, was received at the headquarters of the French Communist Party. L'EXPRESS published a summary of it in February 1985. In the letter the French Communist Party was quite simply called on to renounce the Eurocommunist line and rejoin the socialist camp or accept the consequences.

["La guerre des camarades"] One thing was clear: the CPSU was calling for "the skins" of the members of the PCF leadership who were the most resolute in their criticism of the socialist system prevailing in eastern Europe: Marchais and Kanapa. Never, in the memory of any French communist, had such a procedure been used with a western communist party since World War II. The CPSU thought that the right time had come. It knew that, within the French Central Committee, it could count on a rather large number of members who were totally or partially on its side.

Furthermore, the polls and the atmosphere in France--everything led them to think that the Left, made up of an "Atlanticist" Socialist Party and a Eurocommunist PCF, could win the legislative elections of March 1978 and end up governing the country.

The CPSU could not accept this prospect. This government of the Left would feel itself obliged to be tougher with the Soviet Union than the government under President Giscard d'Estaing and Prime Minister Barre.

The moment had therefore come for the Political Bureau to make its final effort. It met. Each member gave his opinion about the letter from the Soviet party, of which each had received a copy.

The general tone used by the members of the Political Bureau was one of indignation. They considered such interference intolerable, and each one was "warmly" invited by Plissonier to express himself. They naturally waited for Leroy's statement. Using language indicating that he shared the feelings of his peers on the Political Bureau, the editor of L'HUMANITE nevertheless gave them a slap in the face. He stated that this letter from the CPSU in fact threatened a break with the PCF. "Roland" thus tried to strike fear among the "softest" elements in the Political Bureau, who were already frightened at the idea of directly confronting the "fraternal party." Leroy went on. He wanted to force the Political Bureau to think of nothing but that: to mend the tear and reach a compromise with the CPSU.

Then Marchais spoke. Everyone held his breath. According to him, the CPSU did not accept the independence of the French party. It was even resorting to an ignoble effort to split the party by writing in substance to the Central Committee of the PCF: you have scoundrels among the leaders of the party. Get rid of them. Everyone admitted his conclusion: the Soviets had some supporters within the party. In the leadership, of course.

At the Central Committee meeting held on 31 March and 1 April 1977 there was an outcry of indignation. Those who thought that the Soviets were more or less right avoided saying so. The others were even more outraged. Attempts to split the party--that only happened in other communist parties, particularly the small ones. Their French blood was up.

No one in any case was deceived: the letter was aimed at "Georges" in the first place and his closest "associates." Get rid of them! The Central Committee therefore gave Marchais an ovation.

[L'EVENEMENT DU JEUDI] Now it was finally Georges Marchais who cracked. At about this time it was learned that pro-Soviet elements in the Swedish Communist Party had provoked a split and were applauded by the TASS agency and by PRAVDA. This contributed to throwing Marchais into a panic. He continued to be haunted by the way Khrushchev had fallen into a trap. He knew that pro-Soviet elements continued to constitute a considerable force within the Central Committee. He therefore decided to temporize, to swallow the bitter pill. Now, far from calming down, Moscow was preparing to give him the coup de grace.

["La guerre des camarades"] Becoming aware of the agenda for the next session of the Central Committee of the PCF, which was to deal with national defense,

the Soviet party reacted strongly in its contacts with the French party. The CPSU did not mince words: questions concerning French foreign and military policy in case the Left should achieve power were of considerable interest to the Soviet Union.

The CPSU thought that what would happen at the next Central Committee meeting would be a substantial change in the attitude of the PCF on matters of foreign policy and defense. The French nuclear forces were considered a negative element by the CPSU which would strengthen the independence of France. They were a heavy burden for the French workers. In the eyes of the Soviets the French nuclear forces were directed against the socialist countries and provided particular support for the American nuclear forces.

The communists writing under the collective name of "Fabien" took a deep breath before reacting. Loud remarks by Marchais are frequently made in the conversation of the secretary general. This time, within the secretariat, the loud remarks were like shouts.

Wherever he turned, Marchais saw himself as lost. In his view the first decision to be made was determining who could help him most effectively to keep his position as secretary general. After that, he would see. After all, it was better to keep his position and then come back in force in the future and continue the interrupted task of renovation of the party, rather than see the Soviets impose their man, for example on the occasion of the defeat of the Left in 1978.

Could Mitterrand help Marchais to keep his position? "Georges" did not think so for one minute. The first secretary of the Socialist Party, in Marchais' view, had only one idea in his head: to reduce the strength of the PCF, for which was only a steppingstone for him.

When he reached this stage in the drama, Marchais made a new point. He knew the Russians. In their view Eurocommunism was a single entity, a system to be uprooted totally. He knew that, in their view, the Soviets attributed diabolic cohesion to what was not, after all, anything more than a set of ideas and not a new center of communism. Therefore, you could not mince words with them.

Marchais knew that, with such tough negotiators, it was a matter of Eurocommunism against his position as secretary general. "Georges" saw that his salvation lay in accommodating himself to the Soviets.

The Soviets accepted. Without the PCF they knew that the Eurocommunist structure would crumble. And so it happened.

Once the PCF was back in the fold, they could allow Marchais to act as he saw fit within his own party.

We know what happened then!

5170

CSO: 3519/44

POLITICAL

GREECE

POLITICAL MOVES BY FORMER MINISTER ARSENIS REPORTED

Possible Kyrkos-Arsenis Alliance

Athens 1 VRADYNI in Greek 2 Nov 85 pp 1, 5

/Text/ Serious developments are being methodically planned in the PASOK and KKE-Int. moderate Left area with Leon. Kyrkos (KKE-Int. chairman) and deputy and former PASOK minister Arsenis as protagonists. Their objective is to create a new political party which, it is expected, will be joined by other former PASOK ministers (the name of Ap. Alevras is mentioned).

On learning about the activities of his old friend, Premier Papandreou warned Arsenis that if he continued such activities he would be expelled from PASOK and would be charged with undermining "Change" and with conspiracy to defect.

According to political observers, the "conspiracy" charge concerns the protection Arsenis has given and continues to give to expelled /from PASOK/ syndicalists who are ready to follow him in establishing the new party which ideologically will stand between PASOK and KKE-Exterior, and which, according to reliable sources, may be joined by former PASOK ministers Emm. Drettakis and St. Panagoulis. The possibility of other PASOK cadres joining it is not excluded, while it is certain that a considerable number of KKE-Int. cadres will participate in establishing the new party. Other sources, however, are not certain that Drettakis and Panagoulis may join the new party since they were elected as deputies under the KKE banner.

An article published in yesterday's AVRIANI, which is affiliated with Minister /of Interior and Public Order/ Menios /Koutsogiorgas/ is revealing. It refers to the Arsenis denial about his leaving PASOK and states:

"With his statement which leaves things unsettled and which he made after several days of silence, Arsenis denied the orgy of rumors that he would leave PASOK." It added: "The concern that existed among the government deputies was apparent. Moreover, certain deputies did not hide their fears about the possibility of an Arsenis defection."

In the meantime, AVRIANI's "sister", the morning newspaper POLITIKI, created a sudden Lalliotis "affair" by pointing out in a front-page headline that the government spokesman "gives the lie to Andreas the the Executive Office."

The article claims that with his statement 2 days ago ("I do not share the deductions of certain newspapers about fears and panics"), Lalliotis in essence refuted A. Papandreou and the members of the Executive Office who spoke about an imminent danger against Change by planned defections and other destabilizing activities.

Another column in the same newspaper said Deputy Press Minister Lalliotis and his assistant P. Evthimiou will soon be replaced because A. Papandreou "is not satisfied with their work." The paper mentioned as their successors D. Maroudas and Sot. Kostopoulos who "were successful" in the past as spokesmen.

The article resulted in a furious reaction on the part of Lalliotis while the premier's Political Office remained silent, a fact which political observers interpret as a direct confirmation of the article's content.

In the meantime it was made known that the PASOK Disciplinary Council had met to consider the case of the "rebel" Mitropoulos, a member of the Central Committee and decided not to expel him, but to impose a 6-month suspension of his party identity which means that, henceforth, he will not be a member of the Central Committee. Political observers consider the non-expulsion of Mitropoulos as an indication of existing fears and an exhaustion of the limits of hard reactions.

But last night Mitropoulos himself reacted with a hard statement which may now bring about his expulsion from PASOK. With his statement he accused PASOK as "autocratic" and the government as failing to coalesce with the social forces struggling for Change.

Arsenis Details Economic Program

Athens ETHNOS in Greek 5 Nov 85 p 2

/Text/ "The democratic planning with the participation of the people constitutes the basis of a viable economic development." This statement was made last night by former minister Arsenis in a speech at the Argos free open university within the framework of open discussions on the economy. The discussions are organized by the city's Labor Center. More than 800 persons attended the extremely interesting Arsenis speech at the end of which there was a question and answer period that lasted for more than an hour. Also present were many economists from the Argolis and other nomes, representing all political parties.

In his speech Arsenis underlined:

First: A self-supporting economic development must be the result of democratic planning which pre-assumes the proper functioning of the democratic state at the grassroots level.

Second: Democratic planning opposes the conservative meaning of development which leads to social and economic impasse.

Third: Maximization of individual initiative is necessary. Democratic planning says "no" to the competition between individual initiative and the public sector. It proposes a deep modification in the use of the individual.

Arsenis also pointed out that the public sector must be cleansed soon, the banks must be socialized, the functioning of the Supervisory Councils must be advanced, as should the real decentralization.

Balancing

Arsenis, whose speech was continually applauded, also referred to self-supporting economic development and pointed out that:

First: The economy must become competitive.

Second: There should be balancing between production and consumption.

Third: Production should be flexible (the economy, in other words, should be developed simultaneously in many sectors).

Arsenis also warned that the four-five large projects to be announced will not save the economy, but a number of small interconnected projects proposed by the rank and file can save it. He specifically referred to the Amvrakikos Bay projects which have already been scheduled with the participation of many agencies.

Arsenis also pointed out that during the first 4-year PASOK term the foundations of such democratic scheduling had been laid and we must now proceed with their completion for a self-supporting economic development. In his closing remarks he underlined that several 4-year terms are needed for bringing about Change and that the change of a social system is a difficult task.

7520

CSO: 3521/38

POLITICAL

GREECE

GOALS OF FORMER MINISTER ARSENIS SEEN UNCLEAR

Athens TA NEA in Greek 10 Nov 85 p 5

/Article by Pandelis Kapsis/

/Excerpts/ The most important problem that a socialist government in Greece will have to face is foreign deficits and the danger of the International Monetary Fund. This fact had been primarily maintained by Mr Gerasimos Arsenis at a congress that he had organized prior to the 1981 elections, namely the Center for Mediterranean Studies, with the topic being the passage to socialism.

Like a bitter irony of fate, almost 5 years later Mr Arsenis' prediction has been confirmed, the only thing being, however, that it cost him his position in the Ministry of National Economy.

Nevertheless, the irony in the "Arsenis case" does not stop here. Prior to the last elections, a top-ranking cadre of PASOK's Executive Office had contended --and he is certainly not the only one-- that Mr Arsenis' "technocratisms" do not mean socialism.

A few days later, Mr Arsenis ceased being a member of the government. However, it would be difficult for one to maintain that economic policy has become more socialistic.

These inconsistencies, beyond their anecdotal interest, will perhaps help in better understanding certain of the dimensions of the "Arsenis problem." Because, of course, regardless of existing political differences, it is certain that the picture being projected to public opinion, and that often constitutes a subject of exploitation by both government and opposition newspapers, is to a great extent distorted by personal differences.

It is true that today Mr G. Arsenis has a different approach to economic problems and the policy that is required for confronting them. In his latest speech before the Chamber of Deputies, for example, he admitted that there is need for corrective measures. He added, nevertheless, that "we should boldly say that corrective measures for meeting the 1985 targets is one thing and a new economic policy, having as its basis new estimates for the next 4-year period and new estimates for domestic and foreign developments is another thing."

Mr Arsenis has not yet made clear where he disagrees with the new economic policy nor what these domestic and foreign developments that influence it are. Until now he has restricted himself to some general comments on the economy where he stresses the developmental role of the state and institutional and structural changes.

It is exactly this effort of his to differentiate, to put his own stamp, without at the same time aggravating tensions, and to cross the line of party legitimacy, is the most indicative factor of his future position.

It must, nevertheless, be noted that this estimate on the "legitimacy" of his intentions is not shared by all in PASOK's leadership.

5671

CSO: 3521/44

POLITICAL

GREECE

SARTZETAKIS' DIFFICULTIES: 'STYLE,' NOT 'SUBSTANCE'

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 10 Nov 85 pp 2-3

/Article by M. Dimitriou/

/Excerpts/ Is there a "Sartzetakis issue" and to what extent? Prime Minister A. Papandreou's statement the day before yesterday to the Ministerial Council has put an end to the talk of the past few days about a change in the person holding the highest office of the land.

The prime minister emphasized, "A president of the republic exists, namely Mr Khristos Sartzetakis. Any other discussion about another person, including myself, is deceitful and without basis because it serves destabilizing intentions."

Nevertheless, together with all of those who "deceitfully" talk about the issue of Mr A. Papandreou's being elected as the fifth president of the Third Greek Republic, there are also certain straightforward and sincere persons. These are the people who base their reasoning of the facts, namely the following:

- That Mr Menios Koutsogiorgas, when he had sounded out Mr Them. Kourousopoulos, president of the Council of State, about the presidency of the republic, it is said that he had talked to him about a 2-year term of office (until March 1987). It seems that no such limit was placed on Mr Sartzetakis.

- That there is some sort of tradition that says that "charismatic prime ministers" become presidents of the republic.

- That Prime Minister Papandreou has distinguished himself into becoming a personality having broad political acceptance.

Second Five-Year Term

On the other hand, there was a clear pre-electoral statement by Mr Sartzetakis when he answered Mr Mitsotakis' allegations that the president of the republic must resign in case his party were to win the elections. Mr Sartzetakis emphasized at that time (as it was mentioned in the communique of the president of the republic) that "he does not in any way intend to resign. He will remain...until the last day of the 5-year term of office" for which he had been elected, i.e. until 31 March 1990.

At the same time, according to certain information, Mr Sartzetakis is looking at a second 5-year term of office --a desire that he has discussed with certain persons having his trust.

Mr Sartzetakis' desire to be reelected and to serve as president of the republic until 1995 plainly indicates his decision to "conduct himself" as president of all the Greek people, to preserve and strengthen his supports and to reinforce his portrait as the first citizen of the land.

It is exactly this latter ambition and "noble systematic endeavor" on the part of Mr Sartzetakis that harbors certain small and large problems that often lead to attacks. This concerns "the Sartzetakis style" as president of the republic.

Both the selective staffing of the office of the president of the republic and certain specific legislative adjustments that were called for and that had been voted for by the Chamber of Deputies indicate that Mr Sartzetakis wanted to create an "environment of trust" in the Irodis Attikou Building.

The broad powers held by the secretary general of the office of the president of the republic, namely former judge Mr Leonidas Papakaryas, no longer appears to suffice.

Thus, the "confinement" of Amb. Kon. Zeppos in the position of director of the Diplomatic Office and his being forcedly put out of commission have resulted in some problems being created with neighboring countries (Yugoslavia and Albania).

Let us, however, take a look at the so-called "Sartzetakis style" in all of its aspects (governmental, political, institutional and public).

It should be stressed that Mr Sartzetakis (regardless of how much certain people maintain that he is obsessed by "some kind of Karamanlis syndrome") does not want, as did his predecessor, to intervene in the government's task through ingenious recommendations and proposals, with the exception of three areas, namely justice, social welfare and television. Mr K. Karamanlis had also extended his interest to issues of the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of National Defense.

Once again, however, the interest of the president of the republic in justice, social welfare and television was more academic and advisory in nature except perhaps for the promotions in the Supreme Court last July.

Sometimes, of course, these interests clash with radical choices made by the government as, for example, in family planning (contraception, abortions, etc.) where Mr Sartzetakis is said to be suggesting that it must be confronted with altogether opposite criteria and in correlation with the population explosion in Turkey.

Generally speaking, one may say that despite some "clouds" the relations of the president of the republic with the government are harmonious and productive.

With regard to the political forces, while the acceptance of the president of the republic has now been supported following Mr K. Mitsotakis' "obligatory statement," come clouds have been created through the "at will" implementation of the protocol to the detriment personally of Mr Kharilaos Florakis and the two KKE's.

Conclusively, there have been until now maladroitness and manipulations in the political arena that have given cause for allegations that within the office of the president of the republic there lurks the danger of arrogance, verbosity, entrenchment from the people and their social representatives and old-time conformity.

The intention of the enemies of the current president to magnify small problems and "small eccentricities" must not give cause for criticism.

The current president of the republic has not obviously been helped by his advisers to maintain the political and popular acceptance he deserves (especially after the end of the Mitsotakis controversy). The office of the president of the republic does not change press officials "like a shirt," it is not only distinguished by the bad manners of certain of its public relations officials, it does not arbitrarily prohibit the presence of journalists (the ultimate case being the French president's press office woman director being denied access when the president had visited Mr Sartzetakis on 22 June) and photographers, but it also shows that he is being kept away from the needed spirit of dialogue, mutual trust and communication.

It is therefore clear that the so-called "Sartzetakis style" favors critics. Especially so if it is associated with allegations about conservative nationalistic ideology and mentality. Assuredly, Mr Sartzetakis has a deep feeling of patriotism. And yet recourse to the traditional ideals of Greek Orthodoxy, continuous aggressiveness toward the Slavs, rhetorical references to the "Macedonian" problem, endless conversion of history into an "ideological tool" all give rise to obviously disloyal talk.

Following Prime Minister Papandreou's explicit statement the issue that had been created with regard to the president of the republic has now certainly come to an end. What has not come to an end, however, is the "Sartzetakis style." The current president has become, thanks to PASOK's political choice, the common point of reference of the country's "progressive forces." However, this "presidential majority" is not something static and always a given fact regardless of how difficult it is to overturn its consequences.

5671
CSO: 3521/44

POLITICAL

GREECE

ND'S MITSOTAKIS SEEN INCREASINGLY 'ANTI-KARAMANLIS'

Athens ENA in Greek 14 Nov 85 p 11

/Excerpts/ Within ND, there are those who consider K. Mitsotakis' decision to move forward toward a "de-Karamanlisization" of the party as a sign of superiority while others consider it as a desperate defensive effort. Through a series of bold moves, ND's president has removed from key ND posts all cadres who had not submitted to him and has had them replaced with persons having his trust.

A short description of the changes in the party apparatus confirms Mitsotakis' intention to place ND under his complete control because all the changes have two common characteristics: the individuals being assigned to key party posts are either completely trusted by the ND leader or have virtually repudiated the party's "Karamanlis assets."

With regard to the category of trusted persons, indicative of the prevailing situation are the promotions and assignments of the following: promotion of Manolis Kefalogiannis to the chairmanship of the Central Regional Organization Committee (KEPO) replacing I. Varvitsiotis; the election of Giannis Kefalogiannis as member of the political council following the neutralization of "the distinguished ones;" the assignment of the youth organization to Vang. Meimarakis; the selection of the journalists of the press office; the makeup of K. Mitsotakis' private office where two relatives rule (Dora's daughter and Mrs M. Kypraiou); the assignment of his brother-in-law Pavlos Bakogiannis as political adviser; the promotion of G. Voukelatos in the "new post" of general director of the political office, etc. (the latter had discarded, even prior to the election, every pro-Rallis title and had for some time claimed Mitsotakis' confidence).

Similarly commented on is the fact that two of the three parliamentary party representatives (Than. Kanellopoulos and Mikh. Papakonstandinou) do not come from the party itself but from the Center and consequently are considered anything but expressers and guardians of the "Karamanlis mortgage." Even the only representative of the old guard who ousted G. Varvitsiotis from the post of secretary general of the parliamentary group, namely Than. Tsaldaris, is considered by other cadres as a "newly-converted" anti-Karamanlist.

Somewhat more cautious and with the maintenance of pretence is the attempted divestment of Milt. Evert's party props. Thus, following the planned refusal of the title of parliamentary representative, Milt. Evert is now realizing that the guns are being aimed at his own group. Ang. Bratakos, director general of the party, who

is considered "his man," received a grievous blow at the beginning of the week: with the appointment of G. Vouvelatos as director general of the political office, a significant net of authority is transferred from of the office of the party director general to K. Mitsotakis' office that fully controls the newly-elected political office. Besides, Ang. Bratakos had already quite a few indications of the disfavor and distrust of the leader's entourage. When a few days ago he began the preliminary work for the selection and assignment of the new unit chiefs of the party, he was informed by Dora Bakogianni not to concern himself with this matter because "the list of new unit chiefs is already being drawn up by the president's office."

K. Mitsotakis' entourage does not consider all of these moves as being provocative or aggressive in nature. They are described as being legitimate acts of a lawful defense against every illegitimate and irregular question of a lawful and elected leadership. And given the fact that the guns are being aimed selectively at the party's "Karamanlis havens" one can easily presume whom K. Mitsotakis considers as "moral instigator" of the question.

This theory is not only categorically rejected by those party cadres in disgrace but is also criticized as being ostensible in nature since "the one doing the attacking will appear as being on the defensive." They maintain that "Mitsotakis is not being threatened by K. Karamanlis but that he is afraid of Karamanlism." In explaining this they add that "the authoritarianism of the present ND leader cannot be imposed on a traditionalist political party that has prominent and enlightened cadres and is imbued with principles and ideas that he himself had opposed during the greater part of his political career. Consequently, the survival of Mitsotakis in ND requires the 'de-Karamanlisization' of the party," according to these same cadres.

Within these conditions, the question as to which of these two versions (with reference to the reasons for the persecution of the Karamanlists) is the true one no longer has any significance. The interest is confined to and culminates in the expected reaction of the party wing in disgrace and also perhaps of the founder of the party himself.

5671
CSO: 3521/44

POLITICAL

GREECE

BRIEFS

AMBASSADOR ANDROPOV'S ABSENCE PUZZLING--According to diplomatic circles, the extended absence of Soviet Ambassador Andropov from Athens could mean a conscious downgrading of relations with Greece. Up to now, it was felt that Mr Andropov's absence --as well as Consul General Smirnov's-- must be linked to the Bokhan case together with the investigations being conducted on this matter in Moscow where the two Soviet diplomats are. The same circles, however, maintain that there are certain indications that lead to the conclusion that the possibility that the Soviet leadership wants to show its dissatisfaction with the Greek Government over the Bokhan case or perhaps over more general policy issues cannot be ruled out. Nevertheless, according to these same circles, the personnel assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Athens is now considerably reduced, particularly with regard to the trade representation. It has also been noted that the Greek Government delegation at yesterday's reception on the occasion of the Soviet national holiday was significantly smaller than in previous years. /Text/ /Athens I MESIMVRINI in Greek
8 Nov 85 p 3/ 5671

CSO: 3521/44

POLITICAL

ITALY

PCI PLENUM DEBATES CONGRESS THESES AMENDMENTS

PM161220 Milan L'UNITA in Italian 9 Dec 85 pp 2-3

[Antonio Caprarica, Stefano Cingolani, Giorgio Frasca Polara, Fausto Ibba, Eugenio Manca, Enzo Roggis, and Marco Sappino report: "Central Committee Discussion and Voting on Congress Theses"]

[Excerpts] Preamble

The preamble to the theses, which outlines the domestic and international political framework within which the congress is called upon to reach its decisions, underwent only a few slight changes. An amendment from [Directorate member Tullio] Vecchietti on the Geneva meeting was approved by 69 votes to 51: The text of the Committee of 77 is maintained where it states that it laid the groundwork for more relaxed relations between the two major powers, but instead of stating that it "reopened the prospect of a halting of the arms race," it is now stated that "it can create favorable conditions for reversing the trend to the arms race."

Characteristics and Values of Socialism in the Italian Communists' Conception (Thesis 1)

On Thesis 1, which defines "the characteristics and values of socialism in the Italian Communists' conception," some 20 amendments were examined covering a number of complex general definitions. At one point it states that the "advanced areas" of capitalism "determine" or "influence" world trends even in the countries of "real socialism" as well as in the dependent underdeveloped areas. Trivelli proposed leaving "influence" and eliminating "determine," which seemed to him excessive, but his amendment was not adopted.

In the section dealing with the tasks of the Left "in the industrialized and 'postindustrial' West," the definition "postindustrial," already cautiously placed in inverted commas, was dropped. An amendment from [Directorate member Adalberto] Minucci describing that expression as "a groundless linguistic invasion with no scientific basis" was adopted by 84 votes to 60.

Next there was a lively discussion on the following passage: "We must now have a more fluid view of socialism in which the aspect of real current movement and that of the historical phase converge." Luporini defended the

expression "a more fluid view" as the most precise way of expressing a dialectical view of historical processes, not a "rigid step-by-step" conception, but he then accepted for reasons of linguistic accessibility [Directorate member Luciano] Barca's amendment ("uncrystallized view"), subsequently adopted by a large majority. An amendment from Rosario Villari designed, as she put it, to make this concept of the "fluidity" of historical processes more explicit was not adopted, however. "Rather than asserting ideal prospects of definitive solutions and formulating abstract projects," her amendment said, "we should fully exploit the gains and reforms" that the workers movement has helped to achieve during its history and thence to derive confidence "for present action." It seemed to Barca who was supported by Garavini, that it not only "dialecticalized" the view of historical processes but ultimately caused an abstract view of all research in the direction of socialism. A majority of votes rejected Villari's amendment.

A significant issue was raised by an amendment from [Directorate member Giorgio] Napolitano. Thesis 1 states that "a conception of socialism in terms of the complete state ownership of the means of production and exchange and in terms of the administrative management of planning is alien to us" (Liberini suggested that this passage was well-founded inasmuch as "complete state ownership" creates "forms of bureaucratic power and wastefulness and hinders research").

Next it states that Communists now regard public intervention as a means of orienting the overall development of the economy "in a market in which private enterprise, a public sector, and a strong cooperative sector all operate." The next sentence states that "beyond that it is the forces at play that must decide," as long as the "universal value" of democracy is guaranteed. It seemed to Napolitano that the expression "beyond that" might create the mistaken impression of an acknowledgement of the role of the market as something temporary, which conflicts with a viewpoint clearly defined in the theses and ratified by previous congresses. Turci and Ranieri too thought that the expression could be interpreted as a kind of "duplicity," especially since with regard to historical prospects the theses state that the capitalist system "is not the ultimate manifestation of civilization." Badaloni, however, said that there can be no misunderstandings because of the reassertion of the fundamental value of democracy: In any case it is impossible to place restrictions on what kinds of ownership could prevail in the future. Andiani too said he saw no danger of a misunderstanding. Luporini perceived in Napolitano's remarks a "rigid conception of socialism." However, he added, so that it is clear that "we do not want to conceal the truth," the text could be amended if it was considered that suspicions of duplicity could arise. This latter argument was also supported by Margheri.

First [Secretariat member Aldo] Tortorella then [Secretary General Alessandro] Natta recommended a formulation that would exclude misunderstandings without appearing to presume to dictate historical developments and of course leaving intact the sense of an outlook transcending the horizons of capitalist society. It was decided to entrust the reformulation of this passage to the theses drafting committee.

Next an amendment from [Directorate member Edoardo] Perna was approved, re-asserting the universal value of democracy and stating that "the struggle for socialism, conceived in terms of this indissoluble bond with the values of democracy and freedom," must aim to "render effective and to extend all individual and collective rights" and to promote the citizens' broadest participation "in reaching fundamental decisions on our political, economic, and social approach."

An amendment from [Directorate member Armando] Cossutta prompted a lively discussion on the point which states that in the developed countries "the transcending of the capitalist system can be conceived not in terms of major traumatic breaks but of a complex combination..." and so forth. Cossutta, who said he considered "a clear statement of intention" necessary, proposed that this sentence begin: "Communists work for the transcending of capitalism...." [Directorate member Fabio] Mussi, De Pasquale, Andriani, Libertini, [Directorate member Gerardo] Chiaromonte, Triva, Spriano, and Peggio all spoke against the proposal, which was basically supported by Tognoni. With differences of detail, it was pointed out that the idea of the "transcending" of capitalism is made absolutely clear in the theses but that Cossutta's amendment embodied an element which exceeded the party's immediate tasks and which conflicts with the view of socialism as a process, as defined in the theses. The Cossutta amendment was rejected by a very large majority (with two votes in favor, from Cossutta and Cappelloni).

An amendment from Natta was adopted, however, providing the following clarification: "the transcending of the capitalist system is regarded by Italian Communists..." and so forth, thus eliminating any misunderstanding.

Peace and Disarmament (Thesis 2)

Several substantive requests were made for changes to this thesis. Following a debate some were withdrawn or shelved pending an examination of the program document. First, a recommendation from [Secretariat member] Gian Carlo Pajetta that the nonaligned countries' role in the international detente process be stressed was accepted.

Fieschi submitted a two-part amendment--regarding the passage which identifies the rejection of the militarization of space as a prime and indispensable condition for balanced and controlled disarmament--suggesting the inclusion of a direct reference to the responsibility in this connection of the Reagan administration, whose conduct has constituted "the chief obstacle" to the initiation of a progressive elimination of the blocs and which was facilitated "the acceleration of the rearmament process." Illustrating his proposal with a series of details, Fieschi described it as "an erroneous stance less advanced than those of the European social democratic parties and of the U.S. democratic community not to specify the U.S. responsibilities in this regard."

Gian Carlo Pajetta immediately suggested, in the light of the Geneva summit, that the fields of greatest conflict between the superpowers--star wars, for instance--be regarded as "still open to the quest for solutions based on a rapprochement of stances or an understanding." Next, Ledda proposed an

alternative amendment to the first section instead of Fieschi's, namely, to specify that the militarization of space "is now specifically reflected in the U.S. SDI program." Luciana Castellina requested the inclusion of "a general assessment of U.S. policy" in Thesis 15, which in her opinion is "particularly incomplete." [Directorate member Giulio] Quercini said he basically agreed with Ledda's suggestion.

At this point the debate on Fieschi's original proposal was combined with some observations made by Luporini. In his opinion, the PCI "is a long way behind in its formulation of a precise policy on disarmament and security" as compared to the German SPD, which has, in this connection, "developed relations and a dialogue with the East European parties." [Foreign Section Chief Antonio] Rubbi accepted Ledda's amendment and stated his opposition to Fieschi's "approach," which "challenges the very structure of the document and evades analysis as much as possible."

Galluzzi added that "a process of apportioning blame would ultimately cause us to neglect the novelty of the resumption of the dialogue in Geneva and the importance which the PCI attaches to the opportunities provided for negotiation." Segre too regarded the original text of Thesis 2 as "of greater political force" with regard to the possibilities of dialogue. Garavini, agreeing with Luporini, asked that there be "no failure to mention here that European governments' support for SDI is an obstacle to the detente process." [Directorate member Pietro] Ingrao, citing Luporini's remarks, said he favored the identification of "the Americans' primary responsibilities." The PCI, which has always forcefully pointed to Soviet responsibilities, "must not show any timidity on this point, lest we obscure an essential aspect of our policy."

According to Ingrao, there is no question of "an anti-U.S. gesture," since "there too there are currents of sharp criticism of the Reagan administration's conduct." Ingrao said he supported Fieschi's and Luporini's requests.

Gianotti supported them too ("The future of Geneva will depend partly on pressures on the European governments in connection with SDI"). Pieralli proposed emphasizing the reference to "star wars" by including the Ledda amendment (points to "specific responsibilities") in the policy document and an amendment from Luporini ("concerning the role of the European and Italian Governments") in the program document. Cossutta supported Fieschi's and Luporini's proposals. [Directorate member Paolo] Bufalini, however, supported Ledda's proposal (warning against "forecasting areas of negotiation through sweeping assertions") combined with a worried assessment of the consequences of the decision "adopted and carried forward" by the U.S. Administration. At this point Luporini accepted Pieralli's suggestion to transfer his request to the program document.

Natta spoke next to advise against "overly isolating each individual thesis in the documents, which should be in the nature of political statements, not analyses of responsibilities or reconstructions of causes." The PCI secretary general stressed that the text submitted already reflected "our unequivocal position of absolute opposition to the militarization of space and to European

governments' support, especially Italy's, for the SDI program." To "avoid distorting the substance of the theses," Natta asked for the adoption only of Ledda's amendment, which is "explanatory and elucidatory." Ledda's amendment was indeed adopted unanimously and Fieschi did not insist on his own.

Next two more amendments were submitted, one from Cossutta, the other from Gianotti.

Cossutta's amendment stated that "in order to halt the general arms race it is necessary first to isolate and defeat the plan pursued by the U.S. leaders for economic, political, and military domination worldwide." This domination, he said, "has encountered increasing limitations in the expansion of the area of socialist countries, the development of the anti-imperialist struggles, and the quest, however difficult, for real national autonomy on the part of former colonial countries." The United States, he went on, "has increased its political and military aggressiveness" within the context of "an offensive strategy designed to block the peaceful development of the socialist countries' economies and the developing countries' autonomous national experiences."

Returning to Natta's observations about the nature of the document, Bufalini described this amendment as "an outright thesis in itself" which "raises important political issues," on which he urged Cossutta to "reflect." Bufalini said: "The analysis of responsibilities is a complex issue and cannot be unilateral but must be conducted on the basis of an objective historical reconstruction. Otherwise the net result would be a denial of our policy line, pursued for years and years, even in a different situation. Such an amendment would introduce into the congress debate a number of arguments that are not helpful at the moment. Some of our criticisms of particular acts or tendencies of Soviet policy were, and remain, justified. But I see no reason now for a controversy that would have the result of reducing the impact on our assessment and stances of the elements of dynamism of the present Soviet initiative."

Following Bufalini's speech Cossutta spoke next, announcing that he was not withdrawing his amendment. In the vote that followed he was defeated by a very large majority (with only two votes in favor).

Next Gianotti's amendment was considered. Gianotti proposed at first that immediately after the reference to the elimination of the blocs the following sentence be inserted: "We believe that unilateral acts limited to disarmament can facilitate a climate of international trust and mark a change of course."

The following spoke on the subject: Boffa, Castellina, De Pasquale, Maura, Vagli, Gerace, Pieralli, Bufalini, Vitali, Andriani, and Gruppi--all of them opposing "unilateral acts," for various reasons.

A revised version of Gianotti's amendment was defeated by 95 votes to 55.

At Cappelloni's request the whole of Thesis 2 was submitted to a vote in which it was approved by a very large majority, with only 3 abstentions (Cappelloni, Castellina, and Cossutta).

New Order in International Relations

An amendment from Bassolino asserting the need for "a major democratic thrust capable of influencing parliament and the government" for "the reform of article 80 of the constitution, on the procedures for the appraisal and approval of international treaties and for the establishing new rights and powers of public intervention" in connection with missile deployment. The amendment stressed "the just demand for a referendum on Comiso." In the debate it was pointed out that this issue was a matter for the program document.

PCI and the Countries of "Real Socialism" (Thesis 14)

Before broaching the substance of the thesis the subject of its title was raised, starting with an objection from Boffa concerning the expression "real socialism" (which is in inverted commas in the thesis): "This," Boffa pointed out, "is an expression which originated with a polemical intent directed against us, to stress in fact that the 'reality' of those experiences was there in opposition to our criticisms. But it does not even appear in Soviet documents now. I would therefore suggest using the expression 'socialist-type countries.'" Several objections were made, which can be summed up in Ingrao's remarks: "'Real socialism' is indeed an artificial term, which does, however, present easily identifiable characteristics the expression 'socialist-type,' however, seems to me too difficult and threatens to obscure our critique of those countries." Other formulations were suggested by various comrades--Napolitano ("Countries governed by communist parties" or countries "with a communist leadership"), Natta ("socialist countries," simply because this is the expression generally used in current political and diplomatic documents), Gruppi ("Of socialist leanings"), Mussi, and Berlinguer (the former proposed a descriptive title, so to speak: "The PCI and Relations with The USSR and China"). Ultimately there was a vote in favor of keeping the title unchanged, by 102 to 97.

Next two amendments from Cossutta were considered, which virtually replaced the existing thesis. The first, he explained, was designed to emphasize the value of the October revolution as a "permanent ideological inspiration and reference point" for Italian Communists, who are committed "to the theoretical development and practical implementation of the 'Italian road to socialism'" and the second concerning the thesis' critical verdict on the characteristics of Eastern bloc societies. According to Cossutta, the latter would mean "taking undue account of the external pressure exerted on us" and consequently underestimating the innovative elements that have emerged in the life of Soviet society: "It would therefore be a serious mistake to reassert the verdict issued by the 16th congress, since events have shown that it was incorrect."

The first to reply was Spirano, who denied that the assessments issued by the last congress had isolated the PCI, as Cossutta argued: "On the contrary, the international status that we acquired by adopting those stances has enabled us to expand our ties with the other left-wing and democratic forces." The next speaker was Natta, who pointed out that the innovations that have occurred in the USSR's leadership do not disprove the stances adopted by the PCI over the years but in fact reinforce them: "Of course there can be no question of

presuming too much or of considering our opinions decisive, but certainly our encouragements of serious and thorough reforms in those countries, first and foremost in the field of democracy, were precisely in the direction that is now emerging. And we would not now be making a wise, opportune, or useful move, partly as regards the attempts under way in the USSR, if we were to dilute our critical encouragements or weaken our stances."

The same opinion was expressed by [Directorate member Gianni] Cervetti and Rubbi, while Cappelloni spoke in support of Cossutta's proposal, stressing that the innovations in the Soviet leadership "stem from the democratic potentials that I believe are still present in that society." Next Bufalani asked Cossutta to withdraw his amendment, but the suggestion was not accepted. The ensuing vote resulted in the rejection of both amendments, with only two dissenting votes.

It was decided that the drafting committee should consider an amendment from Trentin designed to specify some aspects of what Thesis 14 calls the "fundamental shortcomings which generally characterize" the countries of "real socialism." Another amendment from Trentin concerning "trade union freedom" in those countries was not adopted, simply because this concept was considered to be embraced in the assertion that the need for new forms of economic management "cannot be separated from the need for promoting forms of democratic life, individual freedom, political participation, and public initiative." An amendment submitted by Turci, to include a reference to Afghanistan in this thesis, was not adopted because the Afghan issue is raised in the international section of the program document, which was considered the most natural context for it. An amendment from Pieralli confirming appreciation of Yugoslavia's role in the nonaligned movement and of Cuba's effort in connection with the Third World countries' debts was adopted as a recommendation for the final draft.

Relations With the United States (Thesis 15)

A broad debate took place on this thesis, which aims to specify the PCI's stance toward the United States. The text proposed by the committee of 77 states that the PCI nurtures no "anti-American feelings," while nevertheless combating the Reagan administration's "policy of rearmament and of seeking supremacy." It states that the PCI's stance is dictated not "only by the awareness that Italy belongs to an alliance in which the United States has an essential role," but also by confidence in "the American people's democratic energies" and by the desire for cooperation with the most advanced U.S. cultural and political forces. Luciana Castellina criticized the entire formulation of Thesis 15, saying that in its indictment of U.S. policy and assertion of its dangerous nature it is less advanced than even certain Socialist International documents. Comrade Castellina presented an amendment intended to replace it completely. It states, among other things, that "a dogmatic and splittist view of U.S. life is not part of Italian Communists' culture." This, however, does not eliminate the "crucial" problem of "a new U.S. quest for hegemony." It argues that Reaganism is not a passing trend but reflects something more deep-rooted --a long-term response to the seventies crisis of the capitalist order.

It is the "quest for world domination," which uses the East-West conflict partly by "exaggerating the condemnation of the alleged Soviet expansionist threat." So it is not enough to say that Italy "must remain within the Atlantic pact, defending its own national dignity and the alliance's defensive nature": It is necessary to recognize "the topical and substantive reasons for our autonomy." Last, it states that "while it is true that the Geneva summit could not reverse the basic trend of the U.S. world policy (and any delusions in this regard would weaken our position), that meeting did certainly demonstrate the forces that are opposed to that policy." Another amendment was proposed by Marisa Rodano, who considered the wording of Thesis 15 "defensive," because "it seems to shelve the struggle against the Reagan administration."

Napolitano voiced his sharp disagreement with Castellina's amendment, which he described as "dismissive" of the theses put forward by the committee, in which the will to combat the Reagan administration and the assertion of its dangerous nature are repeatedly expressed in the most vigorous manner. There is another slant to Thesis 15: It concerns the PCI's specific attitude toward the United States as a whole. The intention was to stress that our opposition to Reagan's policy implies neither a negation of the possibility of Italian Communists' cooperation with the more progressive U.S. cultural and political forces nor a calling into question of our country's alliance with the United States, this latter being a point on which the most artificial attacks on our party are based. Napolitano said that Castellina's amendment rejects the basic intention behind Thesis 15 and constitutes a sort of summary of criticisms already made in various parts of the document, or presents very questionable assessments such as the description of the Reagan policy as a "long-term" trend. Boffa too stressed that for the first time Thesis 15 specifically defines the PCI's stance toward the United States and he defended its substance, pointing out that Comrade Castellina's amendment eliminates crucial aspects of our international stances, including our assessment of the Geneva summit. Ledda voiced his disagreement with Castellina's amendment, stressing the specific character of this thesis, which broaches the new issue of the PCI's relations with the United States. However, precisely to this end he proposed a number of corrections to the draft submitted by the committee. He said that he too was not an "anti-American" (though he "deplored this current identification of America and the United States") but considered Thesis 15 "defensive and conciliatory" and undermined by the "quest for some basic legitimization." According to Luporini, such an approach "gains us no friends either in Europe, or in the American area as a whole, or in the United States." Gruppi spoke in favor of Rodano's amendment and against Castellina's.

Ingrao said he agreed with Comrade Castellina's stance, adding that it concerns "an important point" of the "document." One of the mainstays of the theses, Ingrao said, is the analysis of Reaganism and of its contradictions. We must not underestimate the tenacity of the existence of an American imperial system. A clear stance in this regard would make us more confident in tackling splittist positions. Cossutta said he agreed with Castellina's amendment because it asserts the desire for friendship with the U.S. people but "at the same time issues a verdict on the imperialist U.S. policy in the military, economic, and political fields." Mazza voiced the opinion that a "revised" version of Castellina's amendment "could be taken into careful consideration."

Gian Carlo Pajetta said he rejected Castellina's amendment "because it conflicts so much with the theses" already adopted. Thesis 15 is not dictated by a desire to "gain legitimization" but seeks a more correct approach. Pajetta said, however, that a reformulation would be possible, taking account of Rodano's and Ledda's amendments.

Natta spoke next. We must not write defensive documents or provide sops or seek legitimization, he said. Thesis 15 is devoted not to a verdict on the Reagan administration, which is however mentioned, but to another important matter: the relationship between our party--a party, let us remember, that aspires to govern Italy in the centuries ahead--and the reality of a country allied to our own and the forces at play within the United States. Having said this, let the clearest formulations be adopted. Comrade Castellina, however, issues verdicts which conflict with those already asserted in our document. For instance, we must be careful with regard to the significance of the Geneva summit. In any case we have said there is an element of innovation there and we perceive a change of course or at least the halting of a very negative trend. And we emphasize this innovation partly to encourage all the forces committed to detente. But if we say first that a hope has emerged we cannot immediately add: But it is an illusion!

Next Natta added that there is no doubt about the need for the most explicit criticism of the U.S. Administration's policy, which is indeed expressed in many points of the document. The aim of Thesis 15, however, is to confirm our attitude toward the U.S. political and cultural reality, within the context of the Italian-U.S. relationship of alliance. This--Napolitano is right--is in order to dispel a preconception that has surrounded us and that has burdened Italian political relations. In other words, it is a matter of stating explicitly what we are and what we want to be and of seeking relations that in fact we have never had. I am in favor of having such relations, Natta said, and of an effort to find real interlocutors in the U.S. political and cultural world too--the same effort we have made with respect to other countries.

/7358

CSO: 3528/44

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

PINTASILGO COMMENTS ON PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACY

PM050856 Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 25 Nov 85 p 10

[Interview with Portuguese presidential candidate Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo by Nicole Guardiola in Lisbon; date not given]

[Excerpt] Lisbon--Question: What reasons prompted you to initiate a candidacy for the presidency of the Portuguese Republic?

Answer: My candidacy is in response to a specific situation regarding Portuguese democracy and seeks to provide a modern answer to a problem facing other democratic countries too, namely, the proper place for the chief of state in presidentialist or semi-presidentialist systems in countries where there is at the same time a large range or fragmentation of parties. What I mean is that in such situations the chief of state's role is increasingly important because through the exercise of his functions he establishes a direct rapport with the citizens, because he is elected by universal suffrage, and with regard to all the political forces he can perform a role as mediator, as organizer of potential expressions of consensus on individual issues.

Question: Do you believe that a controversial figure such as yourself is best suited to this role of mediation to rally potential consensus?

Answer: The idea generally exists that the person who rallies a consensus is a gray figure incapable of resoluteness and without ideas of his own. I believe that the best of them are not appeasers, or those who seek the lowest common denominator, or defenders of the reign of mediocracy, but on the contrary those who tackle problems with an innovative attitude.

Question: Will the parties be willing to engage in such a dialogue?

Answer: If the political apparatus ever superimposes its own will on that of the voters it will be the start of a diminished democracy, of a democratic facade. The parties' raison d'etre is to express organized currents of opinion.

In modern societies there are major areas of intersectorial problems and a politicians' role is to define these areas and the protagonists active within each of them to bring all these protagonists together to seek a consensus. The essential factor in this task is not major mobilization of people but the ability to analyze problems and to formulate the most suitable proposals for resolving them.

Question: But the majority of parties in Portugal refuse to sit down at the same table as the Communist Party....

Answer: I believe that the State Council is one of the essential mechanisms for the Portuguese president's action and in it all parties, including the Communist Party, sit around the same table. To conduct a dialogue with the Communists it is enough for me to observe the Portuguese Constitution. I do not believe that a parliamentary party can be excluded from the State Council. Furthermore, I want to say that I am not concerned about the party allegiances of Portuguese citizens who support me. They are all Portuguese, and that is all that counts, the only important thing is how much support they can provide and how much they want to help their country.

Question: Are you very critical of Portuguese political life?

Answer: I must admit that Portuguese political life is in a serious state of decay because political leaders have grown aloof from the country's problems, from the modern solutions to those problems--which do exist. Everything has been boiled down to the power struggle. Since 1980 we have witnessed an almost total neglect of national problems and the absolute predominance of the balance of power, as though the Portuguese people could be bought. This is what I want to combat, and although I have a blueprint for government, I wish to assert it by means of a proposal embodying the solution to the problems.

Question: General Antonio Ramalho Eanes, who also attempted such a role, was "punished" with the revision of the Constitution, which cut his powers, and he had to form his own political party. Are you not afraid that the same could happen to you?

Answer: The mistake our politicians make is to believe that history repeats itself. What has happened in Portugal over the past 10 years will never happen again. General Eanes correctly said some months ago that the end of his second term marks the start of a new phase in Portugal's life. The latest general election showed that Portuguese society is ready for change, and what happened in parliament will happen in the presidential election too. We are approaching such a serious emergency situation that it is necessary to renegotiate the president's powers as thoroughly as possible. My interpretation of these powers differs from General Eanes' and, like General De Gaulle, I believe that every chief of state forms his own personal assessment of government..."

/8309

CSO: 3542/45

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

SALGADO ZENHA ON PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACY

PM081910 Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 2 Dec 85 (special supplement)
pp 2-4

[Interview with Portuguese presidential candidate Francisco Salgado Zenha by
M. Bettencourt Resendes; date and place not given]

[Excerpts] [Introductory paragraph omitted] DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: Some 2 years
ago you regarded yourself as "too left-wing" to be president of the republic.
Today, apparently, you no longer believe so.

Salgado Zenha: The words should be placed in their historical context. In
fact it was not in my plans to run for the presidency of the republic. The
problem confronted me under circumstances which arose recently, and I accepted
the challenge. I do not doubt that there might be other candidates better than
myself. Moreover, in that interview which you mentioned, I cited the names of
Professors Henrique de Barros, Ferrer Correia, and Miller Guerra. Why have
they not put themselves forward? That is a question which should be put to them
and not to me. In the current circumstances I believe that I am the best of the
candidates who have put themselves forward.

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: So do you believe that the fact that your profile is
markedly left-wing has ceased to be important in this respect?

Salgado Zenha: The "markedly" is your word. I said that I deeded preferable
a candidate with the same political profile as General Ramalho Eanes, and that
I was to the left of the current president of the republic. I believe that a
president of the republic should be only Portuguese and a democrat, and so I
feel able, as president of the republic, to be only Portuguese and a democrat,
and to be so as a candidate, too. This is without in any way renouncing my
political convictions, which everybody knows. I am a democratic and independent
Socialist, since I no longer belong to the Socialist Party [PSP]. This is a
normal matter; what matters is the function which is performed. In my opinion,
certain functions are performed by taking into account not a party program
inherent in that body itself.

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: Was it never on your political horizons to run for the PSP leadership at the next congress, before you decided to run for the presidency?

Salgado Zenha: I did not take part in the last PSP congress for reasons which I made public.

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: Fine, but I was talking about the next....

Salgado Zenha: There was no reason to change my attitude with respect to the next congress.

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: My question also had to do with the fact that, in the wake of the October [general election] results, many of the Socialist leaders have publicly demanded radical changes in the party's leadership and strategy....

Salgado Zenha: Since I have left the PSP, I do not have to discuss the party's internal problems. The only thing that I will say is that I believe that a strong and influential PSP is an essential element for Portuguese democracy. Right now I can make no contribution to the PSP, since I do not belong to it, but neither will I do it any harm, because a strong and influential PSP is an essential element. My disagreement with the current PSP leadership is over the fact that the presidential role should not be made partisan. This was the viewpoint which the PSP upheld in previous presidential elections. The current PSP leadership has changed its viewpoint. It is fully within its rights, but I am also entitled not to change.

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: According to what you stated in the interview which you recently granted to the Portuguese Radio-Television System, this is also your main disagreement with candidate Mario Soares. I will ask you whether there are not other significant differences in your candidacy programs.

Salgado Zenha: That is for the public to say. It will take a very long time to explain this systematically. Dr Freitas do Amaral advocates the bi-polarization of Portuguese political life, as General Soares Carneiro did in 1980. He believes that presidential elections should be contended French-style. That is, there should be two blocs, one led by the leader of a party coalition, and, on the other side, another, similar political pole. So there would be a confrontation in that system. Dr Freitas do Amaral leads one of those poles and Dr Mario Soares intends to lead the other. Therefore, this means making partisan the idea of what presidential elections are.

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: But do Mario Soares and Freitas do Amaral have the same idea?

Salgado Zenha: Substantially, this is so--that is, making Portuguese political life, and hence the presidential role, totally partisan. Moreover, at heart, the two political leaders whom I have mentioned would like the election of the president of the republic to be conducted by parliament.

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: And are you opposed to that kind of election?

Salgado Zenha: I am. I believe that democracy in Portugal is still being formed. I do not mean that it is not a democracy. It exists, with defects, limitations, and imperfections which should be corrected, but its process of formation is not yet complete. During this historical period the president of the republic should be the president of all the Portuguese people. He should not be the representative of party forces; he should be the same both for those who support him and for those who oppose him and be a factor of balance and harmony within the Portuguese political system.

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: How do you view the fact that the current president of the republic has decided to support one of the candidates to succeed him at Belem Palace?

Salgado Zenha: I believe that it is a normal situation. I know of no democratic country in which the president of the republic loses the right to support another candidate in presidential elections following his term. I believe that Portugal would not be a complete democracy if the elected president's right to support a candidate in the following elections were not recognized.

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: Do you believe that the current president of the republic's independence has been affected by the active part which he has played in the formation of a political party?

Salgada Zenha: That question proceeds from presuppositions and considerations to which only President Ramalho Eanes can reply.

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: Fine, but did not Gen Ramalho Eanes break the agreement which he signed with the PSP?

Salgado Zenha: That is a question which should be put to Gen Eanes. I am putting forward my candidacy and will not express opinions on problems with which I have nothing to do.

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: To change the subject--or rather, to change the party--do you still believe that the Communist Party's participation in the government would be dangerous for Portuguese democracy?

Salgado Zenha: Well, when that question was put to me it was in my capacity as a PSP member. What I said was that I did not agree with there being a government coalition between the PSP and Communist Party for reasons of an international nature, since the differences between the two parties on foreign policy are so great that, in my opinion, an agreement was not feasible. The PCP is opposed to NATO, the PSP and I are in favor of NATO; the PCP is opposed to the EEC, and the PSP and I are in favor of Portugal's EEC entry.

So I maintain the same viewpoint.

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: However, allow me to attempt to clarify this issue better: Do you accept the PCP's participation in the government without its being in an alliance with the PSP?

Salgado Zenha: I neither accept nor reject.

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: If you are elected president of the republic, that problem could confront you....

Salgado Zenha: Let us see whether we understand each other. Nowadays the government is not politically accountable to the president of the republic. The president has only to interpret the people's vote. Governments are formed in accordance with the Portuguese Parliament's wishes.

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: Do you mean that the president of the republic does not have the right of powers to prevent any party's participation in the government?

Salgado Zenha: The president of the republic is the guarantor of the constitution, freedom, and the principle of democratic alternation. That right is not exercised by inaugurating or not inaugurating. It is guaranteed by the right of veto and by the power to dismiss the government itself. If the government performs actions resulting in the discontinuation of the democratic system I will dismiss it immediately. Any government which endangers fundamental freedoms will be dismissed immediately. I will not accept being the president of the republic who is the grave digger of democracy itself. If parliament shows itself in favor of and makes viable a government in which the Communist Party takes part, the problem is not mine but that of the parties forming that coalition. If that government performs any action against the constitution, against the system of public freedoms, or against the principle of democratic alternation, I will dismiss it immediately, whatever government it is.

This must be considered in general terms and not proceeding from the presupposition that A, B, or C is the vehicle for a specific idea, otherwise we will return to the Inquisition. People are all equal before the president. If they perform some action against the constitution, then the president uses his powers--not the other people's powers. The president of the republic cannot be the guardian of the political parties. The parties must come to terms among themselves.

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: I would like you to point out the basic program differences between your candidacy and that of Miss Pintasilgo.

Salgado Zenha: Miss Maria de Lurdes Pintasilgo has an exaggerated idea of the presidential powers. Her program is a government program. I believe that one of the principles that there are in the constitution is that of the separation of powers. Any state body which seeks to misuse its powers will create a situation of political instability. I will not refer to her program, since Miss Pintasilgo's manifesto has not yet been published. I believe that she expresses many generous ideas, although without specifying the means whereby the realization of those generous ideas is to be achieved.

/8309

CS0: 3542/45

14 January 1986

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

DISTINCT TENDENCIES SEEN WITHIN LEFT

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 1 Nov 85 p 15

[Article by Jose Miguel Judice]

[Excerpts] The final lineup of presidential candidates reveals that the political Right is showing itself to be united and that the Left, on the contrary, has not been able to do the same. The Right is therefore prepared for the challenges of the political decade that is just beginning. But this time it is not the Right that we need to talk about but the three branches of the Left, our purpose being to describe them and try to explain the main reason why their unity is impossible.

The first branch of the Left is hegemonic within the PS [Socialist Party], is currently represented politically by Mario Soares, and could be described as the natural heir to the republican tradition--possibly in a process of modernization along moderate leftist lines marking it as possibilist, Europeanizing, and psychologically prepared to adjust easily to the political practice of the EEC.

The second branch of the Left is hegemonic within the PCP and is represented politically by Alvaro Cunhal (and, to some extent, by General Eanes). Heir to the Jacobin stream of republican tradition, it is by inclination authoritarian, dirigiste, autarkist, nationalist, and the defender of a premodern and predemocratic view of Portuguese political organization. This was the left that generated the revolutionary process (disregarding the spontaneity and anarchy involved), and this is the Left that assigns a political role to the "politicomilitary elite." It is a branch of the Left that is in ideological and cultural regression, but as will be seen, it is the branch best adapted to the current situation in the Portuguese social system.

The third branch of the Left is hegemonic within the Portuguese cultural subsystem. Politically, it expressed itself in particular by voting for the PRD [Democratic Renewal Party], and its leading political representative is Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo. It is heir above all to the leftwing Christian Messianism of the 1960's, the crisis of conscience experienced by the sons of middle-class families under Salazar, and the populist and grassroots logic of certain hard-to-label revolutionary movements under the First Republic. This

was the Left that provided the folklore and dreams for the PREC, is seated in the dock in the Monsanto courtroom, is enthusiastic about the basic communities, admired Cuba, took off on a revolutionary crusade with Guevara, and drinks in the theology of revolution through translations of mediocre quality.

For our purposes here, that tripolar arrangement of candidates signifies the impossibility of achieving hegemony in relations among the three components of the Portuguese Left. During the revolution, the Messianic component seemed hegemonic, and it was Otelo who called all the shots. Since the revolution, there has been the natural agreement--like God and the angels--between Cunhal and Eanes, despite all that distinguishes one from the other. For years, the near hegemony of the authoritarian Left has prevailed, but at no time has total hegemony been possible. The reason during the revolution was that the branch of the Left that was modernist and loyal to republican tradition headed the antiautocratic fight and that the "folkloric" component did nothing but throw more wood on Cunhal's fire. Since the revolution, it has been impossible because the memory of 25 November [1975] prevented a rapid rapprochement between Eanes and Cunhal, because the modernist Left's alliance with the Right in the government prevented a militaristic presidential system, and because, in the meantime, the presence of Ramalho Eanes prevented the leap forward that would have been represented by Socialist hegemony when the latter was in a favorable objective position to achieve it.

The current tragedy in the Left is precisely the way in which this situation was reached and the way in which the country has developed during these 10 years. By this I mean that the deterioration in purchasing power, the negative rate of investment, and the destruction of the economic-financial structures that were carrying us into modernity--all of that, plus a few more things, has caused a degeneration of the Portuguese social system that is at the origin of the degeneration of its political system.

If consolidating the hegemony of the modernist Left was difficult 10 years ago--primarily for political reasons--doing so now has become even more complicated, no longer so much because of political factors (since the world has shifted to the right and toward liberalism), but above all because of psychosociological factors: Portugal has regressed in the direction of the Third World over the past 10 years, and as is natural, the Europeanizing Left is not in the best position to rally voters in a state of historic regression.

The PRD phenomenon, the fussy and skillful populism of Manuela Eanes, and the popularity of Pintasilgo all reveal a single fundamental reality: Portugal is becoming increasingly a Third-World country and is joining that crowd, as is obvious, through the left side of its political spectrum.

But at this moment, everything is still up in the air, and the struggle to reach Belem Palace (or, more accurately, the second round) remains to be resolved as far as the Left is concerned.

A combination of circumstances so favorable to the modernist Left is not likely to be repeated. Mario Soares has the opportunity here to alter the

direction being taken by the Portuguese Left, which is tending toward a strengthening of the drive toward authoritarianism, with populist irredentism once again playing into its hands. If Mario Soares does not reach the second round, things will develop as expected--specifically, without the conditions that would allow the modernist Right [as published] to remain hegemonic. If Soares does reach the second round, he will save the Left and perhaps save the system. Especially if he loses.

11798

CS0: 3542/26

POLITICAL

PORTU

POLL ON POPULAR CONCERNS: EMPLOYMENT DESIRED

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 1 Nov 85 pp 6-7

[Text] It has been confirmed: the Portuguese want to work. They want to have more jobs. Are they realistic: are they wanting the impossible? No, that was just an odd slogan painted on the streets of Paris 17 years ago by the spoiled children of the society of abundance. They want only the possible: their chief concern is to be provided with the means of earning their daily bread.

When asked to name the chief problems they would like to see solved in this country, the Portuguese put "the creation of more jobs" in first place (21.4 percent). The second thing they would like to see resolved is the issue of wages in arrears (20.8 percent). "Increased purchasing power" was only in third place (19.9 percent), that being a vague thing that the Portuguese realize does not fall from the sky.

In fourth place (13.2 percent of those polled) is the housing problem, a matter of real distress in a country which, according to statistics, is short 700,000 dwelling units--that is, the equivalent of a big city. And only in fifth place do we see health, which is a matter of concern to 8.7 percent of the Portuguese.

Next comes the fight against corruption--a popular topic at the moment and a recent addition to the catalogue of national diseases, which explains why it has been added to the list of election promises. It is viewed as a priority by 4.7 percent of the Portuguese. Next in line are those for whom the essential thing is to create a climate of hope (3.9 percent).

What about education? It is on the skids, but only 3.4 percent feel that it is the main problem to be solved. Maybe that's why... But is it cause or effect? To the Portuguese, knowledge may not be all that important. They are also not overly concerned about the fact we are being admitted to the EEC and that little has been done to prepare for the shock. "Adjusting to entry into the Common Market" is in ninth place (1.4 percent). It may not be presumptuous to conclude that the great majority of Portuguese are not too sure what the EEC is. It is true that we are not alone, since the majority of citizens in the European Community, in varying percentages, also do not know.

Rich Concerned About Wages in Arrears

"What problem in the country needs to be solved?"

Problem	Total	Sex		Age		Socioeconomic class		
		M	F	18-44	45+	A/B Upper	C Middle	D Lower
In first place:								
Corruption	4.7	6.0	3.5	5.0	4.4	9.0	4.2	-
More purchasing power	19.9	20.2	19.6	11.0	28.1	7.6	22.3	25.4
Housing	13.2	13.5	12.8	14.4	12.1	7.3	12.1	32.4
Climate of hope	3.9	4.8	3.1	6.0	2.0	9.3	3.0	.4
Creation of more jobs	21.4	15.2	27.0	28.5	14.8	15.7	23.6	15.4
Wages in arrears	20.8	23.0	18.8	18.8	22.7	24.1	19.4	24.5
Crime	1.2	.2	2.2	1.9	.6	1.2	1.4	.1
Education	3.4	1.5	5.1	4.8	2.1	6.8	3.0	-
Health	8.7	10.2	7.4	6.9	10.4	18.4	7.2	1.8
Adjustment to EEC	1.4	2.8	.1	2.8	.1	-	1.9	-
No answer	1.4	2.6	.4	-	2.7	.6	1.8	-
In second place:								
Corruption	5.7	5.7	5.7	5.5	5.8	15.0	4.1	-
More purchasing power	15.2	15.1	15.4	16.3	14.3	8.6	16.0	22.2
Housing	17.1	16.0	18.0	12.7	21.0	8.8	17.1	29.6
Climate of hope	2.4	1.5	3.2	3.2	1.7	.8	3.1	-
Creation of more jobs	26.8	26.4	27.1	30.4	23.4	15.6	28.8	32.9
Wages in arrears	14.1	14.5	13.7	11.4	16.5	6.7	15.8	14.8
Crime	3.5	2.3	4.6	5.4	1.7	7.3	3.0	.1
Education	5.1	5.7	4.5	6.4	3.8	19.5	2.1	.1
Health	5.8	6.2	5.5	5.0	6.6	8.2	6.0	.3
Adjustment to EEC	1.8	1.6	2.0	3.5	.3	8.7	.3	-
No answer	2.6	4.8	.5	.1	4.9	.8	3.4	-

Little Fear of Crime

And so, among the concerns suggested in the poll, we come to the one that worries Portuguese the least: crime. Despite everything--the full jails, the spectacular escapes, and the trials reported on the front pages--only 1.2 percent of our citizens assign first place to the fight against crime. We are mild tempered despite everything.

The creation of jobs is the basic program, and this is also shown by the fact that most of the interviewees not considering that a priority nevertheless put it in second place. Among the secondary concerns of the Portuguese, housing becomes more important, while the problem of wages in arrears drops to fourth place. But the hegemony of the "big four" remains: the things that really vex the hearts of all of us are employment, purchasing power, wages, and a little corner to live in. The rest of it--such inestimable benefits as health, justice, and culture--is relegated to the second half of the list. Signs of the times.

Lisbon Wants Money; Rest of Country Wants Employment

"What problem in the country needs to be solved?"

Problem	C i t y						
	Total	Lisbon	Porto	Coimbra	Evora	Vila Real	Viseu
In first place:							
Corruption	4.7	2.7	5.3	17.2	4.9	16.7	22.5
More purchasing power	19.9	21.6	16.1	21.6	15.3	17.2	16.4
Housing	13.2	14.2	13.1	7.9	8.0	4.0	5.1
Climate of hope	3.9	4.9	2.3	1.0	1.9	2.9	3.1
Creation of more jobs	21.4	15.8	34.3	22.5	25.6	27.1	27.8
Wages in arrears	20.8	21.4	21.7	13.6	22.6	12.0	10.0
Crime	1.2	1.2	.6	3.7	.9	4.5	1.4
Education	3.4	4.8	.6	-	2.2	3.7	3.9
Health	8.7	9.8	6.0	5.1	16.5	8.7	4.7
Adjustment to EEC	1.4	2.0	-	.7	2.2	.8	1.3
No answer	1.4	1.5	-	6.6	-	2.4	4.0
In second place:							
Corruption	5.7	6.1	3.3	10.5	7.0	4.9	7.6
More purchasing power	15.2	14.6	15.6	17.0	20.3	15.4	16.5
Housing	17.1	13.7	27.3	15.8	11.2	12.0	10.3
Climate of hope	2.4	1.9	3.5	1.4	2.1	.8	10.0
Creation of more jobs	26.8	28.3	26.9	15.7	18.5	24.1	20.3
Wages in arrears	14.1	14.8	11.5	9.4	23.2	23.7	16.8
Crime	3.5	4.1	1.8	5.2	2.0	4.6	3.0
Education	5.1	6.1	2.7	5.9	3.0	5.5	2.0
Health	5.8	5.1	6.7	7.4	10.9	5.9	4.7
Adjustment to EEC	1.8	2.2	.6	2.7	1.0	.8	4.6
No answer	2.6	3.0	-	9.0	.9	2.4	4.0

If we make a detailed analysis of the sociological groups of inhabitants polled, we see that the need to create new jobs is of concern primarily to women, young people, and the middle class. That is understandable: those are the groups that are entering the labor market in larger numbers every year. But among men, the major concern is wages in arrears. The same is true in the upper class, and that is one of the odd things about this poll: why are the richer citizens concerned about a problem that is probably having a greater effect on the other two classes? The answer is to be found partly in an economic viewpoint—the awareness that wages in arrears indicate financial disorder in the firms—and partly in a sociological viewpoint—the feeling that this is one of the most direct factors for social instability and the radicalization of the masses. Those masses (32.9 percent of the lower class) are more concerned about housing, and there is nothing odd about that.

It should also be pointed out that those over 45 years of age mentioned purchasing power as the priority problem to be solved. They would like to see it increased. Other details: the "creation of a climate of hope" is most desired by the upper class (9.3 percent), that being the class most inclined to daydream. On the other hand, it is the upper class which suffers least from the housing problem (7.3 percent), but reveals itself to be particularly

sensitive to the problems of health (18.4 percent) and education (6.8 percent). Crime frightens women in particular (2.2 percent).

Lisbon Wants Purchasing Power

Geographically, it turns out that employment is the chief problem in five out of the six cities covered by the poll, the exception being Lisbon, where the biggest need is said to be more purchasing power (21.6 percent). Does this mean that Lisbon wants to buy, while the rest of the country wants to work? That may be too simple a conclusion, but the results open up a vast area for reflection. All the more since the second-ranking concern among Lisbon residents is wages in arrears (21.4 percent), while the lack of jobs comes in a poor third (15.8 percent), slightly ahead of housing (14.2 percent, or more than in any of the other cities).

The fight against corruption is desired above all in Viseu (22.5 percent), and it is Lisbon that sees the greatest need to create a climate of hope (4.9 percent) and improve education (4.8 percent). Health is of concern to Evora (16.5 percent), which, being the center of a very distinct agricultural region, also feels particularly affected by the issue of entry into the EEC (2.2 percent). Crime—another interesting issue—is of concern especially in Vila Real (4.5 percent), Coimbra (3.7 percent), and Viseu (1.4 percent) but less so in the major urban centers of Lisbon (1.2 percent) and Porto (0.6 percent), with Evora in between the latter (0.9 percent). Could it be that the smaller centers are more sensitive to this issue than big-city inhabitants, who are afflicted by other overwhelming problems? The bomb that killed Sidonio Cabanelas in Vila Real a few months ago probably has something to do with the state of mind in that city in the Marao Mountains.

No to Coalitions

The Portuguese are tired of government coalitions. By an absolute majority (50.6 percent), they say they favor a government consisting of a single party that can implement its program on its own. But 39.5 percent feel that the next government should be based on an agreement among several parties, and 7.1 percent did not choose either solution.

All the same, that feeling is not unanimous. In the lowest social group, 52.7 percent feel that a coalition of several parties would be better. The upper class feels the same way, but less vehemently (47.8 percent). And the young people are divided almost in half, with 45.7 percent favoring a coalition and 45.5 percent favoring a single-party government. The desire to see a single party in the next government predominates in the middle class (54.6 percent) and among men (50.8 percent).

Of the six cities included in the poll, only Lisbon would like to see an agreement among various political groups (46.7 percent). Coimbra takes the opposite view (77.4 percent). It is in Vila Real, which also prefers a "monochrome" government, that the fewest people support a coalition, but that is also the city with the largest number of undecided respondents. Evora is where opinions are most divided (51.4 percent against 38 percent).

Long Live "Monochrome"
 "The next government should be..."

Answer	Total	Sex		Age		Socioeconomic class		
		M	F	18-44	45+	A/B Upper	C Middle	D Lower
One party with its own program	50.6	50.8	50.4	45.5	55.4	45.6	54.6	30.3
Several parties in mutual agreement	39.5	38.5	40.4	45.7	33.7	47.8	35.6	52.7
Don't know	7.1	7.2	7.0	7.0	7.2	3.6	8.0	7.0
No answer	2.3	3.5	2.2	1.9	3.7	2.9	1.8	10.1

"The next government should be..."

Answer	Total	C i t y						
		Lisbon	Porto	Coimbra	Evora	Vila Real	Viseu	
One party with its own program	50.6	41.6	65.8	77.4	51.4	72.7	64.5	
Several parties in mutual agreement	39.5	46.7	27.4	19.5	38.0	16.4	26.1	
Don't know	7.1	8.5	4.8	2.1	5.7	10.9	5.4	
No answer	2.3	3.2	2.0	1.0	5.0	-	4.0	

It turns out, then, that the greatest distrust of a single-party government exists on the coast and in Evora. For its part, the interior is definitely in favor of an end to agreements and of "the fewer people the better" in the country's government. While matters in Portugal are decided on the coast, it happens that for once the general attitude is leaning toward the opinion expressed by the interior. The figures are what they are.

Technical Data

Universe: Portuguese population over 18 years of age residing in the cities of Coimbra, Evora, Lisbon, Porto, Vila Real, and Viseu. Sample: 604 individuals. Sampling: Random, stratified by city, nonproportional imputation. Selection: Homes selected by random route method, with individuals to be interviewed selected by the Kish method. Technique: direct personal interviews using a structured questionnaire at the interviewee's home. Sampling points: Six cities in which starting points were selected. Fieldwork: Interviews conducted between 9 and 16 October 1985. Margin of error: In total, an error of +4 percent in a confidence interval of 95 percent. For P = 50 percent. Institute responsible: The survey was conducted by NORMA, Inc., the Portuguese member of Gallup International.

11798
 CSO: 3542/26

POLITICAL

SPAIN

POLL REFLECTS STABILITY ON MAJOR ISSUES, PERSONALITIES

Madrid ACTUALIDAD ECONOMICA in Spanish 7 Oct 85 pp 13-23

[Text] Spain has been a constitutional democracy since December 1978 and, as has been indicated since "Barometer's" first poll installment, most Spaniards have a good opinion of both democracy as a political system and the Constitution devised on the basis of the consensus of the majority parties. Democracy is accepted by nearly 80 percent of Spaniards, whereas those who reject it number slightly over 7 percent. Based on voters from the different parties, it is those from AP [Popular Alliance] who have a higher rate of rejection (twice the overall average, 15.1 percent); but this number is small compared with the 67.3 percent of those who accept it. Based on sex, the rate of acceptance is quite similar between men and women, although the men declare themselves to be slightly more democratic. Based on age, the ones most favoring the democratic system are between 30 and 45 years old, followed by the youngest.

The Constitution, with less support than democracy (something logical, because its structure is concrete), is accepted by over 60 percent of the population, and rejected by only 8.6 percent.

On this occasion, the most critical position toward the Constitution is shared by AP and Communist voters. Percentage-wise, it is the Alliance members who reject it more than the Communists do; but there are also more Alliance members who accept it.

A clearcut sign of approval for the democratic values and the Constitution is the fact that each one of the seven surveys on acceptance of democracy and of the Constitution has brought similar results, not only in the overall sample as a whole, but also in each one of its segments.

We Are All in Politics

The acceptance of democracy and of the Constitution coincides with the fact that a 70 percent majority think that, "it is better for each and every one of us to take an interest in politics and consider ourselves responsible for it"; as opposed to 21.5 percent who think that, "it is better for a prominent man to have authority and decide for us." The question was deliberately phrased the same as in the Foessa Report of 1975, to note the historical change of

opinions. On that occasion, the responses were 56 and 36 percent, respectively. The conviction regarding collective leadership in political life has increased 14 whole points during the last decade.

Based on age, the younger people were, the more often they were democratic.

To gauge the degree of individual identification with the state as a political organization, people were requested to choose between two propositions (which were also posed in the 1975 Foessa Report): "All of us are the state," and "the state is those who give orders." Ten years ago, the latter was what 44 percent of Spaniards thought; in September 1985, the number declined to a still revealing 34 percent. On the other hand, those who felt that they were leaders of the state, who numbered 47 percent in 1975, total 57 percent now.

...But From Afar

Nevertheless, all this undeniable democratic sentiment coexists with a meager interest in politics: Only 32.7 percent claim to have much or considerable interest, as opposed to 14.1 percent who admit to having little or no interest.

The Communist voters (the most politicized) are the ones expressing the greatest interest, and those from AP are the ones voicing the least. The Spaniard seems to be aware of his present apathy concerning politics; and so, he comments: "We Spaniards have less interest in politics than the citizens of the European democracies do" and he admits that "Since the last general elections of October 1982, the political interest has declined." In both judgments there is homogeneity among the various segments, whether they be based on sex, age or political affinity.

The trip to China and Japan made by the head of the government, accompanied by businessmen, is possibly the leading factor that has caused a moderate increase in all the popularity indexes of Felipe Gonzalez and his cabinet; and this is despite the fact that the journey was marked by incidents which, in view of the data, many of those interviewed have not taken into consideration.

Government and Prime Minister: Favorable 'Rentre'

During the first UCD [Democratic Center Union] governments, it was claimed that their prime minister, Adolfo Suarez, traveled outside of Spain to carry on a campaign inside the country. The data from the 22d poll installment make the hypothesis that the prime minister's trips abroad improve the popularity of political leaders admissible. Felipe Gonzalez' image as head of the government, even after a criticized summer, has undergone a noticeable improvement: 2.8 points in the "good" connotation, a 2.9 point reduction in the "bad", and a 5.7 point increase in the neutral vote on this.

The fact that it is among the AP electorate that Felipe Gonzalez' improvement has been the greatest is inevitably linked with the role that businessmen played on the prime minister's trip, the basically economic nature of the latter and the information published by the news media on the negotiations.

In the view of the Alliance electorate, Felipe Gonzalez' "good" connotation has increased 5.5 points and the "bad" one has declined 14.1 points, with a 19.6 point rise in the neutral vote.

AP Votes

On this occasion, the improvement in the government's image has accompanied that of its prime minister, with a 2.6 point increase in the "good" connotation and a 1.2 point decline in the "bad" one, making his neutral vote become positive by 1.1 points; which represents a 3.6 increase in comparison with the poll installment of August. It is also among the AP voters that the government's image has improved most decidedly.

A year ago, "Barometer's" 10th poll installment showed that September 1984 reflected the critical turning point, with the greatest erosion of the Socialist option; because the head of the government, after a summer with a high degree of questioning, had suffered a major decline in his image. Nevertheless, in this installment of September 1985, there is every indication that the Socialist government is staking everything on preparations for beneficial general elections.

Four Phases

When the time is short before the marking of the government's third anniversary, the legislature can be divided into four periods: a first year of popular enchantment, which lasted from the October 1982 elections until December 1983; a second year of a continuous loss of image, until October 1984; a third year of balance, with slight declines, until September 1985; and a fourth clearly preelectoral year the evolution of which is still difficult to guess, but which, at least at its beginning, is favorable for the Socialists: for the time being, a good "rentree" [re-entrance].

Manuel Fraga's image as leader of the main opposition party continues as it was, without rising or falling after four poll installments. The neutral vote on Fraga's image has varied two tenths of a point; he is still accepted by his voters and completely rejected by the rest. In the popularity "ranking" of the leaders, he retains an unchangeable fourth place in all 11 surveys.

Suarez, Better Than Guerra

Adolfo Suarez is also steady in his image, which is better than that of Manuel Fraga and worse than that of Felipe Gonzalez. On this occasion, Suarez is ahead of Alfonso Guerra again in the "ranking," occupying second place after Felipe Gonzalez.

Santiago Carrillo and Gerardo Iglesias have received the two worst ratings since the beginning of "Barometer." Owing to the appearance of Jose Antonio Ardanza, who is still little known, Oscar Alzaga has for the second consecutive time lost his last place rating position.

PSOE Advances

With the Socialists' electoral increment of 3.2 points in the voting intention without projection, and of 2.4 points with projection, the government party, standing only 6.2 points from October 1982, is assured, for the present, although without much leeway, of the absolute parliamentary majority.

AP has declined, receiving the lowest number of points since the beginning of "Barometer," both in the voting intention without projection (23.3 percent) and with a projection of undecided (25.1 percent); a voting intention somewhat less than even its results in October 1982.

Of the two parties which regularly receive voting intentions exceeding their meager results in October 1982, CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] ranks between 5 and 6 percent, and PCE [Spanish Communist Party] has suffered a major decline, possibly as a result of the growing division among Communists.

NATO: Confusion

The confusion has increased in the opinions regarding whether or not Spain should remain in NATO: Those favoring egress have decreased; those for total entry remain the same; there is also a reduction in those who prefer membership only in the political organization and not in the military; and, in particular, there is an increase in those with don't know/don't answers who number nearly 30 percent in this installment. Perhaps the lack of decision has something to do with the lack of exactitude regarding the "when" and "how" of the holding of the referendum and with the Democratic Coalition's announcement that it would "pass" on it, if the latter is called for.

Finally, the different progress in the popularity indexes for the two majority labor confederations, UGT [General Union of Workers] and CCOO [Workers Committees], is noteworthy. The latter has received a very steady acceptance, close to that of the UGT confederation. Nevertheless, UGT has been subjected to significant ups and downs, associated with its different level of confrontation with the government. Thus, UGT is observing how the very times of its best understanding with the government coincide with its least popular acceptance.

Democracy

Spain is a democracy. What is your opinion of democracy as a political system?

Good: 77 percent; fair: 11.4 percent; poor: 7.4 percent.

Constitution

What is your opinion of the Spanish Constitution?

Good: 61 percent; fair: 22.2 percent; poor: 8.6 percent

The State

Do you believe that "all of us are the state," or that "the state is those who give orders"?

All of us are the state: 57.3 percent; the state is those who give orders: 34.4 percent; don't know/no answer: 8.3 percent

The Power

With which of the following two statements do you most agree?

It is better for a prominent man to have authority and decide for us: 21.5 percent; it is better for each and every one of us to take an interest in politics and consider ourselves responsible for it: 69.7 percent; don't know/no answer: 8.8 percent.

Politics

In general, do you have much, considerable, little or no interest in politics?

Much: 5.7 percent; considerable: 27 percent; little: 38.8 percent; no: 25.3 percent; don't know/no answer: 3.2 percent

In Comparison...

Do you think that we Spaniards have more or less interest in politics than the citizens of the European democracies do?

More interest: 6.7 percent; the same interest: 25.5 percent; less interest: 44.2 percent; don't know/no answer: 23.6 percent

All For Democracy

Spain is a democracy. What is your opinion of democracy as a political system?

Overall	Dec 83	Feb 84	Apr 84	Jun 84	Aug 84	May 85	Sep 85
---------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------

Good	74.5	76.1	79.0	72.6	75.0	81.0	77.0
Fair	16.4	14.3	11.9	13.9	14.3	11.6	11.4
Poor	5.7	6.6	5.5	10.1	7.8	5.5	7.4

PSOE	Dec 83	Feb 84	Apr 84	Jun 84	Aug 84	May 85	Sep 85
------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------

Good	81.7	86.1	89.1	84.9	85.9	89.6	85.2
Fair	13.6	8.6	6.0	9.9	10.9	5.7	7.4
Poor	2.9	2.3	1.9	3.4	1.9	3.2	4.6

AP	Dec 83	Feb 84	Apr 84	Jun 84	Aug 84	May 85	Sep 85
Good	70.1	66.7	66.8	57.6	71.6	73.7	67.3
Fair	16.2	20.7	20.8	15.2	14.7	18.8	16.1
Poor	11.1	9.9	10.0	21.9	11.8	6.8	15.1

PCE	Dec 83	Feb 84	Apr 84	Jun 84	Aug 84	May 85	Sep 85
Good	81.2	80.5	85.4	70.3	66.7	79.1	81.4
Fair	8.3	13.9	10.4	13.5	15.2	13.4	9.3
Poor	10.4	5.6	4.2	16.2	15.2	7.5	4.7

Sex

Age

	Men	Women	18-29	30-44	45-65	+ 65
Good	78.2	75.8	78.1	84.3	74.4	66.2
Fair	12.3	10.6	9.8	8.9	13.4	15.2
Poor	7.8	7.7	9.4	4.9	8.2	9.3

A Good Constitution

What is your opinion of the Spanish Constitution?

Overall	Dec 83	Feb 84	Apr 84	Jun 84	Aug 84	May 85	Sep 85
Good	61.1	61.1	66.3	59.9	67.0	66.9	61.0
Fair	24.0	24.5	20.8	22.8	20.9	20.4	22.2
Poor	5.9	7.2	5.9	9.6	5.7	6.9	8.6

PSOE	Dec 83	Feb 84	Apr 84	Jun 84	Aug 84	May 85	Sep 85
Good	73.6	71.5	79.2	74.4	77.5	79.7	75.0
Fair	18.4	19.6	12.5	18.0	15.6	12.2	16.0
Poor	1.7	2.6	2.1	3.7	3.1	4.2	2.8

AP	Dec 83	Feb 84	Apr 84	Jun 84	Aug 84	May 85	Sep 85
Good	52.9	56.7	50.8	53.8	67.7	60.4	61.0
Fair	25.6	28.8	33.3	22.0	18.6	30.0	22.4
Poor	11.9	9.0	9.2	16.7	7.9	5.8	13.2

PCE	Dec 83	Feb 84	Apr 84	Jun 84	Aug 84	May 85	Sep 85
Good	70.9	72.2	68.9	54.1	54.4	70.2	55.8
Fair	25.0	24.5	25.0	27.0	21.2	17.9	34.9
Poor	2.1	5.6	4.2	8.1	12.1	11.9	4.7

	Sex		Age			
	Men	Women	18-29	30-44	45-55	+ 65
Good	63.8	58.5	58.9	64.6	62.4	54.3
Fair	22.4	22.1	25.8	23.9	20.2	17.2
Poor	10.4	7.0	10.5	7.9	7.6	9.3

The State, For Debate

Do you think that "all of us are the state," or that "the state is those who give orders"?

		Vote Oct 82				Sex		Age			
	Foessa 75	Sep 85	PSOE	AP	PCE	Men	Women	18-29	30-44	45-65	+ 65
All of us are the state	47	57.3	62.0	58.5	58.1	60.0	54.9	57.9	65.6	53.1	49.7
The state is those who give orders	44	34.4	30.6	36.1	37.2	34.7	34.1	36.9	29.2	35.7	37.1
Don't know/no answer	9	8.3	7.4	5.4	4.7	5.3	11.0	5.2	5.2	11.2	13.2

Against Enlightened Despotism

With which of the two statements that I shall read to you do you most agree?

	Vote Oct 82					Sex		Age			
	Foessa 75	Sep 85	PSOE	AP	PCE	Men	Women	18-29	30-44	45-65	+ 65
It is better for a pre- eminent man to have authority and decide for us	36	21.5	12.7	46.8	0.0	21.2	21.8	9.4	20.0	28.6	30.5
It is better for each and every one of us to take an interest in politics and consider ourselves responsible for it	56	69.7	80.6	44.4	100.0	70.5	68.9	84.3	75.4	60.5	52.3
Don't know/no answer	8	8.8	6.7	8.8	0.0	8.3	9.3	6.3	4.6	10.9	17.2

Europe, More Politicized

Do you think that we Spaniards have more or less interest in politics than the citizens of the European democracies do?

	Vote Oct 82				Sex		Age			
	Overall	PSOE	AP	PCE	Men	Women	18-29	30-44	45-65	+ 65
More interest	6.7	7.9	1.9	11.6	6.6	6.9	7.3	6.6	7.9	3.3
Same interest	25.5	25.9	28.8	34.9	26.7	24.3	23.0	25.2	26.7	27.8
Less interest	44.2	43.2	52.2	46.5	49.6	39.3	52.3	47.9	38.4	35.8
Don't know/ no answer	23.6	22.9	17.1	7.0	17.1	29.5	17.4	20.3	27.0	33.1

Politics Is Boring

In general, do you have much, considerable, little or no interest in politics?

	Vote Oct 82					Sex		Age			
	Foessa 75	Sep 85	PSOE	AP	PCE	Men	Women	18-29	30-44	45-65	+ 65
Much	3	5.7	5.1	4.4	23.3	7.2	4.3	5.6	6.9	4.4	6.6
Considerable	12	27.0	29.2	21.4	58.1	36.4	19.5	32.8	32.4	21.8	17.9
Little	28	38.8	42.8	45.4	11.6	34.7	42.5	38.3	42.0	38.7	33.1
No	57	25.3	20.6	23.4	7.0	18.0	31.1	21.6	16.4	30.2	38.4
Don't know/ no answer	-	3.2	2.3	5.4	0.0	2.8	3.6	1.7	2.3	4.9	4.0

Fixed Interest

Since the last general elections of October 1982, do you think that your interest in politics has increased, decreased or is still the same as before?

	Vote Oct 82				Sex		Age			
	Overall	PSOE	AP	PCE	Men	Women	18-29	30-44	45-65	+ 65
Has increased	18.0	17.6	9.3	41.9	18.2	17.8	25.8	15.4	16.6	11.9
Still the same	48.8	53.9	57.1	37.2	47.9	49.6	44.6	53.4	47.1	51.0
Has decreased	23.1	20.8	22.9	20.9	26.7	19.9	20.6	25.3	23.2	23.8
Don't know/ no answer	10.1	7.7	10.7	0.0	7.2	12.7	9.0	5.9	13.1	13.3

Conscious

For what concrete reasons...?

	Vote Oct 82				Sex		Age			
	Overall	PSOE	AP	PCE	Men	Women	18-29	30-44	45-65	+ 65
More information in the new media	14.1	13.2	5.3	11.1	14.7	13.5	6.8	30.4	14.7	0.0

More participation	5.5	6.6	10.5	5.6	6.3	4.8	4.0	4.3	9.8	0.0
More information										
on political issues	7.5	6.6	10.5	11.1	9.5	5.8	10.8	4.4	3.3	16.7
More freedom	10.1	10.5	15.8	11.1	8.4	11.5	6.8	8.7	18.0	0.0
Consciousness of										
civic duty	15.6	17.1	15.8	5.6	11.6	19.2	25.7	2.2	16.4	5.6
Interest in politics										
has increased in										
general	19.1	23.7	5.3	16.7	20.0	18.3	21.6	19.6	14.8	22.2
Others	22.1	18.4	26.3	33.3	22.1	22.1	17.6	26.1	19.7	38.9
Don't know/ no answer	6.0	3.9	10.5	5.5	7.4	4.8	6.7	4.3	3.3	16.6

Apathetic

For what concrete reasons...?

	Vote Oct 82				Sex		Age			
	Overall	PSOE	AP	PCE	Men	Women	18-29	30-44	45-65	+ 65
No interest in										
politics; it's all										
the same to me	21.7	20.2	21.4	12.5	17.7	25.3	31.3	20.7	16.2	20.8
The political										
situation is										
still the same;										
the problems are										
not solved	13.8	12.9	9.4	25.0	16.5	11.4	16.4	15.2	12.7	9.1
Poorly informed;										
don't understand										
politics	7.4	8.2	5.1	0.0	3.5	10.7	6.3	7.3	7.5	9.1
All politicians are										
alike; they aren't										
convincing	4.6	4.7	1.7	12.5	6.3	3.1	3.9	2.5	6.9	5.2
Others	17.1	19.3	15.4	25.0	22.1	12.8	10.9	22.0	19.7	11.7
Don't know/ no answer	35.4	34.7	47.0	25.0	33.9	36.7	31.2	32.3	37.0	44.1

Dissatisfied

For what concrete reasons...?

	Vote Oct 82				Sex		Age			
	Overall	PSOE	AP	PCE	Men	Women	18-29	30-44	45-65	+ 65
Dissatisfaction,										
disappointment, dis-										
illusionment										
with politics	35.8	33.3	29.8	22.2	39.0	31.9	39.0	46.7	28.2	25.0

Non-fulfillment of programs, loss of credibility	24.1	30.0	25.5	33.3	20.6	28.4	28.8	18.2	25.9	25.0
Poor operation of government or its leaders	12.1	8.9	27.7	33.4	14.9	8.6	6.8	11.7	15.3	13.9
Tired of politics, the euphoria of democracy is gone	2.0	0.0	2.1	0.0	2.1	1.7	3.4	0.0	2.3	2.8
Lack of time	3.1	4.4	0.0	0.0	2.8	3.5	6.8	2.6	2.4	0.0
All politicians are alike	5.4	10.0	4.3	0.0	5.7	5.2	1.7	6.5	3.5	13.9
Others	11.3	6.7	10.6	11.1	8.5	14.7	11.8	6.5	11.8	19.4
Don't know/ no answer	6.2	6.7	0.0	0.0	6.4	6.0	1.7	7.8	10.6	0.0

Up, Up, Prime Minister

What is your opinion of the current prime minister of the government, Felipe Gonzalez?

Overall	Dec 83	Dec 84	Feb 85	Apr 85	Jun 85	Aug 85	Sep 85
Good	54.1	39.8	36.3	36.8	34.8	35.5	38.3
Fair	29.2	35.6	36.5	33.1	33.7	33.2	32.5
Poor	12.3	20.5	24.8	26.8	28.6	28.5	25.6
Neutral vote	41.8	19.3	11.5	10.0	6.2	7.0	12.7

PSOE	Dec 83	Dec 84	Feb 85	Apr 85	Jun 85	Aug 85	Sep 85
Good	77.4	61.3	63.3	61.1	60.0	61.3	64.4
Fair	17.9	27.9	31.0	28.0	29.6	29.6	24.8
Poor	3.2	9.9	5.5	9.3	9.6	7.6	9.7
Neutral vote	74.2	51.4	57.8	51.8	50.4	53.7	54.7

AP	Dec 83	Dec 84	Feb 85	Apr 85	Jun 85	Aug 85	Sep 85
Good	38.5	15.7	11.6	11.9	3.7	5.2	10.7
Fair	35.0	38.1	36.6	29.0	32.5	32.3	40.5
Poor	21.4	39.0	48.6	56.3	62.5	60.9	46.8
Neutral vote	17.1	-23.2	-37.0	-44.4	-58.9	-55.7	-36.1

PCE	Dec 83	Dec 84	Feb 85	Apr 85	Jun 85	Aug 85	Sep 85
Good	50.0	14.8	15.5	27.4	21.1	30.0	30.2
Fair	29.2	50.8	45.1	49.3	40.4	35.0	41.9
Poor	18.8	32.8	36.6	23.3	36.8	35.0	27.9
Neutral vote	31.2	-18.8	-21.1	4.1	-15.7	-5.0	2.3

The Government Improves

What is your opinion of the present government of the nation?

Overall	Dec 83	Dec 84	Feb 85	Apr 85	Jun 85	Aug 85	Sep 85
Good	39.4	27.8	27.9	27.8	26.9	26.9	29.5
Fair	38.5	40.9	41.5	37.2	36.5	40.9	38.6
Poor	17.6	26.5	27.8	31.4	33.3	29.6	28.4
Neutral vote	21.8	1-3	0.1	-3.6	-6.4	-2.7	1.1

PSOE	Dec 83	Dec 84	Feb 85	Apr 85	Jun 85	Aug 85	Sep 85
Good	65.5	45.6	53.5	52.7	52.7	50.6	52.6
Fair	29.8	38.9	39.4	33.4	34.3	40.3	36.6
Poor	3.7	12.9	6.9	12.0	12.5	7.8	11.1
Neutral vote	61.8	32.7	46.6	40.7	40.2	42.8	41.5

AP	Dec 83	Dec 84	Feb 85	Apr 85	Jun 85	Aug 85	Sep 85
Good	19.6	8.1	3.7	5.8	1.1	1.6	4.9
Fair	40.2	35.4	32.4	27.6	21.3	33.9	36.1
Poor	35.1	49.3	59.7	64.1	76.1	64.6	56.6
Neutral vote	-15.5	-41.2	-56.0	-58.3	-75.0	-63.0	-51.7

PCE	Dec 83	Dec 84	Feb 85	Apr 85	Jun 85	Aug 85	Sep 85
Good	35.4	13.1	8.5	20.5	10.5	22.5	20.9
Fair	39.6	45.9	59.2	53.4	52.6	22.5	53.5
Poor	25.0	39.4	29.6	26.0	35.1	50.0	25.6
Neutral vote	10.4	-26.3	-21.1	-5.5	-24.6	-27.5	-4.7

Old Ones Known

Popularity Index

Jan 84 Mar 84 May 84 Sep 84 Nov 84 Jan 85 Mar 85 May 85 Jul 85 Sep 85

Felipe										
Gonzalez	55.8	55.0	52.1	51.8	54.4	50.6	52.5	50.0	51.1	50.9
Adolfo Suarez	38.3	39.5	41.9	43.3	43.0	41.8	43.6	42.6	39.6	41.8
Alfonso Guerra	44.1	44.8	41.7	41.0	43.5	41.1	42.8	40.9	41.0	39.8
Manuel Fraga	39.3	35.9	38.0	36.2	38.3	35.3	34.8	34.2	36.4	35.6
Miguel Roca	32.6	29.3	36.3	31.5	33.2	32.0	33.4	33.6	31.8	32.2
Jordi Pujol	28.3	24.4	35.7	38.7	29.2	27.9	29.4	29.5	28.8	29.1
Antonio										
Garrigues	30.4	28.3	31.9	28.8	28.0	26.6	28.3	30.2	27.2	28.0

Santiago Carrillo	27.7	28.0	30.3	31.2	31.0	30.2	32.3	29.0	29.7	27.5
Gerardo Iglesias	29.9	29.2	30.4	31.3	32.3	27.7	30.6	29.2	28.7	27.1
Oscar Alzaga	21.1	24.0	24.3	21.8	24.0	23.4	25.0	24.8	22.3	24.1
Jose A. Ardanza	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20.7	20.5

Fraga, For the Worse

What is your opinion of the leader of the main opposition party, Manuel Fraga?

Vote Oct 82

	Overall			PSOE			AP			PCE		
	Jan 85	May 85	Sep 85	Jan 85	May 85	Sep 85	Jan 85	May 85	Sep 85	Jan 85	May 85	Sep 85
Good	20.5	21.8	22.5	5.2	5.4	5.8	73.6	78.5	76.6	3.6	9.0	0.0
Fair	30.3	25.3	23.1	28.8	27.5	23.8	23.1	18.1	19.0	3.6	6.0	4.6
Poor	43.9	49.0	49.0	61.5	65.3	68.5	2.0	3.1	3.4	89.3	85.0	95.4
Neutral vote	-23.4	-27.2	-27.4	-56.3	-59.9	-62.7	71.6	75.4	73.2	-85.7	-76.0	-95.4

Suarez Remains Steady

What is your opinion of Adolfo Suarez?

Vote Oct 82

	Overall		PSOE		AP		PCE	
	May 85	Sep 85	May 85	Sep 85	May 85	Sep 85	May 85	Sep 85
Good	22.6	23.4	21.2	23.2	30.4	22.9	14.9	23.3
Fair	42.7	43.0	47.6	48.6	39.6	42.9	46.3	27.2
Poor	30.9	29.3	29.6	25.9	27.7	33.2	37.3	39.5
Neutral vote	-8.2	-5.9	-8.4	-2.7	2.7	-10.3	-22.4	-16.5

Toward the Alliance

In your opinion, what type of relations should Spain maintain with NATO?

	Dec 83	Dec 84	Feb 85	Apr 85	May 85	Jun 85	Jul 85	Aug 85	Sep 85
Total integration	13.0	13.0	15.4	15.8	14.7	13.1	13.9	13.3	14.8
Integration in the political organiza- tion alone, but not in the military	20.0	19.4	19.1	19.6	18.3	16.5	15.3	19.2	16.3
Total departure	49.2	46.8	46.5	41.4	45.6	45.5	48.2	42.2	40.6
Don't know/ no answer	17.1	20.8	19.0	23.2	21.4	24.8	22.6	24.9	28.4

Trade Unions: the Pulse

Could you give me your opinion of the activity of the following trade unions?

	Jan 84	Mar 84	May 84	Jul 84	Sep 84	Nov 84	Mar 85	Jul 85	Sep 85
UGT									
Good	21.3	16.5	18.7	18.4	19.6	17.0	20.4	18.5	21.2
Fair	25.5	29.6	26.6	28.6	28.9	29.2	26.8	27.9	25.1
Poor	19.8	20.8	26.5	23.0	20.6	24.5	25.0	28.4	27.1

CCOO

Good	16.7	16.9	15.6	18.6	19.6	15.3	20.7	21.6	19.4
Fair	26.2	24.8	23.6	26.9	25.0	27.3	25.0	26.4	26.5
Poor	23.4	21.9	31.4	24.1	23.2	27.5	26.3	25.7	26.9

Technical Record

Direction: Communication Techniques, Consultants, Inc.

Execution: Sigma-Dos, Inc.

22d poll installment: Technical record.

Universe: persons 18 years of age or older; environment: Spain, with the exception of the Canaries, taking 11 autonomous regions as a sample; sample: 1,111 interviews, with a possible error of ± 3 percent, for a confidence interval of 95.5 percent and $p/q = 50$, based on the Arkin and Colton tables; selection: random, based on the random route method, supplemented by the quota corrector system based on sex, age and occupation; interviews: held through personal visits to domiciles; dates of field work: 12 to 17 September 1985.

2909

CSO: 3548/13

POLITICAL

SPAIN

POLL INDICATES PSOE UNLIKELY TO ACHIEVE ABSOLUTE MAJORITY

Madrid TIEMPO in Spanish 14 Oct 85 pp 28-31

[Text] Difficulties for PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] in repeating its absolute majority of 1982, a slight recovery for Manuel Fraga's Popular Coalition and a progressive decline in Felipe Gonzalez' image are some of the results from an eleventh "installment" of the OTR/TIEMPO poll, directed by Prof Juan Diez Nicolas.

The Socialist Party does not appear to have been affected from the standpoint of intention of voting for it by the unfortunate summer that has just ended. On the other hand, the regrettable handling of the government crisis, the excursions on the "Azor," the festive presence of PSOE leaders among the Marbella and Ibiza "jet set," and the troubled "fly where you can" of the presidential trip to Peking have unquestionably influenced the decline in Felipe Gonzalez' political image shown by the OTR/TIEMPO poll.

During the past 5 months, Felipe Gonzalez has lost six tenths in the assessment of Spaniards, three tenths of them between June and September, until it reached 5.6 points, at its lowest interval since long before the 1982 general elections.

Nevertheless, the head of the government still leads in the "ranking" of political leaders' assessments, but with a gradual decline; while approaching him, only six tenths of a point away, is the leader of PRD [Democratic Reformist Party] and of the "reformist operation," Miguel Roca. In the competition for the central space, Roca has an advantage of three tenths over Adolfo Suarez, who is the third best evaluated leader, with 4.7 points; although he is still less well known than the former head of the government. The head of AP [Popular Alliance] and leader of Popular Coalition, Manuel Fraga, despite his active summer campaign in Galicia and his constant presence on the streets and in the news media, has not managed to destroy that bad authoritarian image with which he is judged by an extensive sector of the public, and which has left him 3.7 points in the assessment, despite the slight recovery of his political strength.

In the previous "installment" of the OTR/TIEMPO poll, it was determined that the qualities of being "intelligent" and "hard-working" were the ones most

highly esteemed by Spaniards in their leaders; while that of being "authoritarian" was one of those most repudiated. Felipe Gonzalez and Miguel Roca have benefited from this type of evaluation, which has harmed the leader of the conservative opposition because of his authoritarian quality.

The Liberal Campaign

In the poll there are questions about many more leaders, besides the four principal ones already mentioned. The head of the Liberal Party (PL) Jose Antonio Segurado, shows the effects of a good image campaign that has brought his evaluation up to 4.7 points; in other words, to the same level as Adolfo Suarez. Nevertheless, it must be noted that, whereas Suarez is identified by nearly 90 percent of Spaniards, only 20.4 percent know Segurado, for the time being.

The leader of UGT [General Union of Workers], Nicolas Redondo, and that of the major management association, CEOE [Spanish Confederation of Business Organizations], Jose Maria Cuevas, are assessed very evenly, with a slight advantage for Redondo, who has 4.5 points, as compared with 4.4 for Jose Maria Cuevas. On the other hand, CEOE is a tenth ahead in the evaluation of the unions. The former "super-minister" of economy and finance, Miguel Boyer, now president of the Banco Exterior of Spain, shows in his image the effects of his departure from the government and the sentimental adventure attributed to him. He has received an assessment of 3.9 points, compared with the 4.8 that he had in December 1984. It is symptomatic to observe that "jet society" is by far the social group considered worst by Spaniards, with 2.9 points; which has contributed to the loss of image of politicians who appear to be overly associated with the "jet set" parties.

PSOE retains its preeminent position as the country's leading political force, with 29.9 percent voting intention, nearly double the 15.5 percent inclined in favor of Manuel Fraga's Popular Coalition. The two center parties, Miguel Roca's PRD and Adolfo Suarez' CDS [Social Democratic Center Party], which together totaled 7.4 percent of the voting intention in September 1984, now total 9.4 percent, with a 2-point gain for the two combined. The summer has affected the relative backing for the two center parties. In fact, PRD moved from 2.6 in June to 3.8 percent in September, with a gain of 1.2 points; while CDS dropped from 6.2 to 5.6, with a loss of six tenths. The "reformist operation" appears to have surmounted the spring crisis, largely as a result of the improvement in the image of its leader, Miguel Roca.

It is interesting to note that, out of a minimal predictable abstention of 20 percent of the electorate, only 15 percent (in all likelihood considerably less) of the voters still remain to be signed up. Realizing that PSOE is over 6 points from the necessary number for an absolute majority, and if one reckons the "concealed" vote of the right, which has been more than sufficiently proven in previous polls and elections, it would be highly unlikely that Felipe Gonzalez would manage to repeat an absolute majority of seats in elections which took place now.

Insofar as Gerardo Iglesias' PCE [Spanish Communist Party] is concerned, the September poll shows a recovery of four tenths in comparison with June, with the voting intention rising from 2.4 to 2.8 percent. In any event, it is still below the very meager results of the 1982 elections and hence, would have difficulties in maintaining any parliamentary presence. A year ago, in September 1984, PCE had a voting intention of 4.8 percent. It is obvious that the exacerbation of the internal crisis, with the radical confrontation between "Gerardistas" and "Carrillistas," has represented a disintegration of PCE as a useful vote; which explains the persistence of the leftist vote backing PSOE, despite the shift to the right by Felipe Gonzalez' government that has been evident.

In a different connection, and in the opinion of Spaniards, the government as an institution is still considered worse than the Armed Forces, the Church and Parliament. On the other hand, it is considered better than management's CEOE, the unions and Spanish Television.

Between June and September, the government lost four tenths in the public's evaluation; the Armed Forces, five; and Parliament, six. Of these great institutions, only the Church has improved, by a tenth, after the summer hiatus.

A Left-Of-Center Country

The fact is that the fluctuations of opinion concerning politicians, parties and institutions are necessarily very slight, owing to the great stability that Spaniards show on their scale of ideological self-definition which has been repeated, virtually without any kind of change, during the past 2 years. The country is still definitely inclined toward the left, with the greatest relative weight in the left-of center position and the almost non-existence of extremism.

A total of 18.6 percent of Spaniards declare themselves left-of-center, as opposed to only 8.8 claiming to be right-of-center. Somewhat the same thing occurs in the left and right relationship: 16.7 percent declare themselves to be of the left, and only 9.1 percent, of the right; while 17.3 percent position themselves definitely in the center. It is obvious that the extreme left, with 1.6 percent, and the extreme right, with 0.5 percent, lack electoral clout in Spain. The weighted averages lead us to the discovery that the left as a whole approximately doubles the right as a whole; which is clearly reflected in the ratio of electoral forces between PSOE and Popular Coalition, and backs the theory that, without a broad center force, it would be almost impossible for the right to displace PSOE from Moncloa Palace.

Technical Record

Execution: OTR/IS, with the cooperation of Emopublica, Inc, for the field work, and Unitec, for tabulation. Sample: 1,199 persons 18 years of age and older, residing in Spain. Random, by conglomerates and random route. Field: Carried out from 16 to 20 September, by polling in households. Direction: Juan Diez Nicolas.



Key to Chart:

1. Evaluation of the Principal Leaders
2. September '84
3. December '84
4. March '85
5. June '85
6. September '85

2909

CSO: 3548/13

POLITICAL

SWEDEN

SIFO POLL VIEWS LIBERALS' GAIN, COMPARISONS

Poll Results

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 3 Nov 85 p 6

[Article by Willy Silberstein]

[Text] The Liberal Party has recorded its best result ever and overtaken the Conservatives in the SVENSKA DAGBLADET-SIFO [Swedish Institute for Public Opinion Polls] poll for October. The Center Party is at its lowest point ever. According to SIFO, the nonsocialists are now in the majority with 50.5 percent compared to 47.5 percent for the socialists.

Seven weeks after the election, there is great turbulence among the voters, with extremely large shifts in public opinion. This is illustrated by a comparison between SIFO's voter barometer just a few days before the election, a public opinion survey conducted just a couple of days after the election but not published until now, and the new survey (see the table below).

Of those polled in October, 4.5 percent did not answer or did not mention any party. All the changes are statistically reliable.

The long-term trend is as follows: Conservatives: 25.2 percent; Liberal Party: 13.3 percent; Center Party: 11.0 percent; Social Democrats: 44.6 percent; and VPK [Left Party-Communists]: 4.3 percent.

Not Comparable

SIFO figures are not directly comparable with election results. As usual, SIFO asked those it polled which party was best. But since the election was so recent, it is natural to compare this poll with the election results of 15 September, when the figures for the parties were as follows: Conservatives: 21.3 percent; Center Party: 12.4 percent; Liberal Party: 14.2 percent; Social Democrats: 44.7 percent; and VPK: 5.4 percent.

In opinion polls soon after an election, the trend shown in that election usually grows stronger: to him who has, more shall be given. And that phenomenon seems to be true today as well: the Liberal Party is moving up

fast, while the Conservatives and the Center Party are continuing to slip back.

Party	Results of Three Polls		
	Oct 85	18-24 Sep 85	9-12 Sep 85
Conservatives	19.0%	21%	24.5%
Liberal Party	23.5	21	10.7
Center Party	8.0	8	13.6
of which: KDS	1.5	1	2.5
Social Democrats	43.0	45	45.3
VPK	4.5	3	4.8
Other parties	2.0	2	1.1

The three latest SIFO polls. In the poll conducted the week after the election, the Liberals and Conservatives each had 21 percent. Now the Liberals are up by 2.5 percentage points, and the Conservatives are down by 2.0 percentage points.

Catastrophe for Center Party

For Center Party leader Thorbjorn Falldin, already sorely tried, the new SIFO figures make very depressing reading. The Center Party itself (that is, the old Center Party without the KDS [Christian Democratic Union]), has never experienced a figure as low as its current 6.5 percent. "Catastrophe" is not too strong a word for a party which stood close to 30 percent during its palmy days in the 1970's.

In the postelection debate within the Center Party, calls for Center Party leader Thorbjorn Falldin to resign have been heard at regular intervals. They are sure to be repeated now that the party is only 2.5 percentage points from the 4-percent barrier [below which it cannot be represented in Parliament]. Very hard times are ahead for Falldin.

Winning Horse

The winner in the election--the Liberal Party--is being carried forward on its wave of success. The party has never had a score as high as today's 23.5 percent. In 1967 it had 21.5 percent. Another peak of 18.5 percent came in 1979, when the Liberal Party formed a minority government.

A look at the past can serve as a reminder of how unstable big advances in the nonsocialist camp can be. Before the 1982 election, many members of the Liberal Party were even worried that the party would not be able to clear the 4-percent hurdle and get deputies elected to Parliament. The party obtained 5.9 percent.

The upswing was not unexpected, although no one could have anticipated that it would be as large as it was. Besides the fact that nonsocialist voters in general tend to bet on a winning horse, Bengt Westerberg received considerable attention in the mass media, where he was depicted time and again as the big winner in the election.

Psychological Limit

It is clear that he has continued to take voters away from the Conservatives, who have now fallen back by 2 percentage points. In the postelection debate, the party leadership has been criticized from within the party over the way the campaign was conducted. Because SIFO figures for the Conservatives were above 30 percent only a few months ago, expectations within the party were at a high pitch.

Ulf Adelsohn has responded by pointing out that even though the Conservatives are down by a couple of percentage points, their election result was the second best in modern times. In those circumstances, the fact that the party is now below the psychologically important 20-percent level may begin causing some alarm at Conservative headquarters in the Old Town.

Irritation

Since the election, Conservative irritation with the Liberal Party has been brought fully into the open, partly in connection with the general political debate in Parliament and in a couple of interviews published in SVENSKA DAGBLADET. There will now be a difficult balancing act as each of the two parties tries to preserve the credibility of a nonsocialist alternative for government while simultaneously attacking the opponent enough to ensure that its own party grows.

The Social Democrats are down by 2 statistically reliable percentage points. The talk that there will be an austere budget bill in January 1986 may account for that decline. Another possible explanation is that the attention being paid to Westerberg has also caused losses for the Social Democrats.

New Role for VPK

The VPK is still hovering around 4 or 5 percent. Ahead of us are 3 years in which that party may come into focus on many issues. The VPK must vote with the Social Democrats in Parliament if the government is to have a majority for its bills when the three nonsocialist parties vote against them.


This naturally provides the VPK with a chance to push the government's policy toward the left. But at the same time, it may put the VPK in the tough spot of having to swallow bitter pills from the government so as not to precipitate a government crisis.

The party leadership has been criticized by some districts in the past for being too ready and willing to engage in parliamentary huckstering. Now the situation may become even harder to handle.

Poll Covered 2,249 Individuals

And in conclusion, we come to the obligatory data on the poll itself: 999 people were interviewed in their homes between 9 and 29 October, and 1,250 individuals were polled by telephone between 7 and 22 October. Telephone

Party Standings in SIFO Polls From June to October



Bengt Westerberg has suddenly become SIFO king in the nonsocialist camp. The shift among the nonsocialist parties in recent months is unique.

interviews are considered less reliable because those interviewed must reveal their party preferences. During visits to people's homes, the interviewer does not know which "ballot" has been placed in the envelope for SIFO.

Perhaps it should also be pointed out that SIFO does not select those to be polled. Their names come from DAFA (National Computing Center for Administrative Data Processing).

A new feature in this poll is that SIFO no longer interviews only people up to and including the age of 74. The upper age limit has been dropped.

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 3 Nov 85 p 2

[Editorial: "The Liberal Party's--and the Palme Government's--Standing"]

[Text] The ballots had scarcely been counted before a new term was added to our political vocabulary: the election results had been decided by "the Westerberg effect."

Following the SIFO poll whose results are being published in SVENSKA DAGBLADET today, there is reason to widen the discussion. Bengt Westerberg certainly has many splendid qualities. But there is no reason to show such mild disdain for the voters as to think that they are swept away like a teenage girl with a new crush as soon as a new young man appears on the scene. There is good reason to look first for politically rational reasons for the strong change in public opinion shown first in the election and now in this SIFO poll.

One accepted opinion is that there is a large group of general nonsocialist voters who support whichever nonsocialist party happens to be ahead at the moment. The idea is that successes by the Liberal Party very quickly led to new successes: once Bengt Westerberg and his party really had the wind at their backs, the force of the wind could only increase.

There is some truth in that, but the phenomenon can be described in an entirely different way.

The Liberal Party was strong until the mid-1960's. In the 1964 parliamentary elections, it obtained 17 percent of the vote--or several percent more than either the Conservatives or the Center Party. The party had remained at that level or above since the end of the 1940's.

The Liberal Party's crisis began as the 1960's gave way to the 1970's. In the 1973 parliamentary elections, the party received only 9.4 percent of the vote.

A tortuous path from the palmy days through Helen's dualism led to Ullsten's election disaster in 1982. The party reached an alltime low--only 5.9 percent of the voters voted for the Liberal Party.

The Liberal Party [FP] lost large chunks of its former support with every new election defeat. Of those who had voted for the FP in 1979, only 44 percent voted for it in 1982. The FP had lost over 320,000 voters in just 3 years.

The corresponding figure for the preceding 3-year period was about 220,000--of those who had voted for the FP in 1976, that many did not renew their trust in the party 3 years later.

The picture is similar if one goes back another 3 years in time.

Those figures modify the picture of the Westerberg effect and of a large and faithless group of general nonsocialist voters flitting from flower to flower.

The figures say that an important factor was probably the existence of a sizable group of Liberal Party supporters who were prepared to come home to their party as soon as conditions in that party had normalized.

That is not the entire explanation for the unprecedented leap in today's SIFO poll to 23.5 percent. But it indicates part of the pattern.

That "historical" explanation may give some relief to Center and Conservative Party supporters who will naturally feel somewhat glum over today's poll results. These very extensive shifts in public opinion are due not so much to their own weakness as they are to the Liberal Party's earlier weakness and subsequent recovery.

At the same time, that argument is of a nature to depress strategists in the two other nonsocialist parties for another reason. If it is true that the FP is primarily taking back its own voters, there is no easy way back for the Conservative and Center Parties to their respective levels of 30 and 15 percent. The Liberal Party has come to stay at its relatively high level.

The really interesting question presenting itself is naturally this: why do so many voters, including of course a sizable group of former FP supporters, feel that the Liberal Party is their party and their normal political abode?

For the FP's leadership, that question is of crucial importance as far as the next 3 years in Parliament are concerned. To put it rather simply: did people vote for the FP because they saw it as an express nonsocialist alternative with somewhat smoother edges than the Conservatives? Or did their vote reflect a flight from the Conservative Party's sharply defined nonsocialist alternative to the FP's "both-and" alternative? In short, what image of the FP do the FP's voters have?

It is when the FP answers that question that the strategy for the next 3 years will also be decided. The express nonsocialist alternative will strengthen its position through a clear and unequivocal opposition policy. The "both-and" alternative will seek cooperation with the government, and it will mean that the political middle has been reborn in Swedish politics--with whatever lifespan that may mean for our new 20-percent party in Swedish politics.

Palme's Government

The Liberal Party's upswing is spectacular. The same can be said of the Center Party's decline. Only 6.5 percent of the voters support the Center Party. It is only with the help of KDS supporters that the combined Center Party alternative totals 8 percent.

That score will not be of minor significance as far as the future course of events in the Center Party is concerned. But it is also significant from the standpoint of anything that happens in Swedish politics over the next 3 years.

As is true in any ambiguous situation in a parliamentary system, the possibility of new elections is an asset for the government.

In a situation where the government party is in danger of being the sole loser, new elections do not constitute a threat; what the opposition sees in new elections is not the danger of its losing but, primarily, its chance of winning. But at this point, it is certainly not only the government party that looks like being a loser.

Today's SIFO figures show that there is scarcely any limit to how far the Center Party may decline under present conditions. New elections might almost wipe the party out.

If anything, the shifts in public opinion since election day have strengthened the political position of the Social Democrats despite the appearance of a nonsocialist majority among voters.

At the same time, it needs to be said that the government party also has reason to view the current trends in public opinion with some concern. In itself, the Center Party's setback strengthens the government in the short term, but it is also obvious that the leftist wave which parts of the organized labor movement thought they could see emerging is not especially apparent. The Liberal and Conservative Parties combined currently have the support of 42.5 percent of the voters. We are tempted to quote our commentary from the day after the election:

"Another such 'loss' for the liberal renewal in Swedish politics and that new liberalism will have its own majority in Parliament."

Since we wrote that, the two parties have increased their combined voter support from 35.5 percent to 42.5 percent.

Viewed as a leftist wave, public opinion seems to be behaving in a somewhat undisciplined manner.

Polling Techniques Examined

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 3 Nov 85 p 2

[Interview with Hans Zetterberg, head of SIFO, by Gunnar Andren]

[Text] [Question] Can we rely on SIFO? On election night, you stated that SIFO and other public opinion institutes would have to be counted among the losers in that election. How could you have turned out to be so wrong?

[Answer] Certainly we can rely on SIFO---provided that the voters don't change their minds.

I would like to say this:

The election forecast was correct when it was made. "This poll concerns the situation on Wednesday and Thursday of election week" was what we wrote in the SIFO text that you yourself published in SVENSKA DAGBLADET. What happened then was that many voters changed their minds after the TV debate among party

leaders. And as far as the main issue--a continuing majority for the SDP [Social Democratic Party] and the VPK--was concerned, we were right. Their combined total was 50.1 percent.

[Question] Well, you are right about that. The discrepancy for the Center Party, the Social Democrats, the VPK, the Environment Party, and all the others if those others are to be included averaged 0.6 or 0.7 percent. But the SIFO forecast gave the Conservatives 3.2 percent more than they obtained in the election and gave the FP 3.5 percent too little. That is not an acceptable margin of error, is it?

[Answer] No, but the explanation is that developments moved more quickly during the last few days before the election. You yourself expressed the view that the FP had progressed greatly after the TV debate and predicted a sharp upswing, didn't you?

[Question] Yes, I certainly turned out to be one of the very few who could note that the FP did not come up to my election prediction of a full 15 percent. But did the SIFO forecast as well as that by the IMU [Institute for Market Research] come too early?

[Answer] Yes, they did. We would have to measure changes in public opinion at a very late date to be completely accurate. We might even have to publish the results on election day, which has its drawbacks. It happens in other places, but I don't like the idea.

[Question] But didn't SIFO have any indication of the sudden shift which was underway and which has very clearly continued since the election--granting that perhaps not too much attention should be paid to every percentage point that has changed in today's voter barometer?

[Answer] Of course, and I would like to show you the survey we conducted from 12 to 14 September. But let me say first that there were two very clear indications of what was happening.

As you yourself reported in SVENSKA DAGBLADET on 1 September, the inclination by Conservative Party sympathizers to vote diverged markedly from that of supporters of the other parties as early as the end of August. It was 10 percent below what it "should have" been. It was also clear from other questions SIFO was continuously asking that the Conservative Party's sympathizers were not as willing to discuss politics and had almost stopped bringing up political topics for discussion some time before the election, whereas the opposite was true of the FP's sympathizers.

[Question] That survey that you mentioned. What did it show?

[Answer] From 1730 hours on Thursday until 1630 hours on Saturday, SIFO interviewed a total of 666 people by telephone. We obtained the following results--and it must be noted that these figures have not been reworked in any way at all or checked against the way the interviewees voted in the previous election:

Election and Poll Results

Party	Election	SIFO
	15 Sep	12-14 Sep
Conservatives	21.3%	21.0%
Center Party	12.4	12.8
Liberal Party	14.2	15.1
Social Democrats	44.7	44.4
VPK	5.4	3.8
Environment Party	1.5	1.6
All others	0.5	1.3

Substantial elements of the election results are also found in that poll. You can see the full extent of the upswing for the FP, and you can also see that the Conservatives are below their election result in 1982 and that the Center Party is fated to become the smallest nonsocialist party.

[Question] But the figures also indicate a change of government!

[Answer] That is a serious defect. The figures show that the nonsocialists should have obtained 48.9 percent of the vote, compared to 48.2 percent for the SDP and the VPK, whereas the actual result was 50.1 percent for the SDP and the VPK, compared to 47.9 percent for the Conservative, Liberal, and Center Parties.

And even though the margin of error for each party is quite small, the total result is wrong. The VPK's share seems to be lower in telephone interviews than it is in personal interviews. Whether that is a temporary or permanent difference is something we do not know yet.

[Question] The upswing for the FP is remarkable in any event and almost extreme. It is true that sharp swings have occurred before, examples being the SDP's final spurt in the 1968 election campaign, the Center Party's success in 1973, and the FP's setbacks in the summer of 1979 and especially in 1982. Is there an explanation for this?

[Answer] There are always explanations. Curves which once were safely stable are now swinging as though they were tracking a heart attack instead of a normal rate. Many voters--especially on the nonsocialist side--are "borderline" cases: they have more than one party's flower in their political bouquet. It means that big swings in party preferences can easily occur.

[Question] Yes, but even so, the FP is now moving ahead at a tremendous clip and at the expense of both the Conservatives and the Center Party. At the same time, it was not more than about half a year ago--in May 1985--that even SIFO was reporting 7 percent for the Liberal Party. Isn't it true that neither the Conservative nor the Center Party has changed its policy since then?

[Answer] That is true, but--although I cannot back this up with figures--the situation seems to be that when a large group of nonsocialist voters see that it is apparently not possible to beat the SDP and Olof Palme, they show their

disappointment by "punishing" the party and party leader that seemed to represent the chief alternative. It happened to Thorbjorn Falldin, and now Ulf Adelsohn seems to be encountering the same thing. It is an emotional commitment that is finding expression in that way.

[Question] Now I must ask you this:

Hasn't SIFO misled public opinion and perhaps influenced it as well by giving the Conservatives excessively high figures for a long time? I saw an article on that topic in DAGENS NYHETER. Isn't it true?

[Answer] It is obviously necessary that people be confident that the changes reported occurred among the voters and not at the public opinion institute. That is why it is important for survey methods to be stable--the same from one period to the next.

I will tell you that SIFO measured the Conservatives using exactly the same techniques when they had 10 percent in 1972 as it did when they had 30 percent for the first time in 1983. The same applies to the Social Democrats, whether they have had less than 40 percent or more than 50 percent. The same is true for all parties. We are in the fortunate position of having hundreds of samples, and we can calculate margins of measurement error and of significance empirically, not theoretically, as is usual in other contexts.

[Question] But why doesn't SIFO explain how you do things? Why the secretive ways?

[Answer] That is entirely untrue--and it does not become more true by being repeated. The methodology for SIFO's voter barometer is public in all its parts--except that the names and party preferences of those interviewed are never revealed. Detailed statistics concerning the functioning of our systems of questions, both during interviews in people's homes and now by telephone, are available from us shortly after the start of every month.

[Question] But politicians often say that they do not believe SIFO's figures. What is your answer to that?

[Answer] The same that you usually give: the voter barometer is not produced for politicians or parties or for the government or for purpose of election research. It is commissioned by and for SVENSKA DAGBLADET, GOTEBORGS-POSTEN, ARBETET, and SKANSKA DAGBLADET and the readers of those newspapers. No one else. The newspapers represent differing political views, but SIFO is neutral when it comes to political parties.

[Question] What is the specific difference between telephone interviews and interviews in people's homes?

[Answer] The number of people not naming a party amounts to 15 or 20 percent in telephone interviews even though two questions are asked: "Which political party do you consider best today?" and "Which party do you lean toward most?" Compare that to the figure for interviews in people's homes, where the

interviewer never finds out how the individual voted, since a system resembling the balloting procedure is used. The number not naming a party is very low in that case--only about 5 percent on average.

[Question] So I and other people can have confidence in SIFO in the future?

[Answer] Yes.

11798

CSO: 3650/72

POLITICAL

SWEDEN

PAPER PERCEIVES USSR 'SUPERPOWER ARROGANCE' TOWARD SWEDEN

PM180954 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 14 Dec 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Moscow's Welcome"]

[Text] A day after the Swedish prime minister officially announced that he will visit the Soviet Union Moscow has voiced the scarcely veiled threat that it will "take the necessary steps" in the disputed economic zone in the Baltic.

A few hours earlier the Soviet fleet had provided an example of such steps. Swedish fishing boats were driven from their fishing grounds by Soviet inspection vessels and were forced to abandon their tackle.

After this expression of Russian hospitality Prime Minister Palme can hardly feel particularly respected in the Soviet capital. The Russians are showing him the usual combination of enticements and threats. The Soviet Union's state news agency made no mention at all of Olof Palme's forthcoming visit to the country when it put out an article in which the prime minister's view of the summit in Geneva was mentioned in positive terms. Instead of repeating and underlining the invitation, a threatening article is published in IZVESTIYA.

The suggestion that the Soviet Union could be forced to consider suitable measures to defend its interests in the still disputed zone in the Baltic comes shortly after Swedish statements that Sweden has thought that it has seen signs of a rapprochement between the Soviet Union and Sweden in the search for a solution for the zone that has for many years been a bone of contention.

The move from Moscow reflects a growing Soviet irritation with what are called third countries (principally West Germany and Denmark) being allowed by Sweden to fish in the disputed area. The unpleasant element in the Soviet action is that Moscow is invoking "current international law and Soviet legislation."

This is a symptom of superpower arrogance. Adopting unilateral measures in a disputed area is irreconcilable with international law, as Foreign Minister Sten Andersson pointed out in a short and terse reaction Friday [13 December].

When Olof Palme spoke Thursday on the theme of "Swedish Security Policy" he said that during his forthcoming visit to the Soviet Union he will say that Sweden wants good relations with that country. But the prime minister stressed

that relations must be built on a foundation of mutual respect for the fundamental principles of international law and on respect for Sweden's territorial integrity.

The brusque signals from Moscow communicated by IZVESTIYA, the Soviet government organ, do not bear witness to either respect for international legal regulations or respect for Sweden's prime minister.

Nor will the Soviet attitude make the negotiations on the economic zone in the Baltic any easier. Instead Moscow's action appears to be a Soviet attempt to frighten Sweden into making concessions when it comes to fixing the disputed demarcation line in the Baltic.

For the last 10 years Sweden and the Soviet Union have been negotiating in various rounds of talks on the drawing of a demarcation line in the Baltic without their being able to reach any agreement on the two countries' economic zones. Sweden has said that the demarcation line should be drawn between Gotland and the Baltic coast. The Soviet Union has said that the demarcation line should be drawn midway between the Swedish and Soviet mainlands.

Such a demarcation line would not only affect Swedish fishing. It would also have other, more serious consequences for Sweden. Recently, Sweden had thought that it had been able to see increasing Soviet understanding for the original Swedish position. However, Sweden's negotiating position has been weakened by the willingness demonstrated in the past to compromise on the drawing of the demarcation line.

If the Soviet Union wants now to seek to exploit a vacillation on the Swedish side by excessive actions against Swedish fishermen and a scarcely camouflaged threat of actions in the disputed area this is not the way to bring about the normalization of relations which Moscow so often says it is striving for.

/9365

CSO: 3650/844

POLITICAL

TURKEY

TALKS WITH U.S. ON NEW BASES ACCORD POSTPONED

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 27 Nov 85 pp 1,10

[Text] Ankara--Technical talks between Turkey and the United States on the review of the Defense Cooperation Agreement have been adjourned until next month. Although it was announced after the talks opened in the first week of November that the discussions would continue, officials have confirmed that the second round of talks have been adjourned until next month because the U.S. administration has not yet decided the course it will pursue at the talks.

Circles linked with the issue stated that the U.S. departments of Defense and State, the National Security Council and the White House have not yet agreed on the strategy to be pursued during the bargaining for the bases and that this has resulted in the postponement of the talks.

The same circles indicated that the U.S. embassy in Ankara is awaiting official instructions from Washington with regard to American counterproposals.

U.S. embassy sources in Ankara speculated that the Geneva summit may have had a role in the postponement of the talks. However, these sources "ruled out" the possibility that the United States "may be dragging its feet" on these talks.

Meanwhile, it has been learned that there have been contacts between the U.S. envoy in Ankara, Ambassador Robert Strausz-Hupe, and the Director General of the Foreign Ministry's Common Defense Affairs Department, Ambassador Selcuk Korkut, on the format of the technical talks. These contacts indicate that the talks will proceed more smoothly in the future. Indeed, Foreign Ministry spokesman Yalim Eralp told reporters yesterday: "We expect the talks to resume in the near future."

Interim Status of Bases Questioned

In response to reporters' questions, the Foreign Ministry spokesman clarified the issue of what the status of the bases will be during the talks. Eralp said: "The agreement remains in effect as long as we do not abrogate it." In response to another question, Eralp implied that Turkey reserves the right to annul the agreement saying: "We always have the means to abrogate the agreement. However, that is not our goal. Our goal is to put Turkish-American relations on stronger foundations."

When asked what the status of the bases will be when the 3-month negotiation period envisaged by the agreement expires before a new accord is reached, Eralp said: "The agreement remains in effect as long as we do not abrogate it." When asked whether an interim arrangement will not be necessary in such a situation, Eralp repeated the same answer. He thus signaled to Washington that in case the 3-month negotiation period expires without a new accord Ankara will permit the bases to continue operating in accordance with the provisions of the 1980 agreement without requiring an interim status.

How can the agreement be abrogated? In answering this question yesterday, Foreign Ministry officials stated that paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 7 of the agreement may be invoked. Paragraph 3 states that the agreement may be abrogated at the end of the 3-month negotiation period and Paragraph 4 says it may be annulled "with a 1-month notice if any one of the sides concludes that some aspects of the agreement are not being implemented."

9588

CSO: 3554/17

POLITICAL

TURKEY

DENKTAS SCORES PLANNED TALKS ON EEC-CYPRUS CUSTOMS UNION

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 27 Nov 85 pp 1,8

[Text] Nicosia--It has been announced that at the meeting of the EEC foreign ministers in Brussels two days ago it was decided to open talks on establishing a customs union between the Greek Cypriot Administration and the EEC. President Rauf Denktas of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus [TRNC] declared that the decision is one-sided and contravenes the principle of the equality of the two communities in Cyprus.

According to the Greek Cypriot press, which reported the decision to open talks to establish a customs union between the Greek Cypriot Administration and the EEC, the starting date of the talks will be decided jointly by the EEC Executive Committee and the Greek Cypriot Administration. The Greek Cypriot papers further write that the said talks will conclude by the end of December.

In his statement on this issue, TRNC President Denktas said:

"The fact that the EEC has moved toward a customs union with the Greek Cypriot Administration as if the Turkish Cypriot side did not exist raises serious doubts on whether it really supports the UN Secretary General's initiative on Cyprus. Can the EEC not see that with such pro-Greek Cypriot actions it is simply encouraging the Greek Cypriot side to maintain its negative attitude and thus blocking the path that may lead to a compromise and a solution in Cyprus?"

Denktas added that the establishment of a customs union between the EEC and the Greek Cypriot administration will effectively make the EEC a partner in the illegitimate and inhuman economic embargo that is being implemented against the Turkish Cypriot side.

9588
CSO: 3554/17

MILITARY

GREECE

'REAL' PURPOSE OF U.S., TURKISH AEGEAN VIOLATIONS

Athens ETHNOS TIS KYRIAKIS in Greek 27 Oct 85 p 5

[Article by Stratos Kalogeropoulos]

[Text] There are no encouraging prospects for re-establishing any kind of cooperation between Greece and the military branch of NATO, as long as issues connected to Greece's sovereign rights in the Aegean are still pending.

The commander of GEETHA [National Defense General Staff], General Kouris, made this reminder to the deputy commander of the European allied forces, German General Mach, who came to Athens for a familiarization visit.

Furthermore, the GEETHA leader noted to General Mach that Greece's relations with the NATO military system are entering, inevitably, a new period of tension following the recent mass violations of the country's national airspace by the U.S. and Turkish air forces during the recent exercise in the Aegean.

It should be pointed out that the numerous violations on Tuesday, and the interceptions of the intrusions in the southern and northern Aegean were reported to General Kouris by the GEA [Air Force General Staff] commander while he was talking with General Mach. In the case in question, the reports of the jet pilots concerned with intercepting the violations stress clearly that it involves methodical actions, not accidents due to the high velocities of modern airplanes.

The GEA's aerial photographs also clearly show that the choice of this area for allied exercises in the Aegean is matched with planned provocations in Greek geographic territory, with a further target of escalating a new series of pressures on Greece.

According to the facts from military analysts, the frequency of the violations in the "Athens FIR" aims, in a first stage, at legitimizing the real Turkish and U.S. contestation of the 10-mile expanse of Greek airspace, in conformity with the breadth of Greek shores.

To the Turkish and U.S. demand for restricting the airspace to six miles, the Greek staff counterposes the armed forces' right to control the outermost boundaries of the realm; therefore, any type of settlement in the NATO frameworks is rejected.

As General Kouris charged to General Mach, the Turkish airplanes, using the opportunity of participating in NATO exercises, are trying to reconnoiter the

degree of defensive organization and preparedness of the Greek islands in the Aegean.

The Jurisdiction

As concerns the Turkish Air Forces' refusal to submit flight plans to the Greek authorities during its entry into the Athens FIR, NATO is now proposing re-establishment of the Larisa-Eskisehir telephone circuit connecting the commanders of the 28th TAD (Tactical Air Force) and 1st TAF (Tactical Air Force), which is controlled entirely by the Turkish GEA.

Aside from these jurisdictions, however, NATO granted to Turkish generals the administration of the headquarters of the southeastern wing of NATO in Smyrni [Izmir], which means that it is impossible for Greece to revive its relations with the Alliance's military branch.

The staff is confronting with absolute composure the NATO hint that it is possible Turkey may again put in practice the "NOTAM 714"; that is, including in the "Istanbul FIR" international airline zones over the islands.

In practice, Ankara's proclamation 714 plans for classing in the "Istanbul FIR", from north to south, the islands of Samothraki, Limnos, Lesbos, Agios Evstratios, Psaras, Andipsaras, Khios, Ikaria and Dodekanisos, east of Rhodes and Karpathos--that is, half of the Aegean airspace.

The GEETHA, in accordance with the counterplans provided, this time is not going to get involved in interminable discussions with NATO or other accomodating mediators, and will proceed to countermeasures which will create, without fail, problems difficult to solve throughout the Alliance's network.

And, as was stressed to NATO factors, Greece is not the one who will repent if it puts into practice its own "NOTAM 1157," which provides for proclaiming the Aegean a dangerous area for flights of foreign military airplanes.

Let us not forget that the application of this NOTAM in August, 1974, shocked, first of all, NATO itself which was forced to cancel not only the planned exercises in the Aegean's international waters, but also its communication with the regional headquarters of southern Europe and Turkey.

Via Bulgaria

As long as the Aegean was a dangerous area, flights, especially of military airplanes from the West to Turkey, took place via Bulgaria from the north and, from the south, via the FIR of Malta and Cyprus. The closing of Aegean air corridors for military airplanes is the great trump card in the Greek staff's applications, regardless of the show of force undertaken by the Turks and Americans during their maneuvers. With the above presumptions, Greece, as it has been explained to Brussels, is putting a definite end to proposed, suspicious arrangements, such as the abolishing of Limnos' Tacan (Tactical Navigation) radio aid, which controls to a great degree the approach of foreign military airplanes to the northern Aegean area.

Finally, NATO's enraging demand for all of eastern Greece's radar to be connected with receiver centers in western Turkey, for joint defense strategy reasons, is definitely being rejected.

Such an imprudent act would give the Turkish staff the opportunity to securely monitor 100 percent of the Greek Air Forces' activity from Crete to the country's northern borders and the eastern islands.

Regardless of NATO's ensnaring proposals for arrangements in the Aegean, Greece is answering straightforwardly that its national airspace will always be measured based on the boundaries of its continental territory in connection with its territorial waters, throughout the expanse of its seas.

9247

CSO: 3521/37

MILITARY

GREECE

PASOK'S 'MAGIC FORMULA' FOR MAINTAINING U.S. BASES

Athens ENA in Greek 7 Nov 85 p 9

[Text] The formula which A. Papandreou has apparently arrived at concerning the future of the U.S. bases in Greece is like a "magic picture." This magic picture will be able to persuade credulous or well-disposed people that the bases are being sent away, while distrustful and more observant people will "discern" that the bases not only are not leaving, they are being strengthened....

This is because one or two of the bases more known to the Greek people will be "packed up" to be removed, in accordance with plans for their readaptation, either to Rota, Spain, or Sigonella, Italy. Turkey will have to be excluded so it will not be thought an attempt is being made to strengthen the Turkish role, with an extortionary meaning, at Greece's expense. Included in the category of "facilities" for removal are Ellinikon and probably Nea Makri (which is in the direct view of many), as well as some telecommunications stations and certain nuclear weapons depots.

Furthermore, the advanced, modern technology allows for the U.S. Navy's very strong telecommunications base at Nea Makri to be cut off. This is a base which, according to an old expression of a qualified government official, "catches" even submarines sailing in the Indian Ocean.

In another branch of the "formula" for removing-maintaining the bases is amalgamating some of them--such as Nea Makri with the Gournia telecommunications station. In this case, the "loss" from the cut-off will be balanced by the strengthening of the amalgamated stations and, by extension, by the upgrading of their strategic and operational importance. And where this upgrading extends to operational practice, and reveals the base which remains of more momentous importance than that which was "cut off," the military facility will be called a "NATO" facility. Such as Volis Field in Crete, the ACE High (Telecommunication System of the Allied Command Europe), the airspace surveillance system known as NADGE [NATO Air Defense Ground Environment] and FORACS [Fleet Operational Readiness Accuracy Check Sites] (the navy's unit for checking the precision of weapons systems).

So to the NATO formula which the government rejected during the Greek-U.S. negotiations (it maintained the bases did not serve the interests of the Atlantic Alliance, but of the United States only) Papandreou is now returning, to cover those bases remaining beyond 1988--for an indefinite, additional period of time.

However, despite the fact that satisfying the U.S. demand for the bases' future was a basic prerequisite for U.S.--and by extension, western--support of an economically tottering country, the government avoided making additional demands.

This stance of the Greek Government does not appear to be accidental. Simply, the Greek Government is obliged to "eavesdrop" on what is happening on our right, where the new U.S.-Turkish agreement is evolving. It would be nationally damaging--but also encumbering in terms of the party--for the government to ask for and--why not?--to take trade-offs, primarily of an economic nature, without first knowing what to demand so Turkey will not come out a beneficiary at the expense of the present correlation of forces pursued by our country. It was, therefore, natural last weekend, when Michael Armacost spent a "long weekend" in Ankara listening to Turkish requests for an increase in aid, for the Athens telephone line with our embassy in Ankara to have lit up. Any information was valuable for the coming Greek requests for additional economic and other exchanges; when, that is, these requests will encircle the type of renewal for the terminating 1983 Greek-U.S. agreement, and their satisfaction, appropriately argued, along with the removal of certain bases and concealing of the amalgamation of others, will be one more "victory" for the government over the United States.

Essentially, at any rate, the government, in accordance with its negotiating tactics, has no other possibility than following the policy of K. Karamanlis; a policy which overlooked the amount of aid and was interested foremost in the correlation of Greek and Turkish forces, stability in the Aegean and the maintenance--by extension--of the seven-to-ten ratio. It was a clever tactic which allowed Ankara to turn to extortions and devote itself to tough negotiations, and in the end our country benefitted the same proportionally, without any particular negotiating "cost in friction" for Greek-U.S. relations.

9247

CSO: 3521/37

MILITARY

GREECE

BRIEFS

FRENCH MISSILE PURCHASE MEETINGS--A new round of talks will begin in a few days between Greek and French air force officers, this time not on the "Mirage-2000" but on purchasing the ultramodern air-to-ground and air-to-air "Matra" missiles. These missiles will be carried by new combat airplanes, whose construction began five months ago in Bordeaux, France. Correspondingly, as was made known, a group of air force technicians will depart for France in a few weeks to oversee construction of the Mirages. The first aircraft will be delivered, in full operational readiness, at the beginning of 1988. The Ministry of National Defense has not announced anything concerning the new talks with the French, nor how much the new missiles will cost. According to information, however, the purchase of the new missiles will be accompanied by compensatory benefits. [Text] [Athens TO VIMA in Greek 3 Nov 85 p 8] 9247

CSO: 3521/37

MILITARY

ITALY

DEFENSE CHIEF OF STAFF ON REORGANIZATION OF ARMED FORCES

General Bartolucci's Address

Rome INTERARMA NEWS in Italian 10 Jul 85 pp 382-386

[Text] A Smaller Army, but a Better Armed and a More Efficient Army. A Streamlined Navy and Air Force, but with Modern Equipment

The top military are ready to assume the responsibility of even painful technical-operational choices in order to create a more streamlined apparatus, balanced and compact in its components.

The principle of deterrence is predicated on an apparatus with credibility and credibility is based upon operational capability and technological efficiency.

The reorganizations involve the operational forces and support organizations, including the Defense technological-industrial structures that are no longer productive.

The draft of a bill regarding the legal and financial conditions of the military and the protection of retired personnel is ready.

"At a time when the Armed Forces are subjected to sacrifices of a magnitude that requires the reorganization of the operational component, it would be improper to force them to keep in operation unnecessary organizations solely for political and social reasons that have prevented their elimination, or even a mere consolidation, in the past."

This was among the statements made by General Lamberto Bartolucci, Defense Chief of Staff, in his address at the close of the 36th session of CASD [Defense Center for Higher Studies] (26 June). Bartolucci had emphasized the need to "prune the dead and unproductive branches of the military apparatus" in order to be able to achieve the goals of readiness and efficiency necessary for a better performance of its tasks. This is necessary because there is the possibility of tightening the Defense budget: "With the available funds, the Defense Chief of Staff said, "neither the objectives necessary for carrying out the interforce missions set forth in the White Paper nor the meeting of NATO standards can be achieved."

Here is the text of Bartolucci's address, carried in its entirety by INTERARMA (Only the subslugs are the editor's):

"The extremely important problems discussed during the 36th session of the Institute give me the starting point for dwelling today on some salient points for modernizing our military apparatus. This is a problem that commands the full attention of the top political-military echelons in order to formulate a proper and definitive solution, projected and good for the last 15 years of the current century."

Operational Capability and Technological Efficiency

"The central point, the focus of the adjustment in question, such as it emerges from the results of the most recent planning studies, is the restructuring of the military apparatus. As is known, in outlining the model of national defense, the 1985 White Paper pointed out the principal interforce operational missions of the Italian military apparatus. It was a matter of describing, in minute detail--or, as it is referred to in technical jargon, to take apart--that great common mission of defending the nation that the constitution of the Republic and the law of principles entrust to our Armed Forces. This has made it possible to give more definite outlines both to the political-strategic objectives of the defense model and to the tasks that the operational components of such a model are called [upon] to perform. One can, therefore, say that the interforce missions correspond to the aggregate of the tasks that the Italian military apparatus is called upon to perform.

"The analysis of these tasks makes it possible to define the operational requirements and, therefore, the operational level and composition of the individual forces. However, a mere quantitative assessment, even if combined with interforce proportional and balancing criteria, is not enough.

"The principle of deterrence is postulated on an apparatus that is plausible and the credibility is based on operational capability and technological effectiveness. Therefore, a process of verification in greater depth is indispensable in order to direct long-term planning and define the program of the defense interforces as accurately as possible. This by absolutely keeping in mind as well the financial resources that are realistically believed to be made available within the time span of the planning. Such verification was completed a short time ago by the Defense General Staff and has made it possible to achieve results that I consider to be of great importance for the future of the Armed Forces."

The 1975 Restructuring

"The present situation cannot be understood without a brief mention of the past. The comprehensive strength of the present military apparatus was determined in 1975 when, on the basis of available resources, it was decided to restructure the apparatus by cutting it down in size, with the intention of achieving a qualitative improvement of the operational forces. The levels of the forces set in 1975 were judged to be sufficient to meet the needs of those days, keeping in mind the quantum leap in quality that the modernization would have engendered. Actually, the modernizing process, which was based mainly on supplemental appropriations, in the following years underwent conspicuous regressions. Specifically, the main causes of the incomplete success of the modernizing process were the extent of the inflationary phenomenon, the freezing of annual budgets, the increase in the cost indexes of military materiel and, due to all sorts of difficulties, the

non-implementation of the scheduled cuts in the manpower programs of the Army. The assessment of the situation, made in mid-decade in 1981, led to the formulation of a long-term financial premise that foresaw a progressive increase in resources in order to obtain, although belatedly, a satisfactory implementation of the modernization plan. This premise, expanded before the Supreme Council of Defense, obtained a political agreement in principle. Nevertheless, during the following years, the increase in the budgets--stimulated undoubtedly by a commitment made within the NATO Alliance, the well-known annual increase of 3 percent--did measure up to expectations and, as a matter of fact, the 1981 premise, once again submitted to the Supreme Council in 1983, was not considered and, although some of the more recent budgets have shown a certain tendency to remedy the situation, the prospect for the immediate future is not at all encouraging. In order to insert into this difficult starting point the process of adjustment of the defense model, it is evident that a strict verification to obtain a clear understanding of compatability was of the essence. The outline of the needs set forth in the White Paper, the increased importance that the strategy of the Alliance places on the conventional apparatus and the greater involvement undertaken by Italian policy within the Mediterranean region have required, in the first place, the absorption of the 1975 objectives into a smooth-running plan more in keeping with the new operational needs and new technological realities."

Reductions: Objectives-Resources Gap

"The updating of the objectives' outline could not, however, disregard the constraints imposed by the limitation of the available resources resulting from an economic policy of the government aimed at eliminating the deficit in public expenditures. This need for balance will force reductions in the Defense budget. This is not a matter of mere hunches, but of an estimate based on the information given and on the directives issued by the minister of Defense as a result of which a basic financial premise, lower than that of 1981, was established. As a consequence of this, a reference point was given to the planning; the analysis made by the Defense General Staff has confirmed that there is a serious gap.

"It is evident, at this point, as has resulted from General Rossi's (CASD president) report, that the gap is so wide that even if it were possible, beginning in 1986, to obtain what was allocated in 1981, it would, nevertheless, be necessary not only to prune those dead and unproductive branches, as I have defined them on other occasions, but it would actually begin to affect the very strength of operational units.

"As we have seen, it would be necessary to conform to a financial premise that is more restrictive than that of 1981; the second finding of the report revealed that neither the efficiency objectives necessary to meet the interforce missions nor the upgrading to meet NATO standards could be met with the funds available. Having to face such a worrisome prospect, the Defense General Staff has considered it necessary to look at the future very realistically in order to make choices that can no longer be postponed. To this end, believing the way to quality and efficiency to be an absolute necessity, it was considered that there were still margins for additional quantitative reorganization in our structures that would allow the saving of resources which could be earmarked of the needed qualitative improvements."

The Reorganization

"It is a matter of reorganization that affects both the operational forces and the support organizations. With regard to the operational forces, the study revealed the need to effect a quantitative reduction of the land apparatus in order to reach a substantial qualitative improvement. Detachments and units with incomplete personnel structures, redundant commands and training organizations, armaments and equipment that are obsolete, but still costly because of the need for their continuous and frequent maintenance, detract from the credibility of the military apparatus and demand resources that could be used in the first-line components. Therefore, a cautious and decisive action to cut down will bring about a substantial increase in the funds available to be invested, while at the same time reducing the expenditures connected with manpower and operation. It is evident that a reduction in the quantitative level of the operational forces must be made in the context of a reorganization of the support organizations to be pursued relentlessly, despite the foreseeable difficulties that such measures involve. On the other hand, while the Armed Forces are forced to make financial sacrifices of such a magnitude as to require the reorganization of the operational component, it would not be right to force them to keep in existence organizations that are unnecessary or uneconomical because of political-social considerations that have prevented, even in the recent past, their elimination or their mere reduction in size.

"Redundant territorial and support structures draw a substantial share of resources; thus, the present situation is clearly unsatisfactory from the cost/efficiency point of view. The reorganization is feasible by reducing the number of military districts, hospitals, depots, training and territorial commands and organizations that are superfluous, in addition to some operational supports as well that are no longer productive structures of the technical-industrial sector. With a dearth of resources, the need for integration dictates aiming at the best fulfillment of the functional needs of the Armed Forces."

Critical Conditions for the Land Forces and Decline for the Navy and Air Force

"The military high command, conscious of this, is ready to assume the responsibility of painful choices of a technical-operational nature affecting the manpower level in order to achieve those goals of readiness, efficiency and, consequently, of credibility that I consider indispensable for a better performance of our mission. The center having jurisdiction should make the most careful decisions possible to safeguard the needs of national defense as well as the commitments made within the Atlantic Alliance. As a matter of fact, if the requests for confirmation that have been made repeatedly are not taken into account, the balancing of the military apparatus will not meet the hoped-for results, results that must be such as to bring about, in the end, a more streamlined military apparatus, compact and balanced in its components and attuned to the emerging technological realities that will find an effective application during the 1990's. I believe I must emphasize, for the sake of clarity, that, if in the years to come, the premises for cutting down the defense budgets come to pass, the situation of the land forces will remain critical despite the savings of financial resources resulting from the indispensable reduction of the operational forces and their supports. In addition, there will be a further decline in quantity and quality of the operational lines of the Navy and the Air Force with the consequent compromising of their respective capabilities to carry

out the tasks delineated in the White Paper. Should this occur, it is a prospect about which the country must be fully apprised and that the politicians must evaluate carefully, taking into consideration that the Italian Armed Forces, as stated in the constitution, are an essential and irreplaceable element for stability and peace. To penalize them would have negative consequences on Italian industry, both from the employment standpoint and the technological one, with adverse effects, therefore, on its capability to compete in the international market. For this reason, it is essential that the Armed Forces be adequately supported by both the government and parliament in order for the effort aimed at achieving a balance in the structures to have a corresponding adequate financial commitment in the area of the modernization programs in order to respond properly to the technological challenge and to the need for a higher operational efficiency."

Smaller, but More Efficient Armed Forces

"Looking at the future realistically, the idea of a smaller Army must be accepted, but only if it is better armed, better equipped and more efficient, and of a Navy and an Air Force smaller in size than the optimum, but on condition that they be equipped with modern and up-to-date equipment. Only by means of this technological quality and efficiency can a more effective defense model and wise investment of resources be achieved. Furthermore, I must add that the 1975 reorganization failed to succeed, not only because the reduction was not effected to the extent it was supposed to be, but because it did not achieve the degree that had been estimated. In my opinion, it is necessary today to take great care in order to prevent the repetition of experiments that turned out to be sterile and unproductive. A new failure could also irreparably prejudice the military apparatus because of the negative effects that inefficiency and inoperability have on the cadres. This last consideration inevitably directs my address, prior to its conclusion, to the supporting element of the military apparatus: that is: the man, on whose moral strength the real value of every military apparatus actually depends."

Man, the Supporting Element

"The moral strength of cadres, of the volunteers and of the draftees springs, in the first place, from the innermost motivation, from the intellectual and professional qualities of the individual, from discipline and from efficient and continuous training. In order to achieve that, for all of these elements to develop and reach a satisfactory level, it is necessary, in my opinion, to safeguard the unusual peculiarity of the military status, by bringing out its moral inspiration on the one-hand and guaranteeing an adequate financial-remunerative dignity, on the other hand. From this point of view, the need of a legislative proposal that single-purposely covers the delicate facets of the military position as related to the peculiarity of status and employment has become ever more pressing. The juridical-financial protection of personnel is of great importance that is strongly felt by the entire military complex and the General Staffs have studied it in depth and have prepared the draft of a proposal for a bill that contains a series of regulations aimed at controlling, in the future, the fundamental elements of the juridical and economic treatment of the military. It is indispensable for this proposal to be quickly and considerably implemented if the qualities and motivation of personnel, together with the technological progress, are to be kept at a standard that is equal to the challenges of the future. It is only in this way that the ultimate and effective level of operational efficiency of a balanced military apparatus can

be effectively achieved. In this context, the fair protection of retired personnel should be properly stressed because it continues to suffer disproportionately, depending on the year of retirement, despite recent actions that have relieved only partially the hardships resulting from the phenomenon of pensions based on the year of retirement. As a matter of fact, the annuity of an officer who retired in the early 1970's is, after the recent equalization, only about one-half of that of a colleague of the same rank who retires today. In order to correct this unjust situation another bill was prepared and submitted aiming at ensuring full retirement coverage for those who, until now, have been denied such a benefit. Therefore, I address myself to the sensitivity of our politicians in order to prevent the legitimate expectations of the members of the Armed Forces and retired military personnel from going unfulfilled."

The CJCS concluded his address by thanking the outgoing president of CASD and by bidding farewell to those attending the 36th session, which was then adjourned.

Military Observer Comments

Rome INTERARMA NEWS in Italian 10 Jul 85 pp 387-392

[Text] It finally appears that something is moving here at home; we have become aware that perhaps the course we have followed until now does not lead very far.

Last 26 June, Chief of Defense General Staff, General Bartolucci, at the close of the 36th session of CASD [Defense High Studies Center], sounded an alarm, which, because of the occasion and his position, must be considered with care and apprehension: "The Armed Forces must reorganize themselves, eliminate the dead and unproductive branches, otherwise ..." We would say: almost start all over!

How have we come to this? For some time now political and military authorities of every country, experts, scholars and technical experts ask themselves in an ever urgent and serious manner: How will the Armed Forces be structured during the '90's and at the beginning of the new century? There is not much time between now and the year 2000; a child born today will be a mere adolescent then; however, the social, economic, technological and political changes that are foretold for that time are enormous. Europe will become smaller and smaller and poorer; the limelight will be on countries with hundreds of millions of poor and needy people. Mexico City will have more than 30 million inhabitants; Lagos, Calcutta, Cairo and Sao Paolo, not many less, while London and Paris will be medium-sized cities filled only with history and tourists. Nearly 50 years of peace "suffered" because of fear, not "chosen" because of wisdom, have gone by since the last great war, the war of wars that in 6 years annihilated almost 50 million human beings, that began with rifles and bayonets, cavalry and biplanes and ended with strategic missiles--that is what the V2's actually were--jets and atomic bombs. Limited wars, guerrilla wars and small wars by professionals, often bordering on treacherous terrorist actions, have taken the place of the enormous conflicts during which Europe destroyed itself. It is worthy of note, however, that the possibility of the same enormous conflicts repeating themselves have never disappeared.

The Armed Forces have developed, as everything else has, but almost strictly in a technical and technological context, keeping their structures and thoughts geared

exactly on the past great conflicts, always possible, but forced to fight wars and little wars by experts and professionals. These are the Armed Forces of today: large enough to be able to fight a general war and sophisticated and trained enough, at least in some of their not so negligible components, to be able to cope with guerrilla wars and small actions; in other words, Armed Forces that are very flexible, very well equipped, very well trained and, therefore, very costly.

In the past, the potential enemy to confront was of equal strength: France and Italy, Russia and Austria-Hungary and so on; as for the others, the small ones, the poor or emerging nations, it was sufficient to send a gunboat into one of their ports, a small expeditionary force, a strong ultimatum and that was that! Today it is no longer that way. Small nations which at one time did not exist or were negligible: Libya, Syria, Israel, Cuba, just to mention a few, or actually political or religious factions such as Shiites, Druses, Palestinians, Vietcong, Sandinistas, Afghani Mujaheddin and many others, who can cause apprehension, exact blackmail, engage and even defeat great or medium-sized powers. It is necessary, therefore, for these powers to have the means to wage not only a general war, but also deadly, often times unpredictable, costly "pin-pricks" and to do it promptly and decisively anywhere.

At this point, it is evident that poverty and bankruptcy are unacceptable in order to afford the luxury of a good defense; it is imperative to make some choices.

We think that:

It is in the common interest to increase the conventional forces in order to escape from the nuclear monopoly and, therefore, blackmail by the great powers.

Conventional weapons are far more costly than nuclear ones. Their cost, according to recent figures, increases an average of 6 percent per year and their operational life becomes increasingly shorter.

The yearly increase of 3 percent in the NATO military budgets, which yesterday was considered sufficient to maintain the level of defense equal to that of the threat, is no longer enough.

According to a careful study carried out by General Luigi Caligaris, an extremely well-informed military critic and well-regarded author, a European research group is cited as having indicated that an annual increase of 7 percent would be acceptable for the above-mentioned purposes.

The world economic crisis makes it doubtful that anyone could keep increasing the budget by 3 percent annually and that would be the limit, even for the USA or the USSR.

From all these considerations there emerge only two paths that can be followed:

1. To accept, attempting only to contain it, the downgrading of the defense apparatus, hoping only that the same is happening to the potential adversary;
2. To make a complete review of the defense apparatus for the purpose of drastically reducing its cost and maintaining its efficiency at a high and adequate level.

Someone has already made a choice; we are talking about Europe. The United States, because of its enormous economic-industrial potential, which, moreover, is continuing to grow; the Soviet Union, because of its extraordinary riches and because of "being able to do everything without having to justify anything," are not, for the time being, affected by the crisis. This "someone" is Great Britain, which has thought out, planned and formulated a complete restructuring of its defense apparatus.

General Caligaris, in the previously-mentioned study, has clearly outlined the plan; the basis of everything is to make better investments with the funds available, this appears obvious, but it is not!

We believe that one statement on the subject is particularly revealing. It is that of the Chief of the Defense Section of the Foreign Office, Robert Alston: "In the past, we worried about having more money, today, however, we must worry about spending what we have well."

The two main points of the reorganization are:

First: There will be two top officials responsible for everything:

A top military, the Defense Chief of Staff and the Permanent Under Secretary, as political top authority.

The first will make the strategic decisions, evidently based on the directives from the political side, the choice of equipment, the planning and directing of the missions, the management of military personnel. The second will provide the resources, their management and distribution, the programs and will administer non-military personnel.

From the two top officials on down there will be commands and offices having maximum responsibility and close connections between them with a saving, compared to the old organizational charts, of as many as seven billets for three-star generals and admirals and the resulting consistent cuts in all other ranks and, therefore, in manpower and expenditures. In addition to the Sections depending from the two top echelons, seven in all, there is the most important Office of Management and Budget, mandated to check on the expenditures directly.

The General Staffs of the Services will continue to exist, but only for routine purposes, for training, for oversight and efficiency control, for carrying out their specific missions jointly, as much as possible.

One thing seems worthy of particular emphasis: there will no longer be a preset rotation for the office of Defense Chief of Staff among the three Armed Forces.

The office will go to the officer judged to be best suited, the service to which he belongs notwithstanding. It will never happen that a "mediocre" officer is chosen over and "outstanding" one merely because, at that time, it happens to be his "team's" turn for that one office!

Someone has asked how can the "best" always be chosen from among officers with training and experience that are so different and with little possibility of direct comparison beforehand. There may be some difficulty, but, after all, at the time there will not be that many candidates so as not to know each of them thoroughly. If they are not sufficiently known, it would be their fault after all because they had not made themselves sufficiently visible.

Second: Turning over military factories to civilian management.

This is a truly revolutionary innovation. The Royal Ordnance Factories will be turned over to the private sector. These factories, equipped with high-level technology and with great experience and capability, have great traditions and indisputable successes, but they are irreparably hampered in their progress because they are state-run apparatuses. Turning them over to private management means many things, but mainly this:

Closing the factories that are no longer productive or that are losing money;

Development and expansion of those making a profit or, at least, being capable of making progress;

Streamlining personnel, that is, mobility or separation. Within a short time there were 875 hirings and 7,260 separations, retirements or early retirements.

On top of all of this, there is a "hatchet office" that is the keystone of the system, the Management Information System, which has the task of establishing whether the resources used are justified by the delivered product and to suggest drastic remedial action.

In other words, this is the first time that the concept of gain, of yield, of profit, is being introduced into defense production, of making money, so to speak, with the only difference being that this time the one who profits is the nation.

We have attempted to describe what is happening in Great Britain and only in a very cursory way. Actually, there are many more enacted measures, but all of them are part of the same plan, that of achieving the modernization of the defense apparatus, to update it, to make it efficient and compatible with the national economy. France is successfully following the same course; West Germany, for some time now, has followed the same course with visible success. Canada, Sweden and The Netherlands are headed in the same direction and research is now in progress in Spain; great progress has been made in Japan, Korea and Brazil, actually, almost everywhere.

What about here at home? In Italy? Let's broach the subject while holding our breath, especially for the part of this article that, although cursory, is close to our hearts, and immediately we can candidly affirm, someone might say, coarsely, that, at first glance, little or nothing has been done.

It is true that a reorganization was attempted in 1975. Some top echelons were merged, a few central offices, but all the dependent branches were left virtually untouched. General Bartolucci, in his address to CASD, characterized it as a failure because "the cutting down did not occur in the measure that was needed."

Everything has more or less continued the same as always. The 1985 White Paper has paved the road of Defense with good intentions and excellent purposes, however, 8 months have passed since its publication and nothing has happened: the silence is deafening!

Army, Navy, Air Force, each continues fearlessly to go its own way. They are like polite tenants in a condominium who greet each other courteously when they meet on the stairs and hadmouth each other behind closed doors.

As a matter of fact, the Navy and the Air Force pretend not to know each other since the "Garibaldi" affair, which is still very much in evidence. What news have you, Mr Minister?

The much talked about Defense Chief of Staff, who is first among the Chiefs and higher than they, even in rank, is responsible for everything, together with the secretary general, still appears in the pages of the White Paper where he has been described so well. For the time being, he continues, as before, to act as a mediator between the three Chiefs, who are "implacable" friends.

In General Caligaris' report, which we mentioned earlier and from which we have obtained considerable data, there appears an interview with Defense Minister Spadolini. There are a lot of good intentions, many promises, but then, at a specific question (today our General Staffs are spread throughout Rome in various buildings. Could they not be brought together, or at least have them under the same roof?) he answered literally, "The idea of an Italian Pentagon goes back more than 20 years ... I ask does it make any sense to spend 100 billion lire for a Pentagon when only 50 of the 500 barracks in existence were built after the war and many others actually date back to the 'Risorgimento'?"

Ah! Mr Minister! What an answer ... to begin with, it is not a "housing" problem, but a "functional matter of the defense brain," which is a totally different problem ... then, we, and perhaps you (Do you remember that beautiful film "Drums of Glory" with Alec Guinness?) know of British barracks that are much older than ours, but they are well maintained and constantly updated; it is a matter of pride with them despite the fact that their climate is quite different from ours!

The many old barracks in existence have not, however, prevented the British from bringing together in one place their General Staffs, just as old buildings, which certainly exist there, have not prevented the United States, Germany, Greece, Sweden and many other countries from doing likewise.

To build new, very modern barracks similar to hotels is certainly nice, but it also has a touch of demagoguery. To build a Pentagon is only functional: the former is a current expenditure, the latter a necessary investment.

To have a unified General Staff, whose members talk the same language, who know each other, visit and confide in each other and thus overcome old mistrusts and foolish platitudes: this would be a proper objective and would certainly pay off.

Just imagine a meeting of officers of the three General Staffs set in Rome on a weekday morning at the Defense General Staff on Via XX Settembre. The Navy officers,

who would wear their uniforms for the occasion because they traditionally wear civilian clothes on duty, would leave from Lungotevere, those of the Air Force from the Viale dell'Università'. For a one-hour meeting they have to waste all morning, so, before calling it, they have to think it over and, more often than not, nothing happens.

So much for considerations and reflections, let's now go on to more serious things, to the future, to what is possible, to how it is necessary to react and in what directions to go after the alarm was sounded by General Bartolucci and problems that appear on all sides.

It is immediately evident that if a radical reorganization is to be initiated, the time is particularly propitious:

We have ahead of us well-founded hopes for political stability until the 1988 political elections.

There is an attentive, willing, sensible parliament, and the referendum-like election of Cossiga is a sign.

The international situation, while Reagan and Gorbachev are in power, excluding the always possible and deadly "pin-pricks," is good as a whole.

Even the president has changed, that is, the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. President Pertini has left the presidency and the highest military responsibility and also a great vacuum. We bid him farewell with the greatest respect, proud to have had him, with his adamant strength of character and his courage, as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.

But, for loyalty's sake, it is not easy to forget that he, in good faith certainly, because of his mental and spiritual make-up as an "old socialist," of being politically persecuted by a state that exalted the Armed Forces in an inordinate way, of being partisan, a very noble attribute that means "a man of the party," has never held the Armed Forces in great esteem, at least not the same esteem in which he held other sectors and organizations of the nation.

It is not easy for us to forget that his [Pertini's] otherwise great and most appropriate statement, "Let the arsenals be emptied and the granaries be filled," which was directed at the entire world, was not made at the UN, nor at the Kremlin, nor at the White House, but on national television in an end-of-the-year address. Many interpreted it as an invitation to unilateral disarmament. Were they to blame?

We cannot easily forget either his message made on the spur of the moment, to be sure, following the 1980 earthquake in Irpinia and the little attention paid on that tragic occasion to the Armed Forces who were the most generous stars in almost all of the aid given under conditions that were extremely difficult, nor other instances nor the little attention given the Defense Council, which met only rarely under his chairmanship.

It is evident, we think, that we do not belong to the group of President Pertini's "widows," but we bid him farewell loyally and we thank him for what he did for Italy and for the great prestige he won for us all and we wish him long life and good luck.

On his successor falls the heavy burden, among many, for the supreme military responsibility of the nation, according to the dictates of the constitution. Because of all of the above-mentioned facts, therefore, the time appears to be most propitious for attempting a military reorganization, which having failed in 1975 and having been appropriated by the White Paper in 1985, which General Bartolucci, a few months before leaving office, indicates being an absolute necessity.

What is the reorganization's agenda? The Chief of Staff has indicated part of it precisely to be: reduce, proportion, cut, eliminate and update.

Let us attempt to present some of the criteria that we consider fundamental for this purpose:

1. A single head. Achieve at least a Defense General Staff that has the maximum managerial and strategic powers and the maximum responsibility.

Service General Staffs delegated to training, inspection and operation of the Services in accordance with the directives of the Defense General Staff.

2. Reduction in numbers to the benefit of quality. A determined reorganization in numbers to improve the quality of the forces. Achieving the European levels in the proportion between draftees and volunteers. We have, roughly, a proportion of 5 percent volunteers to 95 percent draftees; France and Germany have 30 to 70 percent, more or less.

Less units, therefore, accepting the resulting risks, but units on which we could truly depend.

We merely remember only one thing from the great experience in Lebanon: the joy, the relief, everyone's pride, really everyone's because "it went well," we had not made a bad impression, we were like the others, and so on.

That will no longer do. Let us remember, it is true, that in Lebanon everything went well: the logistics, the services, the morale, the medical service, precisely everything ... however, we did not do one thing, and, therefore, it could not be verified: we did not engage in combat.

3. Territorial reorganization. The minister mentioned 500 barracks, do we actually need all of them?

We have 20 operational or territorial commands with three-star generals, dozens of lesser territorial commands spread out everywhere, often merely because of tradition, "because there has always been one" ... here too drastic reductions!

Everywhere we have detachments, warehouses, depots, hospitals and infirmaries, a thousand kinds of schools, ammunition dumps ... everything. Here too, hard and pitiless reduction!

4. Training. Almost all of our cities or towns would like to have a nice barracks with a nice infantry battalion or better yet, Alpini or Bersaglieri, or a nice naval base or a nice military airfield. They would like to have them, but on one condition:

that they should never fire a shot, that the tanks never move, the aircraft never fly, especially if they are supersonic, the ships never sail near the shore, especially if there are bathing beaches.

Eliminate the military installations wherever regular and planned training is impossible to carry out.

5. Civilian personnel. We continue hiring, as if nothing had happened.

It is a way of combatting unemployment, especially in the South, at the expense of defense, naturally.

Arsenals and factories with thousands of workers. They have become mere centers for bidding and contracts for private industry and they produce nothing. The hallways of the ministries overflow with employees, almost always women, almost always hired as "laborers," later revealing themselves to be college or high school graduates and desirous of having desks and offices. That British Management Information System, delegated to control expenditures with ample powers, would have had quite a job to perform here.

We could go on and on! Enough! We say only: Do something before we deteriorate irreparably with the budget being unable to maintain today's Armed Forces in an acceptable manner.

Let's not let them deteriorate; let's not accept their existence merely for the commemorative messages, the parades, the disasters, the strikes, the guarding of electoral precincts, the warehousing of youths while they await their first job, the blood drives, the complaints of mothers, of the pacifists and of Falco Accame, but let's see to it that, yes, they are all of the above, if they really have to be, but also, and above all, let them be a valid instrument of war, of combat, for that defense of the nation that the constitution entrusted to the citizen as a "sacred duty."

9731

CSO: 3528/94

MILITARY

NETHERLANDS

NEED FOR INCREASE IN CONVENTIONAL ARMS QUESTIONED

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 9 Nov 85 p 8

[Commentary by G. van Benthem van den Bergh, chief associate at the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague: "Why Does the Defense Budget Have to Go Up? Need for Thought about the Concept of 'Conventional' Arms"]

[Text] Certainly the least discussed part of the 1 November decision is the annual three percent increase in the defense budget that the cabinet committed itself to with Nato. Is there a better reason for that decision than merely to prove ourselves a faithful ally? It is of course possible that the increase will benefit Netherlands business, but it has not been--and cannot be--justified on those grounds.

The three percent goal dates way back to 1977 and is a product of the effort to strengthen Europe's conventional defense. And that effort in turn plays a very important role in the discussion of the so-called burden sharing between the United States and Europe.

Nato has a long tradition of agreeing to ambitious goals and then not meeting them. Way back in 1952, for instance, in Lisbon the Nato Council set a goal of increasing Nato's military forces from 25 to 96 divisions within 2 years. They thought they needed to do that in order to stand up to the Soviet Union's superior conventional forces, which at that time were estimated at 140 to 175 divisions, besides reserves which would double that figure again.

Since that time the Soviet Union's conventional superiority has remained a constant theme in Nato, although at various times it has received more or less emphasis depending on current thinking about nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy.

In the 1950's as the fear of war in Europe subsided, military strategy came to emphasize nuclear deterrence. The United States adopted the so-called "New Look Strategy," preferring (cheaper) nuclear weapons to conventional military power.

It is often claimed that at that time we came to rely on "massive retaliation," as it is called, on the threat to use large numbers of nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union if it attempted any expansionist move whatsoever. In fact, Dulles' promise, from which that slogan was borrowed, was intended to warn the Soviet Union that in the future the United States would be able to reply with atomic weapons to a challenge such as that in Korea.

This was more a matter of calling the Soviet Union's attention to a risk than a general strategy.

The Kennedy administration did, it is true, bring about an enormous increase in the number of strategic nuclear weapons, but at the same time it accepted a new strategic conception that came to be called "flexible response" when it was agreed on by Nato in 1967. In fact it was anything but clear what this response--which would not necessarily lead to nuclear war--could consist of. But the strategy did imply a different structure of military forces.

The continual American pleas to strengthen conventional forces did not lead to much in practice, however, because the European allies continued to feel that the chances of war were slight and (with the exception of De Gaulle's France) felt themselves adequately protected by the combination of American strategic nuclear weapons and American troops stationed in Europe and armed with tactical nuclear weapons.

Emerging Technologies

Besides the traditional argument that conventional forces should be strengthened because of the presumed Soviet superiority (now we are also to make use of the so-called "emerging technologies" (ET) to do this), we now hear yet another argument, which also played a role in the cabinet decision: reducing the role of nuclear weapons.

It is not terribly clear however how this conclusion follows from that goal. For many it is simply a corollary of the idea that "nuclear weapons are bad," that the fewer of them you have and the less you depend on them, the better it is. Many people find that reason enough to demand a reduction in the Netherlands' nuclear tasks. They assume a sort of trade off: if you reduce or drop the one (nuclear tasks), then you have to strengthen the other (conventional defense). That explains the cabinet decision.

How convincing are the arguments for increasing conventional defense? The first argument is based on the possibility that the Soviet Union might carry out a conventional attack, which could not be deterred by nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union, it is said, has a strategy of the lightning offense.

The Soviet Union, it is further claimed, possesses non-nuclear missiles capable of putting both nuclear weapons and important military objectives in Western Europe out of action so quickly that defense would be impossible. This presupposes nearly perfect war planning and execution on the part of our opponent, while our own military capabilities are greatly underestimated. The only response, it is said, is to entertain an offensive strategy ourselves, making use of emerging military technologies.

This has gradually become the "accepted wisdom." In fact, however, the Soviet Union is in no position to attain a quick victory because of what Clausewitz called "friction," but also because it would not be able to put all nuclear weapons out of action (and in any case could never be certain of doing so).

Nato takes seriously the opponent's contingency planning, which--like most military planning--is based on the need to prevent an initial defeat such as was suffered in the previous war. We would complain very strongly if the Soviet Union took our contingency planning and war scenarios as seriously as we do its strategy of the offensive (which is not the same as offensive strategy, a term which really suggests readiness to attack). The Soviet Union does take them seriously though. However, it is no more than we should expect of the military if they imagine all possible combat possibilities and plan for them to some degree. We cannot attach any political significance to military contingency planning if there is no political reason to do so.

Misunderstanding

The supposition that the Soviet Union could launch a conventional lightning offensive rests moreover on a misunderstanding, or more accurately, on an incorrect interpretation of deterrence.

People assume there is a distinction (or threshold) between the various levels of force. Thus, they say, a nuclear deterrent does indeed deter nuclear war, but a conventional deterrent is necessary to deter conventional war.

Way back at the start of the 1970's Bernard Brodie wrote a devastating criticism of this line of reasoning. In fact the distinction between nuclear and conventional deterrence is of no significance whatsoever any more in Europe. You might say that all weapons have been nuclearized in Europe. After all, any military confrontation in Europe, intentional or unintentional, could escalate into a nuclear war. And a nuclear war very likely could not be restricted to Europe. The important point is "could," the fact that neither of the two superpowers could ever be certain that things would not escalate.

In Europe the boundaries between the two security blocs are entirely fixed and recognized by both sides as inviolable.

Because of its geo-strategic position, the Soviet Union will always have a conventional superiority over Western Europe. However, that superiority has no military-strategic significance as long as the Atlantic alliance exists and is sufficiently united politically and militarily to ensure there is a risk of escalation. We are talking here about the "utility in non-use" of nuclear weapons. The purpose of nuclear weapons is to be there. They are there to exclude any idea that there might be some profit in a military adventure and to keep political crises within limits. Nowadays East-West conflicts in Europe are about arms control rather than Berlin. That is an enormously important difference.

Do we not need any conventional defense at all then? Of course we do, although we need less rather than more. We could answer the question of how much conventional defense is just enough as follows: armed forces and weapons must be such and of such numbers that it is impossible to imagine any scenario where the Soviet Union could conquer Western Europe in whole or in part completely without risk.

"Completely without risk" is a demanding criterion, which means that at present the risk of escalation is overinsured rather than underinsured--and for the sake of stability this must remain so. It is in any case unnecessary to strengthen our conventional defense in line with the offensive strategy which General Rogers--and many with him--wishes. Rather, the Soviet Union must be convinced that a strategy of the offensive is contrary to its own interests. Imitating the opponent can only lead to greater tensions and to a conventional arms race in Europe.

Complicates

Naturally it complicates things that the most important pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, the United States, wants to adhere to the goal of three percent growth, both for reasons of burden sharing and for reasons of strengthening conventional defense. Since 1977 defense budgets have been increased to be sure, although the three percent has certainly not been achieved everywhere. From a political point of view it may be that a concession to the United States is necessary. Nonetheless, the discussion within Nato ought to deal with substantive questions rather than with quantitative criteria.

The present military-strategic equilibrium rests on the deterrent effect of the shared danger of nuclear war and compels the opponents to certain forms of limited cooperation. The more stable the equilibrium, the greater the chances of making that limited cooperation permanent. Today things could move in the wrong direction: if Europe's role is strengthened at the same time as conventional defenses are strengthened and the role of nuclear weapons is reduced, this could lead to a reduction in the risk of escalation and thus to an increase in the chances of war.

Given the totally disproportionate relationship between the possible gains and risks of a military confrontation in Europe, it will certainly not come to that for the time being. Nonetheless, why should we for dubious reasons set out on a more dangerous course if we do not need to? In any case it would be highly desirable to think a bit about the question of what exactly the concept "conventional" means in the age of nuclear weapons.

ECONOMIC

DENMARK

GOVERNMENT PROPOSES ADJUSTMENTS TO DECREASE DEFICIT

Schluter Defends Government Intervention

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 5 Dec 85 p 16

[Article by Helle Ravn Larsen: "The Action is Humane"]

[Text] Unemployment will continue to decline. This applies also to the deficit in the balance of payments and the national budget, and the government is holding steady to its economic goals, which it believes it can achieve with the adjustment now on the table.

"The thought behind the adjustment of the economy is to stop in as gentle a way as possible increased consumption. The action will mean a sensationally low deficit in the national budget in 1986. It will go well on the right path. Real wages will rise, and the government is holding steady to its goal of equilibrium in the balance of payments in 1988 and for the elimination of the budget deficit by 1990."

This is what Prime Minister Poul Schluter (conservative) said yesterday as he, together with Finance Minister Palle Simonsen (conservative) and Economics Minister Anders Andersen (liberal) presented the government's proposal for adjustments in the economic policy.

"The limitation of demand by eight billion kroner will enable us to bring down the deficit in the balance of payments according to schedule. We are on the right path, but the problem is that economic progress and the overheated construction sector have placed extraordinary pressure on the balance of payments," the prime minister said. He continues to believe that unemployment will decline -- even if not at the same rate as now -- and that price increases will be considerably smaller.

Finance Minister Simonsen said that the deficit in the national budget next year is expected to be 14.5 billion kroner. This is a drop of 12 billion in comparison with the deficit predicted when the finance law was introduced.

Economics Minister Andersen admitted that it would be difficult to hold the deficit in the balance of payments to 20 billion kroner this year. It will be

closer to 22 billion kroner, to a great extent because the drop in the exchange rate for the dollar came too late, and initiatives and investments have been larger than expected. Nevertheless, he calculates that the deficit in 1986 will have dropped to 16 billion kroner.

"We are counting on a drop in unemployment next year of 20,000. This means we will drop to an average of 230,000 unemployed at the same time that industrial exports will rise by 5 and 3/4 percent," Andersen said.

The prime minister said that he hoped that this adjustment will be effective, but "We don't know what surprises we will meet." Schluter did not want to promise that the increased energy charges would be lifted if the dollar exchange rate rose again.

Concerning the increased gross loans from credit institutions, which in the first three quarters of this year rose by a good 50 percent over loans in the same period in 1984, the economics minister said, "The financial institutions have been very active in consumer loans, and there has been a colossal growth in the issuance of real credit obligations. Therefore loans must be limited so that we can reach a more normal level, and I understand that the financial institutions are ready to follow the suggestion of limiting loans."

Economists Criticize Income Policy

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 6 Dec 85 Sec III, p 4

[Article by Hugo Garden: "Measure Will not Reduce Consumption"]

[Text] It is income policy that is to be saved, not the balance of payments, economists say. There is not much confidence that there will be much limitation of consumption.

Several economists believe that it is the overheating in the construction industry that is responsible for the government's Christmas action. Neither consumption nor the deficit in the balance of payments is of great importance.

The main purpose of the measure is to limit a too rapid rise in wages in construction. The effect on wage drift might bring wage policy into danger, the economists think.

The government stresses that the measure is both to limit consumption and to improve the balance of payments at the same time that competitive ability is rising.

"But the purpose of this measure can only be to hold the wage drift down," Professor Gunnar Thorlund Jepsen of Aarhus University said.

"There is no doubt that building in the public sector will be greatly curtailed, and this will obviously reduce the pressure on wages. In this way the

danger of bottleneck problems is reduced.

"Private consumption will not be limited. A suggestion for the limitation of consumer loans will accomplish nothing, and the limitation of credit unions will not have much significance either, since the tax deduction will balance the increased expenditure that will come with the reduction of the loan limit in change of ownership from 20 to 15 years," Jepsen said.

"The government should state clearly that it is afraid of wage drift. If the wage structure is broken, it will have a negative effect on the balance of payments. The important thing therefore is that income policy is adhered to. In general, therefore, a measure against overheating is reasonable. The other actions concerning loans are nothing more than cosmetic and must be an indication that the politicians and their supporters believe that consumption will be limited, even if everyone knows that this is not the case," Jepsen said.

A Mild Improvement, the Wise Men Say

The economic sages are calculating the consequences of the measure. Arne Mikkelsen, head of the Economic Advisory Committee, says that the measure will lead to a mild improvement in the balance of payments compared to the opinion of the wise men, and that the deficit in the national budget will be a little less than the wise men have calculated. But he thinks that the government's opinion that demand will be limited by eight billion kroner is a little too high.

The effect of the measure on the municipalities is absolutely the largest and most noticeable effect. It is here, too, that the negative effect on employment is greatest. But the measure's effect on construction will only be a minor part of the total reduction of eight billion kroner.

The three main parts of the measure are: energy taxes of 2.9 billion kroner, reduction of municipal working expenses by three billion kroner, and a reduction of public construction by a good two billion kroner.

In construction, one billion is expected to come from the new special tax on existing and new building. The other billion will be in the form of postponement of construction by the government and by the so-called concessionary companies.

The special tax has been very controversial. Economists are divided on the effect it will have on municipal building. Jepsen says, "Reasonable communities will put off as much building as possible until 1987, and therefore the effect will be much larger than the one billion being talked about as reduction in demand." Mikkelsen says, "It is almost impossible to say what the municipalities will do."

Control of Government Finances

The chief economist of the Handelsbank, Per Bendix, agrees with Jepsen that the measure is aimed primarily at income policy and that there will not be a great effect on the balance of payments and consumption.

He is definitely skeptical about the government's opinion that the deficit in the balance of payments can be held to 16 billion kroner next year. He thinks it will be closer to 17 or 18 billion kroner.

On the other hand, the government has control of the budget deficit, Bendix thinks. He says that the deficit will be 14 to 15 billion kroner in accordance with the government's estimate.

9124

CSO: 3613/35

ENERGY

GREECE

PLANS REPORTEDLY DRAWN FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 4 Nov 85 p 4

[Article by Andonis Zisimatos]

[Text] The country's energy balance is being led to a complete impasse since we do not have even lignite in sufficient quantities (approximately one million tons versus 2.1 million last year) so imports can be made from other countries.

Specifically, DEI [Public Power Corporation] applied to Bulgaria and received a negative answer, but our neighboring and "friendly" country sold a significant amount of power to Turkey and, in fact, at good prices!

And, while our energy production cannot cover local demand, DEI gave a significant amount of power (more than 80 megawatts) to Albania...when in Greece we are in danger of remaining without power and are facing the possibility of big cut-offs.

According to reliable sources, the DEI administration refused to sign an agreement this summer with Austria for importing power, though it knew the shortage it would face this winter.

At the moment, power is being imported in small quantities only from the Soviet Union, at a price of about five drachmas a kilowatt, which are paid in dollars, however.

The forecasts for imports in 1985 were 1,750 kilowatt hours; up to now, only 600 kilowatt hours have been imported, which is creating big problems. But also the lakes at the power units are almost empty after the "predatory" dissipation of waters which has been noted particularly at the Pournarion hydroelectric plant in Arta which consumed, according to information, 450 million cubic meters of water, from an anticipated 158 million cubic meters.

The quantities of lignite in the station yards do not cover the needs of the two 300-megawatt units of Agios Dimitrios Ptolemais.

And, even though the energy balance is at an impasse, new developments are being scheduled.

The inclusion of nuclear plants in the DEI system is being explored in depth, and works will be continued at a very intense rate in the period of the present DEI program.

This was stressed by DEI employees who were representatives at the Twentieth UNIPED (International Union of Producers and Distributors of Electrical Energy) Congress.

The importing of nuclear power, they maintained, requires many years of preparation which is made even more difficult because of the seismotectonics of the Greek earth.

As the DEI program reports, in a long-term policy, and after exploitation of local sources is completed, the possibility of covering the needs in electricity from the two sources available at present for commercial use--mineral coal and nuclear power--is being examined.

Late at night, the DEI in its communication reported that the statements of its two employees do not in any way express it, and that no such press bulletin has been issued by the corporation's press office.

9247

CSO: 3521/37

END

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

29 January 1986